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Market participants, policymakers, and academics often point to the role of contagion in 
recent financial crises—witness terminology such as the “Asian flu.” Typically, however, 
most references to contagion are  made rather loosely, often failing to distinguish between 
normal asset-market linkages and the extreme co-movements that may exist only during 
periods of stress. In the empirical literature, existing research  focuses primarily on the 
presence of contagion, while  measuring the extent of contagion has received little 
attention. Furthermore, most studies focus on a single asset class across countries—often 
via some form of correlation analysis—despite  our expectation that different asset 
markets, domestic or otherwise, are linked by a pool of global investors. 
  The policy interest in this area is clear as contagion can play a key role in spreading 
globally what would otherwise be idiosyncratic episodes of financial stress, potentially 
leading to systemic financial crises. This is particularly the case as financial markets across 
the globe are increasingly becoming more integrated, as they have become rapidly more 
intermingled in complex ways. Indeed, potentially systemic financial crises can be so 
costly that policy makers often intervene by bailing-out key financial institutions or 
relaxing monetary policy when there is a fear that contagion may spread financial crises.  
  This thesis will examine the role of contagion in transmitting shocks across 
markets. The thesis begins by reviewing the empirical literature on contagion. Contagion is 
then examined in individual asset classes, such as bonds and equities, and jointly. In 
particular,  recent crises events thought to have been highly contagious are examined, and a 
methodology to address the current gaps in the literature is proposed. The thesis analyzes a 
number of financial crises during the past decade, encompassing daily financial data for a 
representative set of developing countries and mature economies. In contrast to a large part 
                                                 
1 The views presented in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF 








of the earlier empirical literature on contagion that has traditionally seen developing 
countries as the key, and often the only, source of contagion, here emerging markets and 
mature economies are modeled jointly. In an increasingly integrated global financial 
system, and against the torrid pace of innovation in financial markets as well as the rapid 
introduction of financial sector reforms in most developing countries, examining separately 
financial markets in emerging and mature economies no longer makes sense. One possible 
conduit for contagion that will be also examined is shifts in international investors’ risk 
appetite. 
  There has been a number of episodes of financial crises during the past decade. 
However, the period between the start of the Argentinean crisis in 2001 and the U.S. 
subprime and liquidity crisis in mid-2007 was characterized by fairly infrequent episodes 
of financial stress which were largely contained within national boundaries. Some bouts of 
instability were evident during the spring and summer of 2006, when Iceland and Turkey 
faced financial stress, and in late-February 2007 when China’s Shanghai stock exchange 
experienced a significant correction. However, these recent episodes are generally viewed 
as seemingly idiosyncratic and relatively innocuous from the perspective of contagion in 
global financial markets. The vast academic literature that was sparked by the key episodes 
of financial crises in Latin America in 1994-1995, the Asian crisis in 1996, and the Russian 
crisis in 1998, had been fairly subdued in recent years as no major regional or global crisis 
has been evident in recent years. That is, until mid-2007 when a financial crises of global 
proportions re-appeared, for the first time since late-1998. This latest financial crisis was 
sparked by the decline in the U.S. housing market, which led to a certain segment of the 
U.S. mortgage market deemed to be particularly risky because of the characteristics of the 
borrowers (e.g., self-employed, with limited income verification, etc.), the “subprime” 
mortgages, defaulting in large numbers. What started as a seemingly idiosyncratic and 
market-specific crisis driven by problems in the subprime mortgage market in the United 
States during the spring and early summer of 2007, quickly led to defaults of financial 
institutions in other countries such as Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom. A 
number of systemically important financial institutions became unsound and had to be 





United States. The stress in financial markets was also felt in various measures of volatility 
and illiquidity in a number of global financial markets. At the time of writing this thesis, 
this crisis was far from over. 
  These recent events bring a renewed urgency for the need to understand the 
financial crises of the past, so that we can anticipate the crises of the future and perhaps be 
able to act pre-emptively to avoid the recurrence of systemic shocks sparked by contagion. 
In the past, these type of events have often been associated with bail-out policies or 
liquidity injections which have introduced moral hazard in the system (e.g., “too-large to 
fail”, excess monetary liquidity, etc.). Possibly, these reactive policies have themselves 
introduced the seeds for future crises. It is in this setting that the research agenda in this 
thesis is carried out.  
  There is a common presumption that financial crises are not alike as the triggers of 
crises differ, and the economic and institutional environments in which crises take place 
vary amongst countries. Recent triggers for crises include sovereign debt default (the 
Russian crisis in August 1998), risk management strategies (the near collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management, LTCM, in September 1998), sudden stops in capital flows 
(Brazil in early 1999), collapses of speculative bubbles (the dot-com crisis in 2000), 
inconsistencies between fundamentals and policy settings (as in Argentina in 2001) and a 
liquidity squeeze (associated with the pressure in the U.S. subprime mortgage market from 
mid-2007). These examples include countries with highly developed financial markets as 
well as a number of emerging markets. 
  This lack of commonality amongst crisis affected countries is reflected in the 
development of theoretical models of financial turmoil, where there now exist three broad 
classes of models. The first generation models emphasize the role of macroeconomic 
variables in causing currency crises when countries adopted fixed exchange rates (Flood 
and Marion (1999)); the second generation models focus on the role of speculative attacks; 
while the third generation of models focus on institutional imbalances and information 
asymmetries (Allen and Gale (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003); Kodres and Pritsker 
(2002), Yuan (2005), and Pavlova and Rigobon (2007)). 
  The identification of shocks triggering a crisis is just one dimension to 








identify the transmission mechanisms that propagate shocks from the source country across 
national borders and across various financial markets. These links are emphasized in third 
generation crisis models, where channels over and above the market fundamental 
mechanisms that link countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods appear during a 
crisis. These additional linkages are broadly known as contagion (see Dornbusch, Park and 
Claessens (2000); Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), and Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and 
Martin (2005b), for surveys of this literature). 
  It is not entirely straightforward to combine existing theoretical models into a 
general empirical framework in which to model and test the relative strengths of alternative 
transmission mechanisms operating during financial crises. Some previous attempts are by 
van Rijikghem and Weder (2001) who focus on banking channels; Glick and Rose (1999) 
who look at regional linkages; and Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006) who emphasize 
liquidity effects. Perhaps the most extensive recent work is by Kaminsky (2006) who 
considers a broad range of variables, classified according to alternative theoretical crisis 
models. 
  The strategy to be followed in this thesis is to adopt a broader approach and focus 
on the factor structures of the transmission mechanisms linking international asset markets. 
In a series of papers, the thesis develops an empirical methodology to examine financial 
market spillovers and quantifying the contribution of  contagion during various critical 
episodes. As well, the role of international investors’ risk appetite as a propagating 
mechanism for contagion is examined explicitly.  Some of the key questions to be 
addressed include the following: What are the channels through which recent crises 
episodes have (or not) been transmitted across markets and across borders? Why have 
some episodes been systemic and contagious, while others have not? 
  The thesis is organized in five separate chapters that analyze different aspects of 





constitute work recently published in refereed journals or academic books.
2  This research 
agenda is also reviewed in González-Hermosillo (2007a). 
 
2 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
  Chapter 2 begins by providing a critical review of the various approaches in the 
current empirical literature on contagion, aiming to reconcile seemingly unrelated 
approaches which have been hereto proposed to examine financial contagion (Dungey, Fry, 
González-Hermosillo and Martin (2005b)). Chapter 3 proposes a methodology based on 
latent factor models to analyze contagion and applies it to international bond markets 
across emerging markets and mature economies (Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and 
Martin (2005a), (2006)). It finds that contagion in global bond markets was evident during 
the fall of 1998, when the Russian crisis and the hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) nearly collapsed.  
  In Chapter 4, a similar exercise is undertaken for international equity markets. The    
key result of this chapter is that contagion is also significant and widespread to a variety of 
international equity markets during the LTCM crisis, with the effects of contagion being 
strongest on the industrial markets and the geographically close Latin American markets. 
The contagion transmission mechanisms emanating from the Russian equity market tended 
to be more selective during the Russian crisis, but nonetheless still impacted upon both 
emerging and industrial equity markets. Moreover, rather than the Russian crisis being seen 
as an emerging market phenomenon, as suggested by the Committee on the Global 
Financial System (1999, pp.7-8), contagion from Russia was found to be more statistically 
significant in industrial countries than in emerging markets. 
   The results from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that it would be informative to construct 
a more general model of asset markets, combining both bonds and equities to test the 
importance of contagious transmission mechanisms between markets and across 
                                                 
2 Versions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have been recently published in refereed Economics journals or books; see 
Dungey, M., R. Fry, B. González-Hermosillo and V.L. Martin (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007a). Chapters 2, 3, 4 
and 5 have been partly joint work with Mardi Dungey (Cambridge University), Renee Fry (Canberra 








international borders. Thus, Chapter 5 focuses  on  further refining the sources of contagion 
in a multi-country and multi-asset model and applying the model to recent crises.  In this 
chapter, the sample is extended to include the 2007 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. The 
approach is to examine daily data from early in 1998 through mid-2007 in bond and equity 
markets in a sample of emerging markets and mature economies jointly. A richer set of 
linkages allows identification of three channels of contagion, dubbed the market channel 
(where the shock originates throughout the world in a specific class of asset markets), the 
country channel (where the shock originates in a particular country which transmits it to the 
asset markets of other countries), and the idiosyncratic channel (where the shock originates 
in a specific asset market of a single country). Each of these channels played a significant 
role in recent crises during the period 1998-2007. Based on the estimated amount of 
contagion to international bond and equity markets, the Russian/LTCM crisis in 1998 was 
the most systemic episode. Of the subsequent crises examined in this chapter, the role of 
contagion was smaller  in the Brazilian crisis in early 1999, the so-called dot-com crisis in 
2000, and the Argentinean crisis in 2001-04. The results suggest that the 2007 crisis was 
also characterized by rampant global contagion, and that the transmission of contagion 
generally runs from credit markets to equity markets. Both episodes of contagious effects 
(the fall of 1998 and the summer of 2007) occurred largely through bond markets and both 
of them involved stress in the financial markets of a mature economy. This observation 
raises the possibility that the risk appetite of international investors, who are key players in 
major global financial centers, may play a role in the transmission of shocks across markets 
and countries.  
  Indeed, there may be several mechanisms for contagion whereby channels are 
established only during periods of stress that are over and above the market fundamental 
mechanisms, or spillovers, that link countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods. 
One such mechanism may be the presence of common international investors who react to 
a given shock by rebalancing their portfolios globally in assets and markets that would be 
otherwise seemingly unrelated. As investors become less willing to assume risk, they 
require a higher compensation for bearing such risk. This re-pricing of risk can effect the 





  Observers often refer to this mechanism as investors’ increased risk aversion or 
reduced risk appetite. However, these two concepts are conceptually different.  Risk 
aversion measures the subjective attitude of investors with regard to uncertainty. Since the 
degree of investors’ risk aversion reflects entrenched preferences, it is usually assumed to 
be constant in asset pricing models. In contrast, the notion of investors’ risk appetite is 
broader as it encompasses the notion of risk aversion, but it is also influenced by the 
amount of uncertainty about the fundamental factors that drive asset prices. Thus, the risk 
premia embedded in asset prices are influenced by both risk aversion and the riskiness of 
the asset in question. One potential venue for shifts in investors’ risk appetite is changes in 
global financial market conditions, a venue which is investigated empirically in this 
chapter. Gauging the degree of investors’ risk appetite is relevant from a global financial 
stability perspective as past episodes of brisk changes in risk premia, variations in market 
liquidity, and sharp movements in asset prices have been often associated with changes in 
investors’ risk appetite. 
  Chapter 6, therefore, quantifies the relative importance of the potential determinants 
of spreads for emerging markets’ sovereign bonds and mature markets’ corporate bonds 
from 1998 through 2007, encompassing several episodes of financial market distress. A 
structural vector autoregression model is developed to analyze the dynamics of bond 
spreads among a sample of mature and developing countries during periods of financial 
stress in the last decade. The model identifies and quantifies the contribution on bond 
spreads from global market conditions (including funding liquidity, market liquidity, as 
well as credit and volatility risks), contagion effects, and idiosyncratic factors. While 
idiosyncratic factors explain a large amount of the changes in bond spreads over the 
sample, global market risk factors are fundamental driving forces during periods of stress. 
It is found that the relative importance of the different risk factors changes substantially 
depending on the crisis episode. One key result is that contagion from emerging markets 
becomes small or non-existent when global financial market risks are explicitly taken into 
account.  
  Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes by drawing some inferences from the research of this 
thesis and suggesting areas of future research. The main results are as follows. First, there 








1998 and more recently in mid-2007 as a result of the U.S. subprime mortgage and 
liquidity squeeze. Second, international investors’ risk appetite (conditioned by global 
financial market conditions) appear to be a significant factor in all the crisis episodes of the 
past decade. Third, once investors’ risk appetite are explicitly considered, contagion from 
emerging markets is very small or essentially not existent. This result is at odds with some 
of the results in the empirical literature of contagion. The literature on contagion examines 
the connections that exist over and above the market fundamental mechanisms that link 
countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods, which only appear during a crisis. 
However, the empirical literature on contagion does not identify exactly how these 
additional channels are formed during periods of stress. One potential channel of contagion 
is that shocks in any given market may impact international investors’ risk appetite through 
their rebalancing of portfolios or simply by a revised set of expectations. The results in 
Chapter 6 suggest that contagion essentially dissappears when identifying the actual 
channels of spillovers. Fourth, although emerging markets have been historically more 
volatile than mature economies, global financial market risk factors are important for all 
countries. Finally, this type of analysis should be helpful in elaborating a framework to 
assess global financial stability, an area for future research, as investors’ risk appetite may 
play an important role in increasingly integrated global financial markets.  
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Chapter 2: Review of the Empirical Literature 1
1 Introduction
There is now a reasonably large body of empirical work testing for the existence of
contagion during ￿nancial crises. A range of di⁄erent methodologies are in use, mak-
ing it di¢ cult to assess the evidence for and against contagion, and particularly its
signi￿cance in transmitting crises between countries. The origins of current empirical
studies of contagion stem from Sharpe (1964) and Grubel and Fadner (1971), and more
recently from King and Wadhwani (1990), Engle, Ito and Lin (1990) and Bekaert and
Hodrick (1992).2
The aim of the present chapter is to provide a unifying framework to highlight
the key similarities and di⁄erences between the various approaches. For an overview
of the literature see Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Dornbusch, Park and Claessens
(2000). The proposed framework is based on a latent factor structure which forms the
basis of the models of Dungey and Martin (2001), Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2001,
2003) and Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005). This framework is used to compare directly
the correlation analysis approach popularised in this literature by Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), the VAR approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002), the probability model of
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) and the co-exceedance approach of Bae,
Karolyi and Stulz (2003).
An important outcome of this chapter is that di⁄erences in the de￿nitions used
to test for contagion are minor and under certain conditions are even equivalent. In
particular, all de￿nitions are interpreted as working from the same model, with the dif-
ferences stemming from the amount of information used in the data to detect contagion.
Interpreting the approaches in this way provides a natural ordering of models across
the information spectrum with some models representing full information methods and,
as discussed below, others representing partial information methods.
1This chapter is published in Dungey, M., R. Fry, B. GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and V. Martin (2005b),
"Empirical Modeling of Contagion: A Review of the Methodologies", Quantitative Finance, Vol. 5,
No. 1, February.
2As this paper focuses on empirical models of contagion it does not discuss the corresponding
theoretical literature and more generally the literature on ￿nancial crises. For examples of theoretical
models of contagion see Allen and Gale (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Kyle and Xiong (2001),
Chue (2002), Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002). The literature on ￿nancial
crises is overviewed in Flood and Marion (1998).Chapter 2 10
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2 a framework is developed to model the
interdependence between asset returns in a non-crisis environment. This framework is
augmented in Section 3 to give a model which includes an avenue for contagion during
a crisis. The relationship between this model and the bivariate correlation tests for
contagion of Forbes and Rigobon is discussed in Section 4. This section also includes
a number of extensions of the original Forbes and Rigobon approach, as well as its
relationship with the approaches of Favero and Giavazzi (2002), Eichengreen, Rose
and Wyplosz (1995,1996) and Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003). An empirical example
comparing the various contagion tests is contained in Section 5. The results show
that the Forbes and Rigobon adjusted correlation test is a conservative test, whereas
the contagion test of Favero and Giavazzi tends to reject the null of no contagion too
easily. The remaining tests investigated yield results falling within these two extremes.
Concluding comments are given in Section 6 together with a number of suggestions for
future research that encompass both theoretical and empirical issues.
2 A Model of Interdependence
Before developing a model of contagion, a model of interdependence of asset markets
during non-crisis periods is speci￿ed as a latent factor model of asset returns. The
model has its origins in the factor models in ￿nance based on Arbitrage Pricing The-
ory, where asset returns are determined by a set of common factors representing non-
diversi￿able risk and a set of idiosyncratic factors representing diversi￿able risk (Sharpe
(1964), Solnik (1974)). Similar latent factor models of contagion are used by Corsetti
et al.(2003,2001), Dungey and Martin (2001), Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and
Martin (2005a, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Bekaert, Harvey
and Ng (2005).
To simplify the analysis, the number of assets considered is three. Extending the
model to N assets or asset classes is straightforward. Let the returns of three assets
during a non-crisis period be de￿ned as
fx1;t;x2;t;x3;tg: (2.1)
All returns are assumed to have zero means. The returns could be on currencies, or
national equity markets, or a combination of currency and equity returns in a partic-Review of the Empirical Literature 11
ular country or across countries.3 The following trivariate factor model is assumed to
summarize the dynamics of the three processes during a period of tranquility
xi;t = ￿iwt + ￿iui;t; i = 1;2;3: (2.2)
The variable wt represents common shocks that impact upon all asset returns with
loadings ￿i: These shocks could represent ￿nancial shocks arising from changes to the
risk aversion of international investors, or changes in world endowments (c.f. Mahieu
and Schotman (1994), Rigobon (2003b), Cizeau, Potters, Bouchard (2001)). In general,
wt represents market fundamentals which determine the average level of asset returns
across international markets during ￿normal￿ , that is, tranquil, times. This variable
is commonly referred to as a world factor, which may or may not be observed.4 For
expositional purposes, the world factor is assumed to be a latent stochastic process
with zero mean and unit variance
wt ￿ (0;1): (2.3)
The properties of this factor are extended below to capture richer dynamics including
both autocorrelation and time-varying volatility. The terms ui;t in equation (2.2) are
idiosyncratic factors that are unique to a speci￿c asset market. The contribution of
idiosyncratic shocks to the volatility of asset returns is determined by the loadings
￿i > 0: These factors are also assumed to be stochastic processes with zero mean and
unit variance
ui;t ￿ (0;1): (2.4)
To complete the speci￿cation of the model, all factors are assumed to be independent
E [ui;tuj;t] = 0; 8i 6= j (2.5)
E [ui;twt] = 0; 8i: (2.6)
To highlight the interrelationships amongst the three asset returns in (2.2) during
a non-crisis period, the covariances are given by
E [xi;txj;t] = ￿i￿j; 8i 6= j; (2.7)
3See, for example, Hartmann, Stratemans and de Vries (2004), Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) and
Granger, Huang and Yang (2000), who model the interactions between asset classes.
4The model outlined here can be extended to allow for a richer set of factors, including observed
fundamentals (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996)), trade linkages (Glick and Rose (1999)
and Pesaran and Pick (2003)), ￿nancial ￿ ows (Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)), geographical
distance (Bayoumi, Fazio, Kumar and MacDonald (2003)) and Fama-French factors (Flood and Rose
(2005)).Chapter 2 12












Expression (2.7) shows that any dependence between asset returns is solely the result
of the in￿ uence of common shocks arising from wt; that simultaneously impact upon
all markets. Setting
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿3 = 0; (2.9)
results in independent asset markets with all movements determined by the idiosyn-
cratic shocks, ui;t:5 The identifying assumption used by Mahieu and Schotman (1994)
in a similar problem is to set ￿i￿j to a constant value, L, for all i 6= j:
3 An Empirical Model of Contagion
In this chapter contagion is represented by the contemporaneous transmission of local
shocks to another country or market after conditioning on common factors that exist
over a non-crisis period, given by wt in equation (2.2). This de￿nition is consistent with
that of Masson (1999a,b,c), who decomposes shocks to asset markets into common,
spillovers that result from some identi￿able channel, and contagion. As shown below
this de￿nition is also consistent with that of other approaches, such as Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), where contagion is represented by an increase in correlation during
periods of crisis.
The ￿rst model discussed is based on the factor structure developed by Dungey, Fry,
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a, 2006, 2007a). Consider the case of contagion
from country 1 to country 2. The factor model in (2.2) is now augmented as follows
y1;t = ￿1wt + ￿1u1;t
y2;t = ￿2wt + ￿2u2;t + ￿u1;t (2.10)
y3;t = ￿3wt + ￿3u3;t
where the xi;t in (2.2) are replaced by yi;t to denote demeaned asset returns during the
crisis period. The expression for y2;t now contains a contagious transmission channel as
represented by local shocks from the asset market in country 1, with its impact mea-
5Of course, just two of the restrictions in (2.9) are su¢ cient for independence of asset markets.Review of the Empirical Literature 13
sured by the parameter ￿. The fundamental aim of all empirical models of contagion
is to test the statistical signi￿cance of the parameter ￿:6
3.1 Bivariate Testing
Bivariate tests of contagion focus on changes in the volatility of pairs of asset returns.
From (2.10), the covariance between the asset returns of countries 1 and 2 during the
crisis is
E [y1;ty2;t] = ￿1￿2 + ￿￿1: (2.11)
Comparing this expression with the covariance for the non-crisis period in (2.7) shows
that the change in the covariance between the two periods is
E [y1;ty2;t] ￿ E [x1;tx2;t] = ￿￿1: (2.12)
If ￿ > 0; there is an increase in the covariance of asset returns during the crisis period as
￿1 > 0 by assumption. This is usually the situation observed in crisis data. However,
it is possible for ￿ < 0; in which case there is a reduction in the covariance. Both
situations are valid as both represent evidence of contagion via the impact of shocks
in (2.10). Hence a test of contagion is given by testing the restriction
￿ = 0; (2.13)
in the factor model in equation (2.10). This is the approach adopted Dungey, Fry,
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), which are also described
in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis, and in Dungey and Martin (2004).7
An alternative way to construct a test of contagion is to use the volatility expression













Comparing this expression with (2.8) shows that the change in volatility over the two















6An important assumption underlying (2.10) is that the common shock (wt) and idiosyncratic
shocks (ui;t) have the same impact during the crisis period as they have during the non-crisis period.
This assumption of no structural break is discussed in Section 3.3.
7Most concern seems to centre on the case where ￿ > 0, that is, where contagion is associated with
a rise in volatility. The existing tests can be characterized as testing the null hypothesis of ￿ = 0
against either a two-sided alternative or a one-sided alternative.Chapter 2 14
Thus, the contagion test based on (2.15) can be interpreted as a test of whether there
is an increase in volatility. Expression (2.14) suggests that a useful description of the
volatility of y2;t is to decompose the e⁄ects of shocks into common, idiosyncratic and






















2 + ￿2: (2.16)
This decomposition provides a descriptive measure of the relative strength of contagion
in contributing to the volatility of returns during a crisis period. As before, the strength
of contagion is determined by the parameter ￿; which can be tested formally.
3.2 Multivariate Testing
The test for contagion presented so far is a test for contagion from country 1 to country
2. However, it is possible to test for contagion in many directions provided that there
are su¢ cient moment conditions to identify the unknown parameters. For example,
(2.10) can be extended as
y1;t = ￿1wt + ￿1u1;t + ￿1;2u2;t + ￿1;3u3;t
y2;t = ￿2wt + ￿2u2;t + ￿2;1u1;t + ￿2;3u3;t (2.17)
y3;t = ￿3wt + ￿3u3;t + ￿3;1u1;t + ￿3;2u2;t;
or more succinctly
yi;t = ￿iwt + ￿iui;t +
3 X
j=1;j6=i
￿i;juj;t; i = 1;2;3: (2.18)
The theoretical variances and covariances are an extension of the expressions given in
















whereas the covariance of asset returns between countries 1 and 2 is
E [y1;ty2;t] = ￿1￿2 + ￿1￿2;1 + ￿2￿1;2 + ￿1;3￿2;3 (2.20)
In this case there are 6 parameters, ￿i;j; controlling the strength of contagion across
all asset markets. This model, by itself, is unidenti￿ed as there are 12 unknown pa-
rameters. However, by combining the empirical moments of the variance-covarianceReview of the Empirical Literature 15
matrix during the crisis period, 6 moments, with the empirical moments from the
variance-covariance matrix of the non-crisis period, another 6 moments, gives 12 em-
pirical moments in total which can be used to estimate the 12 unknown parameters by
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).
A joint test of contagion using the factor models in (2.2) and (2.17), can be achieved
by comparing the objective function from the unconstrained model, qu; with the value
obtained from estimating the constrained model, qc; where the contagion parameters
are set to zero. As the unconstrained model is just identi￿ed in this case, qu = 0, the
test is simply a test that under the null hypothesis of no contagion
H0 : qc = 0; (2.21)
which is distributed asymptotically as ￿2 with 6 degrees of freedom under the null. As
before, the test of contagion can be interpreted as testing for changes in both variances
and covariances.
3.3 Structural Breaks
The model given by equations (2.2) and (2.18) is based on the assumption that the
increase in volatility during the crisis period is solely generated by contagion, that is,
￿i;j 6= 0;8i;j. However, another scenario is that there is a general increase in volatility
without any contagion; denoted as increased interdependence by Forbes and Rigobon
(2002). This would arise if either the world loadings (￿i) change, or idiosyncratic
loadings (￿i) change, or a combination of the two. The former would be representative
of a general increase in volatility across all asset markets brought about, for example, by
an increase in the risk aversion of international investors. The latter would arise from
increases in the shocks of (some) individual asset markets which are entirely speci￿c
to those markets and thus independent of other asset markets.
To allow for structural breaks in the underlying relationships, the number of conta-
gious linkages that can be entertained needs to be restricted. In the case where changes
in the idiosyncratic shocks are allowed across the sample periods in all N = 3 asset
markets, equation (2.18) becomes
yi;t = ￿iwt + ￿y;iui;t +
3 X
j=1;j6=i
￿i;juj;t; (2.22)Chapter 2 16
where ￿y;i 6= ￿i; are the idiosyncratic parameters during the crisis period. Bekaert,
Harvey and Ng (2005) adopt a di⁄erent strategy for modeling structural breaks by
specifying time varying factor loadings.
The number of world and idiosyncratic parameters now increases to 3N: Because
the model is still block-recursive, there are just N (N + 1)=2 empirical moments from





break parameters (￿y;i): This means that there are N (N + 1)=2￿N = N (N ￿ 1)=2;
excess moments to identify contagion channels.
Extending the model to allow for structural breaks in both common and idiosyn-
cratic factors in all N asset markets, increases the number of world and idiosyncratic
parameters to 4N; now yielding N (N + 1)=2 ￿ 2N = N (N ￿ 3)=2; excess moments
to identify contagion channels in the crisis period. For a trivariate model (N = 3)
that allows for all potential structural breaks in common and idiosyncratic factors, no
contagion channels can be tested as the model is just identi￿ed. Extending the model
to N = 4 assets, allows for N (N ￿ 3)=2 = 2 potential contagion channels. Further
extending the model to N = 6 assets, means that the number of contagion channels
that can be tested increases to N (N ￿ 3)=2 = 9:
3.4 Using Just Crisis Data
Identi￿cation of the unknown parameters in the factor model framework discussed
above is based on using information from both non-crisis and crisis periods. For certain
asset markets it may be problematic to use non-crisis data to obtain empirical moments
to identify unknown parameters. An example being the move from ￿xed to ￿ oating
exchange rate regimes during the East Asian currency crisis. However, it is nonetheless
possible to identify the model using just crisis period data, provided that the number
of asset returns exceeds 3 and a limited number of contagious links are entertained.
For example, for N = 4 asset returns, there are 10 unique empirical moments from the
variance-covariance matrix using crisis data. Specifying the factor model in (2.2) for
N = 4 assets, means that there are 4 world parameters and 4 idiosyncratic parameters.
This implies that 2 contagious links can be speci￿ed and identi￿ed.Review of the Empirical Literature 17
3.5 Autoregressive and Heteroskedastic Dynamics
Given that an important feature of ￿nancial returns during crises is that they exhibit
high volatility, models which do not incorporate this feature are potentially misspec-
i￿ed. This suggests that the framework developed so far be extended to allow for a
range of dynamics.8 Four broad avenues are possible. The ￿rst consists of including
lagged values of the returns in the system. When the number of assets being studied
is large, this approach can give rise to a large number of unknown parameters, thereby
making estimation di¢ cult. The second approach is to capture the dynamics through
lags in the common factor, wt. This provides a more parsimonious representation of
the system￿ s dynamics as a result of a set of cross equation restrictions arising naturally
from the factor structure. A third approach is to specify autoregressive representations
for the idiosyncratic factors, ui;t. The speci￿cation of dynamics on all of the factors
yields a state-space representation which can be estimated using a Kalman ￿lter, see
for example Mody and Taylor (2003).
A fourth approach for specifying dynamics, which is potentially more important for
models of asset returns than dynamics in the mean, is the speci￿cation of dynamics in
the variance. This is especially true in models of contagion as increases in volatility
are symptomatic of crises.9 A common way to capture this phenomenon is to include
a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic structure (GARCH) on the
factors. This approach is adopted by Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), Dungey and
Martin (2004) and in Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a, 2006,
2007a).10 In the case where there is a single factor a suitable speci￿cation is
wt = et; (2.23)
where
et ￿ (0;ht); (2.24)
with conditional volatility ht; given by the following GARCH factor structure (Diebold
8This implies that methods based on principal components, such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001),
which assume constant covariance matrices are inappropriate to model ￿nancial crises.
9A further approach is by Jeanne and Masson (2000) who allow for a Markovian switching structure
to incorporate the multiple equilibria features of theoretical contagion models.
10See also Chernov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (2003) for a recent investigation of the dynamics
of asset markets.Chapter 2 18
and Nerlove (1989), and Dungey, Martin and Pagan (2000))
ht = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿e
2
t￿1 + ￿ht￿1: (2.25)
The choice of the normalisation (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿); constrains the unconditional volatility to
equal unity and is adopted for identi￿cation.
Using (2.10) augmented by (2.23) to (2.25), gives the total (conditional) volatility

















where the assumption of independent factors in (2.5) and (2.6) is utilised. The condi-
tional covariance between y1;t and y2;t during the crisis period for example, is
Et￿1 [y1;ty2;t] = Et￿1 [(￿1wt + ￿1u1;t)(￿2wt + ￿2u2;t + ￿u1;t)]
= ￿1￿2ht + ￿￿1:
Both the conditional variance and covariance during the crisis period are a⁄ected by
the presence of contagion (￿ 6= 0). In particular, contagion has the e⁄ect of causing a
structural shift during the crisis period in the conditional covariance by ￿￿1; and the
conditional variance by ￿2.
An important advantage of adopting a GARCH factor model of asset returns is that
it provides a parsimonious multivariate GARCH model. This model, when combined
with a model of contagion, can capture changes in the variance and covariance struc-
tures of asset returns during ￿nancial crises.11 The parsimony of the factor GARCH
model speci￿cation contrasts with multivariate GARCH models based on the BEKK
speci￿cation (Engle and Kroner (1995)) which require a large number of parameters
for even moderate size models.12
11Further extensions to allow for asymmetric shocks are by Dungey, Fry and Martin (2003) and
asymmetric volatility by Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005).
12The BEEK speci￿cation, based on univariate estimation of multivariate GARCH models with
simultaneous equations systems, is named after the contibution from Baba, Y., R.F. Engle, D.F. Kraft
and K.F. Kroner described in Engle and Kroner (1995). Problems in estimating multivariate GARCH
models are noted by Malliaroupulos (1997), although research on this problem proceeds apace.Review of the Empirical Literature 19
4 Correlation and Covariance Analysis
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) de￿ne contagion as the increase in correlation between
two variables during a crisis period. In performing their test, the correlation between
the two asset returns during the crisis period is adjusted to overcome the problem
that correlations are a positive function of volatility. As crisis periods are typically
characterised by an increase in volatility, a test based on the (conditional) correlation is
biased upwards resulting in evidence of spurious contagion (Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999), Loretan and English (2000), Corsetti, Pericoli and
Sbracia (2003)).13
4.1 Bivariate Testing
To demonstrate the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach, consider testing for contagion
from country 1 to country 2 where the returns volatilities are ￿2
x;i and ￿2
y;i in the non-
crisis and crisis periods respectively. The correlation between the two asset returns
is ￿y during the crisis period (high volatility period) and ￿x in the non-crisis (low
volatility period).14 If there is an increase in the volatility of the asset return of
country 1, ￿2
y;1 > ￿2
x;1; without there being any change to the fundamental relationship
between the asset returns in the two markets, then ￿y > ￿x giving the false appearance
of contagion. To adjust for this bias, Forbes and Rigobon show that the adjusted
(unconditional) correlation is given by; see also Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999),



















scaled by a nonlinear function of the percentage change in volatility in the asset return









, country 1 in this case, over the high and
13Butler and Joaquin (2002) conduct the same test across bull and bear markets, although they do
not speci￿cally use the terminology of contagion.
14Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in their empirical application, compare the crisis period correlation
with the correlation calculated over the total sample period (low volatility period). That is, x is
replaced by z = (x;y): This alternative formulation is also discussed below.
15Other approaches using correlation analysis are Karolyi and Stulz (1996) and Longin and Solnik
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low volatility periods. If there is no fundamental change in the relationship between
the two asset markets then ￿y = ￿x.
To test that there is a signi￿cant increase in correlation in the crisis period, the null
hypothesis is for no contagion,
H0 : ￿y = ￿x; (2.27)
against the alternative hypothesis of
H1 : ￿y > ￿x: (2.28)
A t-statistic for testing this hypothesis is given by
FR1 =





where the ^ signi￿es the sample estimator, and Ty and Tx are the respective sample sizes
of the high volatility and low volatility periods. The standard error in (2.29) derives
from assuming that the two samples are drawn from independent normal distributions.
That is,
V ar(b ￿y ￿b ￿x) = V ar(b ￿y) + V ar(b ￿x) ￿ 2Cov (b ￿y;b ￿x)








where the second step follows from the independence assumption, and the last step
follows from the assumption of normality and the use of an asymptotic approximation
(Kendall and Stuart (1973, p.307)). To improve the ￿nite sample properties of the test



















In the adjusted correlation test adopted by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in their
empirical work, the non-crisis period is de￿ned as the total sample period. For this
16This tranformation is valid for small values of the correlation coe¢ cients, ￿x and vy. Further
re￿nements are discussed in Kendall and Stuart (1969, p.391). For the case of independence, ￿x =
￿y = 0; an exact expression for the variance of the transformed correlation coe¢ cient is available. An
illustration of these problems for the Forbes and Rigobon method is given in Dungey and Zhumabekova
(2001).Review of the Empirical Literature 21


























which is (2.26) with ￿2
x;1 replaced by ￿2
z;1: From (2.31), the Fisher adjusted version of



















Underlying (2.32) and (2.34), is the assumption that the variances of b ￿
0
y and b ￿z
are independent. Clearly this cannot be correct in the case of overlapping data. One
implication of this result is that the standard error in (2.30) is too large as it neglects
the (negative) covariance term arising from the use of overlapping data. This biases
the t-statistic to zero resulting in a failure to reject the null of contagion.
4.2 Alternative Formulation
In implementing the correlation test in (2.29) or (2.31), equation (2.26) shows that
the conditional correlation needs to be scaled initially by a nonlinear function of the
change in volatility in the asset return of the source country, 1 in this case, over the
pertinent sample periods. Another way to implement the Forbes and Rigobon test
of contagion is to scale the asset returns and perform the contagion test within a
regression framework.17 Continuing with the example of testing for contagion from the
asset market of country 1 to the asset market of country 2, consider scaling the asset
returns during the non-crisis period by their respective standard deviations. First,
de￿ne the following regression equation during the non-crisis period where the returns











17Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) extend the Forbes and Rigobon framework to a model equiv-
alent to the factor structure given in (2.10). Their approach requires evaluating quantities given by





These quantities can be estimated directly using GMM as discussed in Section 3.2.Chapter 2 22
where ￿x;t is a disturbance term and ￿0 and ￿1 are regression parameters. The non-
crisis slope regression parameter equals the non-crisis correlation coe¢ cient, ￿1 = ￿x:
Second, for the crisis returns the regression equation is given as follows, where the











where ￿y;t is a disturbance term and ￿0 and ￿1 are regression parameters. The crisis
regression slope parameter ￿1 = ￿y; which is the Forbes-Rigobon adjusted correlation
coe¢ cient given in (2.26).
This alternative formulation suggests that another way to implement the Forbes-
Rigobon adjusted correlation is to estimate (2.35) and (2.36) by OLS and test the
equality of the regression slope parameters. This test is equivalent to a Chow test for
a structural break of the regression slope. Implementation of the test can be based on




















￿0 ; i = 1;2; (2.38)
represents the (Tx + Ty) ￿ 1 pooled data set by stacking the non-crisis and crisis data
and ￿t is a disturbance term. The slope dummy, dt, is de￿ned as
dt =
￿
1 : t > Tx
0 : otherwise : (2.39)
The parameter ￿3 = ￿1 ￿ ￿1 in (2.37) captures the e⁄ect of contagion. It represents
the additional contribution of information on asset returns in country 2 to the non-
crisis regression: if there is no change in the relationship the dummy variable provides
no new additional information during the crisis period, resulting in ￿3 = 0: Thus the
Forbes and Rigobon contagion test can be implemented by estimating (2.37) by OLS
and performing a one-sided t-test of
H0 : ￿3 = 0; (2.40)
in (2.37), which is equivalent to testing
H0 : ￿1 = ￿1; (2.41)Review of the Empirical Literature 23
in (2.35) and (2.36).18 Of course, the test statistic to perform the contagion test is
invariant to scaling transformations of the regressors, such as the use of ￿x;1 and ￿x;2
to standardise zt. This suggests that an even more direct way to test for contagion is
to implement a standard test of parameter constancy in a regression framework simply
based on zt; the unscaled data.19
There is one di⁄erence between the regression approach to correlation testing for
contagion based on (2.37) and the approach implemented by Forbes and Rigobon, and
that is the standard errors used in the test statistics are di⁄erent in small samples.
The latter approach is based on the asymptotic adjustment given in (2.31) or (2.34),
whilst the former are based in general, on the usual least squares standard errors or
some robust estimator.
4.3 Multivariate Testing
The regression framework developed above for implementing the Forbes and Rigobon
test suggests that a multivariate analogue can be easily constructed as follows. Given
that there is no need to scale the data to perform the contagion test, in the case of
three asset returns the non-crisis period equations are
x1;t = ￿1;2x2;t + ￿1;3x3;t + ￿x;1;t
x2;t = ￿2;1x1;t + ￿2;3x3;t + ￿x;2;t (2.42)
x3;t = ￿3;1x1;t + ￿3;2x2;t + ￿x;3;t
whilst the crisis equations are speci￿ed as
y1;t = ￿1;2y2;t + ￿1;3y3;t + ￿y;1;t
y2;t = ￿2;1y1;t + ￿2;3y3;t + ￿y;2;t (2.43)
y3;t = ￿3;1y1;t + ￿3;2y2;t + ￿y;3;t
18Interestingly, Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2002), conduct a test of contagion based on a
slope dummy, but do not identify the connection of the test with the Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
correlation approach.
19To implement the form of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) version of the correlation test within
the regression framework in (2.37), the pre-crisis data is now replaced by the total sample data. That
is, the low volatility period is de￿ned as the total sample period and not the pre-crisis period. This





and scaling the variables using the total sample period:Chapter 2 24
where ￿x;i;t and ￿y;i;t are error terms. A joint test of contagion is given by
￿i;j = ￿i;j; 8i 6= j; (2.44)
which represents 6 restrictions. A convenient way to implement the multivariate version
of the Forbes and Rigobon test is to adopt the strategy of (2.37) and write the model
as a 3 equation system augmented by a set of slope dummy variables to capture the
impact of contagion on asset returns
z1;t = ￿1;2z2;t + ￿1;3z3;t + ￿1;2z2;tdt + ￿1;3z3;tdt + ￿1;t
z2;t = ￿2;1z1;t + ￿2;3z3;t + ￿2;1z1;tdt + ￿2;3z3;tdt + ￿2;t (2.45)
z3;t = ￿3;1z1;t + ￿3;2z2;t + ￿3;1z1;tdt + ￿3;2z2;tdt + ￿3;t
where the zi;t pooled asset returns are as de￿ned in (2.38), ￿i;t are disturbance terms,
dt is the dummy variable de￿ned in (2.39), and ￿i;j = ￿i;j ￿ ￿i;j; are the parameters
which control the strength of contagion.
The multivariate contagion test is based on testing the null hypothesis
H0 : ￿i;j = 0; 8i 6= j: (2.46)
Implementation of the test can be performed by using standard multivariate test sta-
tistics, including likelihood ratio, Wald and Lagrange multiplier statistics.
Rigobon (2003b) suggests an alternative multivariate test of contagion. This test
is referred to as the determinant of the change in the covariance matrix (DCC) as it is
based on comparing the covariance matrices across two samples (non-crisis and crisis)
and taking the determinant to express the statistic as a scalar. The DCC statistic is
formally de￿ned as
DCC =




where b ￿y and b ￿x are the estimated covariance matrices of asset returns in the crisis
and non-crisis periods, respectively, and b ￿DCC is an estimate of the pertinent standard
error of the statistic. Under the null hypothesis there is no change in the covariance
structure of asset returns across sample periods, resulting in a value of DCC = 0: If
contagion increases volatility during the crisis period, then DCC > 0; resulting in a
rejection of the null hypothesis of no contagion.Review of the Empirical Literature 25
The DCC test represents a test of parameter stability and thus provides an alterna-
tive test to a Chow test. However, given the relationship between Chow and contagion
tests discussed above, this implies that potentially the DCC test is also a test of con-
tagion. To highlight this point, consider the following bivariate factor model based on
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The numerator of the DCC statistic is this case is
￿
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where the ^ signi￿es a parameter estimator. Under the null hypothesis DCC = 0;
which is achieved when ￿ = 0, a result that is equivalent to the tests of contagion
already discussed.
In implementing the DCC test, the covariance matrices employed tend to be con-
ditional covariance matrices if dynamics arising from lagged variables and other ex-
ogenous variables are controlled for. One approach is to estimate a VAR for the total
period, Tx+Ty; and base the covariances on the vector autoregression (VAR) residuals.
This is the approach adopted in the empirical application of Rigobon (2003b). The
advantage of working with VAR residuals, as compared to structural residuals, is that
the VAR represents an unconstrained reduced form, thereby circumventing problems
of simultaneity bias. Endogeneity issues are now discussed.
4.4 Endogeneity Issues
The potential simultaneity biases arising from the presence of endogenous variables
are more evident when the Forbes and Rigobon test is cast in a linear regression
framework. Forbes and Rigobon perform the correlation test on pairs of countries under
the assumption that contagion spreads from one country to another with the source
country being exogenous. The test can then be performed in the reverse direction with
the implicit assumption of exogeneity on the two asset returns reversed. Performing
the two tests in this way is inappropriate as it clearly ignores the simultaneity biasChapter 2 26
problem.20
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show using a Monte Carlo analysis that the size of the
simultaneity bias is unlikely to be severe if the correlations between asset returns are
relatively small. Interestingly, Rigobon (2003b) notes that the volatility adjustment in
performing the test in (2.26) is incorrect in the presence of simultaneity bias. However,
as noted above, the Forbes and Rigobon adjustment acts as a scaling parameter which
has no a⁄ect on the properties of the test statistic in a linear regression framework.
The problem of simultaneity bias is the same irrespective of whether the endogenous
explanatory variables are scaled or not.
To perform the Forbes and Rigobon contagion test while correcting for simultaneity
bias, equations (2.42) and (2.43) need to be estimated initially using a simultaneous
equations estimator and the tests of contagion based on the simultaneous equation
estimates of ￿i;j in (2.45). To demonstrate some of the issues, the bivariate model is
expanded to allow for structural breaks in the idiosyncratic loadings. The bivariate
versions of the model without intercepts during the non-crisis and crisis periods are
respectively
x1;t = ￿1x2;t + ￿x;1;t
(2.48)
x2;t = ￿2x1;t + ￿x;2;t







y1;t = ￿1y2;t + ￿y;1;t
(2.49)
y2;t = ￿2y1;t + ￿y;2;t





















20Forbes and Rigobon recognise this problem and do not test for contagion in both directions being
very clear about their exogeneity assumptions.Review of the Empirical Literature 27





















































The model at present is underidenti￿ed as there is a total of just 6 unique moments













In a study of the relationship between Mexican and Argentinian bonds, Rigobon
(2003a) identi￿es the model by setting ￿1 = ￿1 and ￿2 = ￿2: However, from (2.41), this
implies that there is no contagion, just a structural break in the idiosyncratic variances.
An alternative approach to identi￿cation, which is more informative in the context of





y;2: Now there are 6 equations to identify the 6 unknowns. A test of contagion
is given by a test of the over-identifying restrictions under the null hypothesis of no
contagion. The observational equivalence between the two identi￿cation strategies
has already been noted above in the discussion of the factor model. However, if the
idiosyncratic variances are changing over the sample, the contagion test is under-sized
(Toyoda and Ohtani (1986)). Another alternative solution is to expand the number
of asset markets investigated. For example, increasing the number of assets to N = 3

















and 12 moments (as there are 6 unique moments from each of the variance-covariance
matrices from the two sub-periods).Chapter 2 28
Rigobon (2002) also suggests using instrumental variables to obtain consistent pa-




￿0 ; i = 1;2:
This choice of instruments is an extension of the early suggestions of Wald (1940) and
Durbin (1954). For example, Wald de￿ned the instrument set as a dummy variable
with a 1 signifying observations above the median and a ￿1 for observations below the
median. In the case of contagion and modelling ￿nancial crises, observations above
(below) the median can be expected to correspond to crisis (non-crisis) observations.
This suggests that the Rigobon instrument is likely to be more e¢ cient than the instru-
ment chosen by Wald as it uses more information. Rigobon then proceeds to estimate
pooled equations as in (2.45), but with ￿i;j = 0: But this is not a test of contagion as
￿i = ￿i is imposed and not tested. Not surprisingly, the IV estimator of the structural
parameters in this case, is equivalent to the matching moment estimator using (2.52)
and (2.53), subject to the restrictions ￿1 = ￿1; and ￿2 = ￿2:
4.5 Relationship with Other Models
Interpreting the Forbes and Rigobon contagion test as a Chow test provides an impor-
tant link connecting this approach with the contagion modelling framework of Dungey,
Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005b). To highlight this link, let the dynamics
of the processes be represented by the ￿rst two expressions of the contagion model in
(2.10)
y1;t = ￿1wt + ￿1u1;t (2.54)
y2;t = ￿2wt + ￿2u2;t + ￿u1;t; (2.55)
where as before, contagion from the asset market in country 1 to country 2 is controlled
by the parameter ￿. Combining these expressions to substitute out u1;t from the









y1;t + ￿2u2;t: (2.56)
The corresponding asset equation in the non-crisis period is given by setting ￿ = 0,






wt + ￿2u2;t: (2.57)Review of the Empirical Literature 29
Stacking equations(2.56) and (2.57) yields an equation of the same form as (2.37)
provided that the common factor is taken as wt = z1;t; the stacked vector of asset
returns in country 1 across non-crisis and crisis periods. In this scenario the Forbes and
Rigobon and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin approaches are equivalent
with the test of contagion still being based on ￿ = 0: This amounts to testing the
additional explanatory power of the asset returns in country 1 to explain movements
in the asset returns in country 2 over and above the factors that govern movements in
asset markets during non-crisis periods.
In practice, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) identify the common factor wt using a
number of observed variables including US interest rates. These variables are initially
extracted from the asset returns data by regressing the returns on the chosen set of
common factors and using the residuals from these regressions in the contagion tests
given in (2.26) to (2.31). In conducting the contagion tests, the analysis is performed
in pairs with the source country changing depending on the hypothesis being tested.
This testing strategy is highlighted in (2.56) and (2.57) where the source country is
country 1.
Testing for contagion based on the dummy variable version of the Forbes and
Rigobon contagion test in equation (2.37) also introduces the links to a range of other
tests for contagion. For example, the approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) consists
of de￿ning the dummy variable in (2.39) as
di;t =
￿
1 : jui;tj > 3￿i
0 : otherwise ; (2.58)
where ￿i is computed as the standard deviation of the residuals in a VAR(p) associ-
ated with the variable yi;t.21 A structural model is then speci￿ed where each return
is expressed as a function of all other returns, own lagged returns and the full set of
dummy variables. The system of equations is estimated by full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) and the contagion test is based on a joint test of the parameters on
the dummy variables of the other returns. The test will identify contagion if extreme
returns in the dependent variable are matched with extreme returns in the other vari-
21In a related approach, Pesaran and Pick (2003) also identify outliers by constructing dummy
variables which are used in a structural model to test for contagion. One important di⁄erence is
that Pesaran and Pick do not de￿ne the dummy variables for each outlier, but combine the outliers
associated with each dummy variable.Chapter 2 30
ables. The dummy variables de￿ne the period of the crisis. This contrasts with the
approach of Forbes and Rigobon and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin
(2005a, 2006, 2007a), where the crisis period is determined a priori. One implication
of the Favero and Giavazzi test is that the results can potentially be driven by a small
number of observations thereby making the test rather fragile. A further implica-
tion of this approach concerns the use of lagged variables to identify the simultaneous
equations model. In the case where it is asset returns that are being modelled, the
autocorrelation structure of asset returns is expected to be low.22 This results in a
weak instrument problem where the bias of a simultaneous estimator can exceed the
bias of the OLS estimator which, in turn, can yield spurious results (Nelson and Startz
(1990), andStock, Wright and Yogo (2002)).
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996) choose dummy variables for both y1;t
and y2;t respectively as
d1;t =
￿





1 : y2;t > f(EMP2;t)
0 : otherwise ;
where EMPi;t is the exchange market pressure index.23 As a result of the binary
dependent variable the model is estimated as a probit model. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz
(2003) extend this model to provide for polychotomous variables, where the dummy
variables, di;t, are de￿ned as exceedances
22This is less of a problem in the application considered by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) who used
interest rates which have strong autocorrelation structures.
23The threshold indicator EMPi;t represents the Exchange Market Pressure Index corresponding
to the ith asset return at time t, which is computed as a linear combination of the change in exchange
rates, interest di⁄erentials and changes in levels of reserve assets for country i with respect to some
numeraire country, 0,
EMPi;t = a￿ei;t + b(ri;t ￿ r0;t) + c(￿Ri;t ￿ ￿R0;t); (2.60)
where ei is the logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate, ri is the short-term interest rate and Ri is
the stock of reserve assets. The weights, a; b and c; are given by the inverse of the standard deviation
of the individual component series over the sample period. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) adopt a
di⁄erent weighting scheme whereby the weight on interest rates is zero.Review of the Empirical Literature 31
d1;t =
￿





1 : jy2;tj > THRESH
0 : otherwise :
In their application THRESH is chosen to identify the 5% of extreme observations in
the sample. A co-exceedance occurs when d1;t = d2;t = 1. The number of exceedances
and co-exceedances at time t yields a polychotomous variable which is then used in a
multinominal logit model to test for contagion.24
An important part of the Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996) approach is that it requires
choosing the threshold value of the EMP index for classifying asset returns into crisis
and non-crisis periods. As with the threshold values adopted by Favero and Giavazzi
(2002) and Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), the empirical results are contingent on the
choice of the threshold value. In each of these approaches, this choice is based on
sample estimates of the data, resulting in potentially non-unique classi￿cations of the
data for di⁄erent sample periods.25
The construction of binary dummies in (2.58) to (2.61) in general amounts to a
loss of sample information resulting in ine¢ cient parameter estimates and a loss of
power in testing for contagion. A more direct approach which does not result in any
loss of sample information is to estimate (2.56) by least squares and perform a test of
contagion by undertaking a t-test of ￿: In fact, the probit model delivers consistent
estimates of the same unknown parameters given in (2.56), but these estimates su⁄er
a loss of e¢ ciency as a result of the loss of sample information in constructing the
dummy variables.26
24In the application of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) the cases of negative and positive returns
are considered separately. They also combined all exceedances into a single category. However, by
separating the exceedances of each variable it is possible to test for contagion from the host country to
the remaining countries separately, see Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a). This
is done in the application in Section 5.
25Both Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) use some matching of
their crisis index constructed using these thresholds to market events to validate the threshold choice.
26The dummy variable framework can be extended further by allowing for asymmetric shocks
(Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003), Butler and Joaquin (2002), Baig and Goldfajn (2000), Ellis and
Lewis (2000) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999)).Chapter 2 32
5 Empirical Application: Equity Markets in 1997-
1998
To illustrate the application of the alternative empirical methodologies discussed above,
this section explores the turmoil in equity markets resulting from the speculative attack
on the Hong Kong currency in October 1997.27 This attack was successfully defended
by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, but resulted in a substantial decline in Hong
Kong equity markets. A number of Asian markets were also a⁄ected. This application
considers the potential contagion from this crisis to the equity markets of Korea and
Malaysia, with the US equity markets used as a control for common shocks, as per
Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
The non-crisis period covers January 1, 1997 to October 17, 1997. The Hong
Kong equity markets declined rapidly beginning October 20-23, 1997. The Hang Seng
Index fell by almost a quarter and was associated with large falls in indices in other
international markets including Japan, the US and other Asian markets. The crisis
period here covers from October 20, 1997 to August 31, 1998, a period often associated
with the end of the Asian ￿nancial crisis, marked by the repegging of the Malaysian
ringgitt.
The example presented here is not intended as a de￿nitive analysis of this crisis,
but serves rather as an example of the application of the contagion testing procedures
outlined in the ￿rst part of the chapter. Further analysis of this particular data set and
crisis are presented in Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a) and other
analyses of the Asian crisis episode include Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bae, Karolyi
and Stulz (2003) and Dungey, Fry and Martin (2003b).
5.1 Stylized Facts
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics as well as variance-covariances of equity
returns during the non-crisis and crisis sample periods for the three countries. The
increase in volatility experienced during the crisis period is evident by the large increase
in the variances in each country. In the case of Hong Kong the variance in equities
rises over three fold, while for both Korea and Malaysia there is more than a ￿ve-fold
increase. All countries experience a fall in their average returns during the crisis period.
27This application is based on Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a).Review of the Empirical Literature 33
Table 1:
Descriptive statistics and variance-covariances of daily percentage equity returns for
selected sample periods: Non-crisis period (January 1, 1997 to October 17, 1997),
Crisis period (October 20, 1997 to August 31, 1998).
Non-crisis Period Crisis Period
Hong Kong Korea Malaysia Hong Kong Korea Malaysia
Descriptive Statistics
Mean 0.004 -0.056 -0.209 -0.300 -0.300 -0.468
Max 6.883 4.019 1.666 17.247 10.024 20.817
Min -5.150 -4.306 -5.817 -14.735 -11.601 -11.744
Covariance Matrix
Hong Kong 2.238 10.794
Korea 0.260 2.045 1.611 13.114
Malaysia 0.631 0.063 2.782 4.716 3.348 10.291Chapter 2 34
In addition, for each country the extreme minimum and maximum daily return occurs
during the crisis period.
5.2 Implementation Issues
There are a number of practical issues in implementing the contagion tests outlined
in the previous sections. These include identifying the crisis period from the non-crisis
period, the use of proxy variables to identify common factors, choice of frequency of
data and the treatment of missing observations and time zones. Each of these issues
is dealt with in more detail in Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a),
but are brie￿ y outlined in what follows.
There are two broad approaches to identifying the timing of crises. The ￿rst ap-
proach is based on ex post observation of events in the existing literature as in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) (the FR test) and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin
(2005a, 2006, 2007a) (the DFGM test). The second approach is based on the identi￿-
cation of some threshold value, such as in Favero and Giavazzi (2002) (the FG test),
Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) (the BKS test) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
(1996).
The choice of proxy variables for the common factors is often related to the choice
of data frequency. One group of researchers recognises contagion in its e⁄ects on rel-
atively low frequency data where appropriate macroeconomic controls can be taken
into account, for example Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996). Then there are
those who would presumably prefer to test at higher frequency, but are constrained by
the availability of control data, such as Glick and Rose (1999) who consider trade ￿ ows.
And ￿nally the majority of studies consider contagion in relatively high frequency data,
at either daily or weekly frequency, where contagion is viewed as a relatively short-lived
phenomenon. This is the case with all of the correlation analysis studies, most of the
extreme value studies, threshold models and the latent factor models. Some studies
also utilise observed high frequency data as common variable controls, such as in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) who use US interest rates. This is the approach adopted in the
empirical application whereby a VAR containing one lag and US returns is estimated,
with the residuals representing the ￿ltered returns. This pre-￿ltering of the data is
used in the calculations of the DFGM, FR and BKS tests, but not the FG test so asReview of the Empirical Literature 35
to be commensurate with their methodology.
To allow for di⁄erences in the time zones between the US and the three Asian
equity markets, the US interest rates are dated at time t ￿ 1. In general, time zone
alignment problems arise because markets may be open on nominally the same date,
but there may be no actual trading time overlap. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) ￿nd
signi￿cant time zone e⁄ects in equity markets. One approach to this problem is to
control for di⁄erences in time zones by using moving averages of returns (Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), Ellis and Lewis (2000)). However, this may mask movements in asset
prices and hence introduce biases into the tests of contagion. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz
(2003) choose di⁄erent lags depending on the time zone under investigation, which
works because two distinct time zones are involved. Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo
and Martin (2007a) suggest using simulation methods by treating time zones problems
as a missing observation issue.
Finally, missing observations cause problems in tracking volatility across markets
in a single period, and are usually dealt with by either replacing the missing obser-
vation with the previous market observation or removing that data point from the
investigation. In practice, most researchers seem to use a strategy of excluding days
corresponding to missing observations, which is the approach adopted below.
5.3 Contagion Testing
To gain some insight into the relative size of contagion amongst equity markets during
the crisis, Table 2 provides the DFGM factor decompositions of the variances and the
covariances given in Table 1. As the model is just identi￿ed these decompositions
provide a breakdown of these moments in terms of the underlying factors, including
contagion.
The variance decompositions in Table 2 show that asset return volatility during
the crisis is dominated by contagion with much smaller contributions from the world
and idiosyncratic factors. The dominant contagion channels are from Hong Kong to
both Korea (7:972) and Malaysia (5:972), which are over 50% of the total volatility
of the returns in these two countries (13:114 and 10:291 respectively). There are
also important reverse contagion channels from Korea and Malaysia to Hong Kong
(3:705 and 4:858), and from Malaysia to Korea (3:181).Chapter 2 36
The covariance decompositions in Table 2 reveal that contagion from Hong Kong
had positive impacts on the covariances between all asset returns. In contrast, con-
tagion from Korea and Malaysia tended to have a negative impact on several of the
covariances.
The volatility decompositions discussed above provide a description of the relative
magnitude of contagion linking the three equity markets. To examine the strength of
these linkages more formally, Table 3 presents the results of 7 contagion tests. The ￿rst
column gives the country from which contagion is assumed to emanate (labelled Host).
The second column gives the recipient country. The remaining 7 columns give the
results of the contagion tests based on the DFGM test, the FR test with overlapping
data (FR-0) and with non-overlapping data (FR-N), the multivariate version of the FR
test (FRM), the FG test with an endogeneity correction (FG-E) and a non-endogeneity
corrected version (FG-N), and the BKS test. The row headed ￿ Both￿in each panel of
the table gives the results of a joint test of contagion from the host country to the two
recipient countries. The last panel of the table gives the results of the joint test of no
contagion amongst all three countries.
The results in Table 3 show that the Forbes and Rigobon test (FR-O) ￿nds no
evidence of contagion in any of the channels tested. This lack of any rejection of the
null hypothesis is consistent with the discussion in Section 4 where it was concluded
that this is a conservative test as it is biased towards zero as a result of the variance
of the test statistic being incorrect when the non-crisis period is de￿ned as the total
sample period.
To examine the issue concerning the downward bias in the Forbes and Rigobon test
further, the results of the Forbes and Rigobon test (FR-N) where the non-crisis period
is based on non overlapping data, are also presented in Table 3. The results show that
4 of the 6 bivariate contagion tests do indeed lead to lower p-values. However, at the
5% level, this test still seems to be conservative as it does not identify any signi￿cant
contagion linkages. Further con￿rmation of the bias in the Forbes and Rigobon test FR-
O, arising from overlapping data, is given by the multivariate version of the Forbes and
Rigobon test (FRM). Here the results point to uniformly stronger contagious linkages,
that is lower p-values, with signi￿cant evidence of contagion detected from Malaysia
to both Hong Kong and Korea.Review of the Empirical Literature 37
In complete contrast to the FR test results in Table 3, the FG test (FG-E) ￿nds
evidence of contagion in all cases.28 To control for potential weak instrument problems,
the Favero and Giavazzi test is recomputed with no endogeneity correction (FG-N) by
simply estimating the pertinent structural model by OLS. The results show a very
di⁄erent story with now just half of the bivariate contagion tests showing signi￿cant
evidence of contagion at the 5% level. The strong evidence of contagion based on FG-E
appear to be spurious and arise from the presence of weak instruments.29 Comparing
the results of the FG-N test and DFGM tests shows that the two methods produce
similar qualitative results in 4 of the 6 bivariate cases at the 10% level. The two
di⁄erences are the test of contagion from Hong Kong to Korea where the DFGM test
￿nds evidence of contagion, and the test of contagion from Malaysia to Korea where
the FG-N test ￿nds evidence of contagion. The transmission channel from Hong Kong
to Korea identi￿ed by the DFGM test is consistent with the strong level of contagion
identi￿ed in the variance decomposition given in Table 2. In addition, the lack of
signi￿cant evidence of contagion from Malaysia to Korea identi￿ed by the DFGM
test is also consistent with the moderate level of contagion identi￿ed in the variance
decomposition in Table 2 as well.
The last test results reported in Table 3 are for the Bae, Karolyi and Stultz (BKS)
test.30 Comparing the bivariate DFGM and BKS results shows that the two testing
procedures give opposite results where Hong Kong and Korea are the hosts, but the
same results where Malaysia is the host. Part of the explanation underlying these
results could be the dating of the crisis period which is determined a priori in the
case of the DFGM test, whereas for the BKS test is determined endogenously. An
additional issue surrounding the BKS test is that it discards information in constructing
the dummy dependent and independent variables, which may in turn lead to a loss of
e¢ ciency in the parameter estimates.
In general, these results in Table 3 provide evidence of the di¢ culties in obtaining
consistent information on the existence of contagion from the di⁄erent tests. This is
28The Favero and Giavazzi test based on the dummy variable in (2.58) identi￿es 19 outliers: 1
common outlier, 5 outliers in Hong Kong, 6 in Korea and 7 in Malaysia.
29Performing the weak instrument test based on the F-test of the regressors in the three reduced
form equations yields values of 12:893;7:618;15:369: Using the critical values reported in Stock, Wright
and Yogo (2000: Table 1), shows that the null of a weak instrument is not rejected.
30The BKS test is based on 22 exceedances, 4 co-exceedances between Hong Kong and Korea, 5
co-exceedances between Hong Kong and Malaysia and 4 co-exceedances between Korea and Malaysia.Chapter 2 38
not unique to this example, similar outcomes emerge in other applied examples for the
1994 Mexican crisis and the 2001 Argentine crisis provided in Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-
Hermosillo and Martin (2005a). Some of these problems are shown by Dungey, Fry,
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2004) to be due to low power and poor size properties
of these various tests of contagion.
6 Conclusions
This chapter has overviewed a number of important tests for the presence and char-
acteristics of contagion in ￿nancial markets adopted in the current literature. Using a
framework of a latent factor model similar to that proposed in the ￿nance literature,
the di⁄erent testing methodologies are shown to be related. In essence, each method
is shown to be a test on a common parameter regarding the transmission of a shock
from one country or market to another.
An important result of this chapter is that the main distinguishing feature of al-
ternative empirical models of contagion is the way in which the information is used to
identify contagion. Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2006) and Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) use the information on all of the shocks in the crisis period to
test for contagion. Under certain conditions these two models are the same. Favero
and Giavazzi (2002) utilize shift dummies at selected crisis points to represent poten-
tially contagious transmissions. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995,1996) also use
dummy variables to identify contagion, however they transform both the dependent
and independent indicators into binary variables, which results in a further reduction
of the information used in estimation. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide an exten-
sion of the Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz approach by allowing for a polychotomous
dependent variable, based on the number of co-exceedances in their crisis indicator.
Some of the properties and relationships of the various contagion tests were demon-
strated in an empirical application of the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. A number of em-
pirical issues concerning missing observations, time zones, dating of crises and data
frequency were also discussed. The results showed that the Forbes and Rigobon con-
tagion test was a conservative test as it failed to ￿nd evidence of contagion in any of
the linkages tested. The Favero and Giavazzi test was at the other extreme, ￿nding
evidence of contagion in all cases investigated. Much of this evidence of linkages wasReview of the Empirical Literature 39
Table 2:
Unconditional volatility decompositions of Asian equity markets during the crisis
period, expressed in squared returns: based on equations (2.19) and (2.20).
Components Country
Variance Decomposition
Hong Kong Korea Malaysia
World factor 0.057 1.755 0.017
Idiosyncratic factor 2.174 0.279 2.760
Contagion from:
Hong Kong - 7.972 5.792
Korea 3.705 - 1.723
Malaysia 4.858 3.181 -
Sub-total 8.563 11.153 7.515
Total 10.794 13.114 10.291
Covariance Decomposition
Hong Kong/Korea Hong Kong/Malaysia Korea/Malaysia
World factor 0.317 0.032 0.175
Idiosyncratic factor 0.000 0.000 0.000
Contagion from:
Hong Kong 4.163 3.549 6.795
Korea 1.017 -2.526 -0.693
Malaysia -3.886 3.662 -2.929
Sub-total 1.294 4.685 3.173
Total 1.611 4.716 3.348Chapter 2 40
Table 3:
Contagion tests of Asian equity markets Hong Kong (HK), Korea (K) and Malaysia
(M): p-values in parentheses. A * denotes statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Host Recipient DFGM(a) FR-O(b) FR-N(b) FRM(c) FG-E(d) FG-N(d) BKS(e)
HK to: K 158.17* -0.295 -1.002 1.175 117.582* 7.589 2.210
(0.000) (0.616) (0.842) (0.278) (0.000) (0.180) (0.137)
M 1.574 -0.507 -0.263 1.162 137.669* 8.881 6.015*
(0.210) (0.694) (0.604) (0.281) (0.000) (0.114) (0.014)
Both 182.063* - 1.968 217.451* 17.850 10.019*
(0.000) (0.374) (0.000) (0.058) (0.002)
K to: HK 45.651* -0.315 -1.062 1.518 304.902* 11.077 2.146
(0.000) (0.624) (0.856) (0.218) (0.000) (0.086) (0.143)
M 12.085* -0.256 0.209 1.031 356.649* 17.549* 2.369
(0.001) (0.601) (0.417) (0.310) (0.000) (0.007) (0.124)
Both 439.764* - 1.872 65.402* 33.911* 8.517*
(0.000) (0.392) (0.000) 0.001 (0.004)
M to: HK 53.578* -0.348 0.189 6.582* 146.704* 23.251* 6.862*
(0.000) (0.636) (0.425) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009)
K 0.773 -0.105 0.650 4.963* 73.385* 24.636* 2.181
(0.379) (0.542) (0.258) (0.026) (0.000) (0.001) (0.140)
Both 70.005* - - 10.765* 202.745* 51.439* 11.145*
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Joint 772.474* - - 14.357* 1085.284* 101.973* -
(0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000)
(a) Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin test: A Wald test using the GMM
parameter estimates of ￿i;j in (2.17).
(b) Forbes and Rigobon tests: FR-O is based on overlapping data using (2.34) and
FR-N is based on non-overlapping data using (2.31).
(c) Multivariate Forbes and Rigobon tests: Based on a Wald test using the least
squares parameter estimates of ￿i;j in (2.45).
(d) Favero and Giavazzi tests: FG-E and FG-N are the IV (endogeneity corrected)
and OLS (non-endogeneity corrected) Favero and Giavazzi tests respectively.
Tests based on likelihood ratio tests on the parameters of the dummy variables
de￿ned in (2.58), a trivariate structural system where each return is expressed as
a function of the remaining contemporaneous asset returns, own lagged returns
and the set of dummy variables.
(e) Bae, Karolyi and Stultz test: based on de￿ning the dummy variables as in (2.61)
and using Wald tests applied to the maximum likelihood estimates of a multino-
mial logit model.Review of the Empirical Literature 41
found to be spurious, being the result of weak instruments. Correcting the Favero and
Giavazzi test for weak instruments yielded contagion channels similar to the channels
identi￿ed by the DFGM test. The BKS test results tended to be inconsistent with the
results of these last two tests. In general, the empirical results of the tests highlighted
the need for investigating the sampling properties of the various tests with an extensive
Monte Carlo design that looks at issues such as the dating of crises, the modelling of
dynamics, the information e⁄ects of ￿ltering. Some of these issues have been tackled
in Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2004) who use a number of Monte
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Chapter 3: Contagion in International Bond Markets 
1 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
International financial markets have experienced several episodes of financial crisis 
since the mid-1990s. A major concern of financial market participants, central banks and 
governments during these periods is that a crisis in one country can spread to other markets 
to create extreme volatility elsewhere in the world. This is the case for the period 
corresponding to the Russian bond default in August of 1998, followed by the 
announcement of a recapitalization package for the hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in September, where bond markets in emerging and industrial 
countries exhibited widespread volatility. The Bank of International Settelements survey of 
market participants characterized this period as “the worst crisis” in recent times (BIS, 
1999, p.40). A special feature of this crisis was that the duration was extremely short, 
possibly as a result of the aggressive easing of monetary policy by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve in the period following the recapitalization announcement.  
This chapter identifies the transmission mechanisms of shocks from both the 
Russian bond default and the LTCM recapitalization announcement, to bond markets in 
emerging and industrial countries. Most analyses of recent financial crises tend to focus on 
either currency, banking or equity markets. In contrast, there is little empirical literature on 
the spread of crises through international bond markets. This is partly because a consistent 
and comprehensive historical time series database on bonds for many emerging economies 
is difficult to obtain. It is also partly the result of  bond markets being relatively more stable 
during other financial crises such as the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, where it was equity and 
currency markets that exhibited relatively greater volatility; see for example Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Granger, Huang and Yang (2000).
                                                 
1 This chapter is published in Dungey, M., Fry, R., González-Hermosillo B. and Martin V. (2006), 
“Contagion in International Bond Markets during the Russian and LTCM Crises,” Journal of Financial 





The empirical analysis is conducted on a panel of daily bond spreads for a 
broad range of emerging and industrial countries over 1998. The spreads of the emerging 
economies are the long-term sovereign bonds issued in international markets relative to a 
comparable risk-free benchmark, whilst the spreads of the industrial countries are the long-
term corporate bonds issued in the domestic economy relative to a comparable risk-free 
benchmark.
1 One advantage of working with bond spreads is that they reflect the risk 
premium that investors assign to prospective borrowers. These risks include the perceived 
creditworthiness of borrowers, the willingness of lenders to take on risk, and the liquidity 
in the market, all of which are entangled during crisis episodes.
2 
The identification of the transmission mechanisms linking international bond 
markets is based on specifying a latent factor model of bond spreads. Four types of factors 
are considered. The first three types of factors include a common factor which impacts 
upon all bond markets, a set of regional factors, which are common to countries within a 
geographical area, and country-specific factors which are idiosyncratic to a specific bond 
market. The fourth type of factor investigated represents the effects of contemporaneous 
movements across markets having conditioned on the common, regional and idiosyncratic 
factors. This transmission channel is referred to as contagion as it represents an additional 
linkage during crisis periods in excess of movements in bond spreads that arise during non 
crisis periods; see, for example, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Masson (1999a,b,c), 
Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). An important 
feature of this modelling strategy is that it is possible to decompose the observed volatility 
in bond spreads into various components and thereby identify the contribution of contagion 
to total volatility in each country’s bond market.
3 
                                                 
1 During most of the period of consideration, sovereign bonds in emerging markets were largely below 
investment grade or just investment grade. Therefore, for comparison, investment grade corporate bonds in 
mature economies are examined. 
2 This interpretation is consistent with the widening of the liquidity premium on otherwise similar assets 
(e.g. on-the-run 30-year versus off-the-run 29-year U.S. Treasury bonds) following the LTCM 
recapitalization announcement. The credit risk view of the Russian shock is also consistent with a cash-out of 
liquid markets with increased credit risks as investors’ rebalanced their portfolios. 
3 Another advantage of the latent factor model is that it circumvents the need to use proxy variables to 
measure market fundamentals, as they are identified by extracting the common movements in bond spreads. 
(continued)  
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The empirical analysis leads to four important findings. First, there is substantial 
contagion evident emerging from the Russian shock but relatively little from the LTCM 
shock. The contribution of contagion to total observed volatility in the change in bond 
spreads ranged from under one percent (to the US) to around 17 percent (to the Netherlands 
and Brazil).  The second result points to the importance of financial exposures to the crisis 
countries in transmitting the crisis, the countries most affected by contagion from Russia 
had substantial banking exposures to Russia. The third result provides some evidence 
supporting the literature that contagion effects are regional in nature, contagion is 
consistently present in the Eastern European countries of the sample. The final important 
result is that contagion effects are not necessarily more apparent in developing financial 
markets than developed markets. Although the level of volatility experienced in developing 
markets is generally higher than developed markets the proportionate effect of contagion 
does not systematically differ between them. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
background of events and puts forward a set of four propositions about the transmission of 
the crises. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical characterics of the data in 
Section 3. A model of contagion is described in Section 4, which is related to the existing 
literature on contagion in Section 5. The estimation method is discussed in Section 6 
followed by the empirical results in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Examples of using proxy variables to measure market fundamentals include Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 





Figure 1: Bond Spreads, January 1997-May 1999 







                                                 
4 The shaded areas refer to episodes of crisis in international bond markets: the Hong Kong speculative 
attack on October 27, 1997; the Russian bond default on August 17, 1998; the LTCM recapitalization 
announcement on September 23, 1998; the inter-FOMC Fed interest rate cut on October 15, 1998; and the 
Brazilian effective devaluation on January 13, 1999 followed by several weeks of internal turmoil at the 
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Figure 2: Bond Spreads, January 1998-December 1998 
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5 The shaded areas refer to episodes of crisis in international bond markets during this period: the Russian 
bond default on August 17, 1998; the LTCM recapitalization announcement on September 23, 1998; and the 
inter-FOMC Fed interest rate cut on October 15, 1998. Data Sources: U.S. Federal Reserve, Bloomberg, 





2   BACKGROUND OF EVENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 
2.1   Stylized Facts 
During the Asian crisis, the turmoil which began with the devaluation of the Thai 
baht in July 1997, quickly precipitated declines in currencies and equities in the region and 
in other emerging markets (Granger, Huang  and Yang (2000)). This contrasts with debt 
markets during this period where the effects on the risk premia of international bonds 
issued by emerging countries were rather limited. Apart from the relatively short period of 
turmoil in global financial markets resulting from the speculative attack on Hong Kong on 
October 27, 1997, bond spreads remained relatively stable in non-Asian countries during 
the second half of 1997 (see Figure 1). 
Figures 1 and 2 also show that the stability experienced in international bond 
markets in the second half of 1997, continued into the first part of 1998. However, on 
August 17, 1998, when Russia widened the trading band of the ruble, imposed a 90-day 
moratorium on the repayment of private external debt and announced its plan to restructure 
official debt obligations due to the end of 1999, financial turmoil ensued.
6 Following the 
Russian default, spreads in other bond markets jumped, particularly in emerging markets, 
as markets reassessed global credit risks, see Figures 1-2. 
In a matter of weeks after the Russian crisis, on September 23, 1998, financial 
markets learned of the plan to rescue LTCM, a large U.S. hedge fund which was in danger 
of collapse. LTCM operated by placing highly leveraged positions on the expectation of 
falling yield spreads based on historical evidence. Many historical correlations were 
overturned following the Russian crisis with LTCM losing enormous amounts of money on 
these positions; see Jorion (2000) who documents the evolution of LTCM's problems. The 
situation became serious quickly, to the extent that the New York Federal Reserve acted to 
facilitate a meeting between major banks which eventually co-operated to provide a bailout 
package to the troubled hedge fund.   
During this period the U.S. Federal Reserve cut interest rates in three steps, on 29 
September, 15 October and 17 November, partly due to concerns that the dramatic rises in 
                                                 
6 See Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) for a discussion of the Russian crisis.  
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bond spreads, particularly for corporate debt, were indicative of a liquidity crisis. The 
October 15 interest rate cut was considered a surprise, as it occured between FOMC 
meetings. This cut was also interpreted as signalling a return to confidence in the markets, 
according to market participants surveyed in BIS (1999: pp. 9,39,45).
7  
Informal examination of the data for the second half of 1998 (Figure 2) suggests 
that the Russian crisis had a discernible impact on bond markets in both developed 
economies and emerging markets. The LTCM recapitalization announcement also appears 
to have had an impact on all the countries, with a relatively smaller hump experienced by 
most emerging countries relative to the effect of the Russian shock. The data suggest that 
the Russian and the LTCM recapitalization announcement shocks were reinforcing in their 
effects on other financial markets as practically all markets experienced two jumps in their 
spreads: one following the Russian default (the first band in Figure 2) and another one 
following the announcement of the LTCM financial problems (the second band in Figure 
2).   
Unlike other recent financial crises, the shocks that occurred during August and 
September 1998, seem to have been transmitted across countries with little in common. 
This includes countries that do not fit traditional explanations of contagion based on trade 
links, competitive devaluation or regional effects as suggested in the taxonomies of 
contagion by Lowell, Neu and Tong (1998) and Goldstein (1998). These crises affected 
countries as diverse as the United Kindgom and Brazil, and spanned emerging and 
developed markets. Disentangling the crises of 1998 is particularly complex because of its 
relative brevity and the fact that two distinct shocks occurred within weeks of each other. 
 
2.2   Propositions 
The discussion above suggests that a number of propositions can be formulated 
around the transmission of contagion across national borders. Four broad propositions are 
                                                 
7 The exact timing of the LTCM crisis is necessarily approximate as pressures began building before the 
announcement of the recapitalization package for LTCM. Here we date the crisis as beginning with the 
recapitalization announcement on September 23, 1998 and ending with inter-FOMC Fed interest rate cut on 
October 15, 1998 which signaled the beginning of the “end” of the LTCM crisis. This otherwise arbitrary 





formulated. The first is based on the existence of contagion, whereas the other three 
propositions are concerned with the conditions that control the strength of contagious 
transmisssion mechanisms.  
 
Proposition A: Transmission of the crises through contagion 
 
The empirical evidence for contagion effects is mixed. Some papers find little 
evidence of contagion while others find significant contagion; see for example Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Favero and Giavazzi (2002). Most 
approaches test the statistical significance of the contagion. Here we consider whether 
contagion effects exist and measure their relative contribution to volatility in the bond 
spreads during the crisis. If contagion is not important, then the transmission mechanisms 
solely arise from trade and other macroeconomic linkages which occur during non-crisis 
periods as well. 
 
Proposition B: Exposure through the banking system 
 
Countries whose financial institutions have relatively larger exposures to Russia are 
expected to experience greater contagion.  The implications of financial and institutional 
linkages between countries as a channel of contagion have been investigated by Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000), Van Rijkeghem and Weder (2001, 2003) and Pritsker (2001). Table 1 
provides information on the relative size of offshore banking exposure for the industrial 
economies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. These figures 
show that as a proportion of the total economy, total offshore banking exposure is 23.4% 
for the Netherlands in 1998, which is nearly twice that of the United States and more than 
10 times that of the United Kingdom In terms of exposure to Russia, the proportion is 
nearly 10 times more than both the United States and the United Kingdom These figures 
suggest that the Netherlands is potentially more vulnerable to contagion arising from the 
Russian bond default than either the United States or the United Kingdom. 
 
  




Table 1: Industrial Country Offshore Banking Exposure, June 1998  
(nominal US$ terms) 
Country Size  of 
Economy  
(GNI, US$ bil) 
Offshore Banking Exposure  
(US$ million) 
Total banking 







  (1)  Total (2)  Russia (3)  (2) to (1)  (3) to (2) 
      
U.S. 8447  160784  7781  1.9  0.1 
U.K. 1327  165815  1834 12.5  0.1 
Netherlands 403  94394  3979  23.4  1.0 
      
Sources: Column (1) is drawn from World Bank World Tables; Columns (2) and (3) are sourced from the 
historical data from Table 9C in the BIS Quarterly Review.  
 
Proposition C: Regional effects 
If contagion impacts within regions, it is expected that the Russian bond default 
should particularly impact upon the Eastern European countries, Poland and Bulgaria. The 
importance of testing the regional effects of contagion is emphasized by Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wypolz (1996), Glick and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). 
Proposition D: Fundamentals – Vulnerabilities 
Countries with strong market fundamentals are less susceptible to the effects of 
contagion (Mody and Taylor, 2003, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996). This suggests that 
the emerging market economies investigated here are more likely to be prone to contagion 
than the developed economies; namely the U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands. In a similar 
vein, the Committee for Global Financial System (1999: pp7-8) claims that the Russian 
crisis affected emerging markets, while the LTCM recapitalization announcement affected 
developed markets. In equity markets, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) find that developed 
markets act as a conduit for financial crises between emerging markets, while Bae, Karolyi 





3   The Data and Sample 
The dataset comprises daily data for 12 countries collected for February to 
December 1998 (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Russia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States). The countries were 
chosen to represent the key regions in global financial markets, for which long-term data 
series of liquid bonds could be constructed. This sample period allows our estimation to 
incorporate a clear ‘pre-crisis’ period and the two crisis events of the Russian bond default 
and the LTCM recapitalization announcement.  The choice of daily data, over lower 
frequency data, is made in order to disentangle the effects of the Russian shock and the 
LTCM recapitalization announcement which occurred in close proximity to each other. 
The data represent the spread of long-term debt over the appropriate risk-free yield 
for each country (see Appendix A for source descriptions, definitions and details). We label 
this spread as the ‘premium’ while recognizing that it does in fact reflect a myriad of 
factors, including the liquidity premium and the term structure of the yield curve. The 
choice of the risk-free rate is specific to each long-term bond. In the case of emerging 
countries, sovereign bonds are issued in U.S. dollars and hence the spread is calculated 
against the comparable maturity-matched U.S. Treasury bond rate. Where possible, the 
bonds selected for emerging markets are sovereign issues to reflect the true cost of new 
foreign capital – the exceptions are Poland and Bulgaria which are represented by Brady 
bonds. In the case of the developed bond markets, which are able to issue international 
bonds in domestic currency, BBB investment grade corporate bonds are compared to the 
corresponding risk-free Treasury bond in each country.
8 
The data for the United States are obtained directly from the Federal Reserve, and 
not from published sources. The source of the data for countries other than the United 
States is the authorities of each country. This data set was originally collated for the 
Committee on the Global Financial System to examine the events surrounding the market 
stresses in the third quarter of 1998 and is summarized in BIS (1999). In those cases where 
                                                 
8 Below-investment grade corporate issues experienced even bigger jumps in their spreads and in their 
volatility. However, data limitations restricted the study to investment grade bonds.  
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there are missing observations, the data are obtained from either Bloomberg database or 
Credit Swiss First Boston directly (see Appendix A for more details). 
A potential problem with using just price data is that prices may be biased due to 
lack of active market makers during the crisis periods. This is especially true during the 
LTCM recapitalization announcement period which was a crisis of liquidity. To circumvent 
this problem would require data on trade quantities. However, quantity data are not 
available at high frequency for the range of countries considered. Using lower frequency 
data would have the disadvantage of yielding insufficient information to characterize the 
Russian and LTCM recapitalization announcement crises, which are of a relatively short 
duration. For this reason, attention is focused on using daily price data.  
The statistical characteristics of the data are summarised in Appendix B. The rise in 
spreads over the period is approximated by a unit root, as the corresponding risk free rates 
remained relatively constant during 1998. Both larger means and absolute movements are 
evident in the premia of developing markets compared with the industrialized countries. 
The data display non-normality, and fitting univariate integrated GARCH(1,1) models to 
the changes in the premia suggests that there is a common time-varying volatility structure 
underlying the data. This feature of the structure is exploited in the model described in the 
following section. 
4   A Factor Model of Bond Spreads 
Volatility in the premia of each country is hypothesized to be influenced by events 
that are country-specific and events that are common to all economies. However, it is 
difficult to ascertain both the timing and nature of these events. In the existing literature, 
contagion is tested by conditioning on events chosen by the researcher after the observed 
financial crises, for example the work of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996), 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), and Glick and Rose (1999) follows this approach. The 
economic indicators chosen in this way are often statistically insignificant, and it is difficult 
to know whether they are the ‘correct’ choice even ex-post.  A desirable alternative, noted 





which does not require the choice of specific indicators with which to associate the 
crises, that is to use latent factors. 
Latent factor models have been specified for a number of markets. The majority of 
the existing empirical work has focused on currency and equity markets, such as 
represented in Diebold and Nerlove (1989), Ng, Engle and Rothschild (1992), Mahieu and 
Schotman (1994), and King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994). Empirical work on interest 
rates is rather less extensive. Gregory and Watts (1995) explore long bond yields across 
countries, while Dungey, Martin and Pagan (2000) apply a latent factor model to the 
spreads between individual country bonds and the US bond.
9 
The basic model of the bond market adopted in this paper is similar to that specified 
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) for equity 
markets. Letting  , it r  be the interest rate on the bond in country i, the interest rate is 
determined by a risk-free rate of interest,  , it rf , a world factor, Wt and a time-varying 
country-specific factor fi,t, 
,, , + ,       1... it it i t i it rr f W f i n λ φ =+ = ,   (3.1) 
where n is the number of bond markets. The loadings on these world and country-specific 
factors are given by the parameters λi and φ i respectively. The common factor, Wt , affects 
the premia in all countries, but with a differing parameter in each case.  
  Regional effects have been posited to be important in the spread of crises, for 
example in the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) and Glick and Rose (1999). To 
incorporate these effects, equation (3.1) is extended as follows: 
  , , ,   1      , , , , , Eur As Lat k ,...,n, i R f W rf r t k i t i i t i t i t i = = + + + = γ φ λ  (3.2) 
where Rk,t is a time-varying regional factor and K=3 is the number of regions. The first 
regional factor is common to Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and 
is denoted RLat,t. The second is a regional factor common to the Asian economies 
(Indonesia, Korea and Thailand), denoted RAs,t whilst the third regional factor of Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Poland and Russia) is denoted REur,t. No regional factor is included for 
                                                 
9 A similar class of models is adopted by Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003)  in studying business cycles.  
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the industrialized countries comprising the U.S., the U.K. and the Netherlands. Defining 
































































































































































































































































where the order of the countries is: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, Netherlands, UK and the U.S.. 
 
  To incorporate the large movements in the premia over the sample period identified 
in Section 2, the common factor is specified as integrated of order one 
1 , tt t WW η − =+    (3.4) 
where ηt is a stationary disturbance term. The regional factors in (3.3) are also specified as 
integrated processes of order one 
,, 1 , ,, , , kt kt kt R R where k Lat As Eur ν − =+ =    (3.5) 
where  , kt ν  are stationary disturbance terms. In addition, equation (3.3) shows that each 
premium has a unique idiosyncratic error, or country-specific factor, , it f . To complete the 
specification of the non-contagion model, the disturbance processes are assumed to be 
distributed as  





where in general Ht is a 16-variate system of independent GARCH processes 
normalized to have unit unconditional variances. Whilst the factors are assumed to be 
independent, the model nonetheless is able to capture the comovements in bond spreads in 
the mean, as well as in the variance. An important advantage of adopting a factor structure 
is that it provides a parsimonious representation of the data, thereby circumventing the 
need to estimate highly parameterized multivariate GARCH models. Here we restrict the 
GARCH to the world factor, following the preliminary GARCH results reported in 
Appendix B, Table B.4, which showed a high degree of commonality amongst the 
conditional variance structure of the premia.
10 
  To allow for the effects of contagion, equation (3.3) is augmented to include the 
idiosyncratic shocks from Russia ( f9,t ) and the U.S. ( f12,t ). This definition of contagion is 
consistent with those of Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Masson (1999a,b,c) as it 
reflects the additional contemporaneous linkages across markets during crisis periods 
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10 The three regional factors were initially assumed to exhibit GARCH processes, but were found to be 
statistically insignificant.  
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where the strength of contagion from both Russia and LTCM are controlled by the 
parameters δi,Rus and δi,US,  whilst the other parameters are as defined in equation (3.3). For 
identification reasons there are no own effects, that is δ9,Rus =  δ12,US = 0. 
  Given the global dominance of U.S. financial markets it is desirable to isolate the 
LTCM shock from other US based news.  To achieve this, the contagion effects of LTCM 
(f12,t, ) in equation (3.7) is  multiplied by the indicator variable It. This takes the value of 1 
for the period of the LTCM recapitalization announcement shock, the 23
rd of September 
1998 to the 15
th of October 1998, and 0 for the non-LTCM crisis period.
11 This choice of 
dates is consistent with the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (1999: pp. 8-9). 
It begins with the recapitalization package announced on 23
rd September, and ends with the 
inter-Federal Open Market Commission (FOMC) rate cut by the Federal Reserve on 
October 15
th, a date supported by Kumar and Persaud (2001). Whilst it is apparent that 
there were signals that LTCM was in difficulty pre-September 1998, reports suggest that 
the true size of the problem became clearer around the time of the meetings co-ordinated 
by the Federal Reserve; see, for example, Shirreff (1998). As the clearest signal to the 
market of LTCM's difficulties was the recapitalization announcement, this is used as the 
starting date. 
  A useful way of examining the results from estimating a model such as (3.7) is to 
consider the contribution that each factor makes to total volatility in the movement of the 
premium of each country. As the factors are independent, the total variance of the change 
in the premia for each economy can be conveniently decomposed as 
12 
()
22 2 2 2
,, , 22 2 . it i i iR u s iU S i Var P λ γδ δ φ Δ= + + + +  (3.8) 
The results of interest are then given as the proportion of the total volatility in the changes 
in the premium for country i due to the: 








                                                 
11 In Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2002b), the indicator variable, It, was omitted – the 
influence of the US economy in global markets means that the impact of the LTCM shock was somewhat 
overstated. We thank Charles Goodhart for his suggestions on the structure of the dummy variable. 
12 The expression in equation (3.8) is based on rewriting equation (3.7) as an error correction model; for 







































5   Relationship with Existing Literature 
The concept of contagion from both a theoretical and empirical viewpoint is 
controversial in the literature. Recent overviews of the issues are provided by Dornbusch, 
Park and Claessens (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). The definition of contagion 
adopted in this paper is that contagion represents the effects of contemporaneous 
movements across countries having conditioned on a range of factors including common, 
regional and idiosyncratic factors. This definition of contagion is related to the approach of 
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) and under certain 
scenarios is also equivalent to Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Bae, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2003); see Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2005b).  
Contagion is viewed here as a residual, which is a common theme in the literature, 
for example the work of Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Masson (1999a,b,c). 
Masson decomposes exchange rate changes into four components. These are “monsoonal 
shocks”, or global shocks affecting all countries simultaneously, (Wt in (3.7)); linkages 
which occur through normal trade and economic relationships, (a combination of Wt and 
Rk,t in (3.7)); country-specific shocks, (fi,t in (3.7)), and a residual, which is the component 
unexplained by these systematic relationships. It is this last concept that both this chapter 
and Masson (1999a,b,c) denote as contagion. For the model specified here this residual is a 
combination of the effects from f9,t and f12,t which are the shocks from Russia and the U.S.. 
Masson (1999a,b,c) attributes part of the residual process to multiple equilibria, or 
sunspots, where there is a role for self-fulfilling expectations leading to contagion if  
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opinions are coordinated across countries, an approach also taken by Loisel and Martin 
(2001). Multiple equilibria models are also consistent with other channels for contagion, 
such as wake-up calls due to Goldstein (1998) or heightened awareness due to Lowell, Neu 
and Tong (1998). In these cases a reappraisal of one country’s fundamentals leads to a 
reappraisal of the fundamentals in other countries, thereby resulting in the transmission of 
crises. Kyle and Xiong (2001) explain contagion in the LTCM and Russian crises as a 
wealth effect, as traders operating in risky markets encounter shocks and liquidate their 
portfolios. Thus, a shock in one market can reverberate in seemingly unconnected markets. 
Both the wake-up call, wealth effect model and Masson's definition of contagion are 
consistent with the model presented in Section  4. 
The transmission of expectations in both the multiple equilibrium and wake-up call 
models can lead to herd behavior as in work by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) and 
Calvo and Mendoza (2000). Herd behavior leads to a concept distinguished as unwarranted 
contagion by Kruger, Osakwe and Page (1998), which occurs when a crisis spreads to 
another country that otherwise would not have experienced a speculative attack. This also 
corresponds with contagion defined as a residual. A further potential channel of contagion 
is through asset bubbles created by self-fulfilling expectations, moral hazard, or 
government guarantees, either implied or explicit. Krugman (1998) shows how herd 
behaviour may burst these bubbles.  
Existing empirical work which also uses definitions of contagion fitting into the 
current framework, include Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who test for changes in the 
correlation structure between asset returns, and Favero and Giavazzi (2002) who 
concentrate on testing for the transmission of large shocks across markets. The effect of 
‘news’ announcements in transmitting crises is investigated by Baig and Goldfajn (1999) 
and Ellis and Lewis (2000) for a range of countries.  Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) also 
analyze the effects of news, where contagion is defined as the spread of investors’ moods 
across national borders. Their key result is that some of the largest swings in the stock 
market occurred on days of no news. However, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) and Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (1999) make no distinction between anticipated or unanticipated shocks. 
Alternative definitions of contagion which lie outside the framework adopted in this 





channels are captured by the global and regional factors of the model. For example, 
Reside and Gochoco-Bautista (1999) define contagion as the spillover effects of domestic 
disturbances on nearby or related economies, using lagged changes in the exchange rates as 
their contagion variable. Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) construct a contagion 
vulnerability index based on correlations between stock markets, trade linkages, presence 
of common markets and inter-linkages between banking systems. Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2001) construct a subjective binary variable to examine contagion effects due to 
financial and trade linkages. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Wirjanto (1999), and 
Kruger, Osakwe and Page (1998) condition their models on the existence of a crisis 
elsewhere.  
 
6   Estimation Method 
  Gourieroux and Monfort (1994) have shown that direct estimation of the factor 
model in Section 4 by likelihood methods based on existing deterministic numerical 
procedures is infeasible as a result of the nonlinear structure arising from the GARCH 
conditional variance structure. Estimation procedures based on the Kalman filter or GMM 
only produce an approximation to the likelihood and thereby yield inconsistent parameter 
estimates. To circumvent problems of parameter inconsistency we adopt the indirect 
estimation techniques of Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and Gourieroux and 
Monfort (1994) to estimate the models specified in Section 4. A recent alternative 
numerical simulation approach focusing on the direct likelihood is Fiorentini, Sentana and 
Shephard (2004). 
  Indirect estimation belongs to a class of techniques whereby the parameters are 
estimated by matching the characteristics of the sample data, with those of data simulated 
from the hypothesized model. The key to this technique is that while the model is 
analytically complex to evaluate directly, it is relatively straightforward to simulate. Other 
forms of this technique are known as Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) and Efficient 
Method of Moments (EMM). SMM is associated with the work of Duffie and Singleton 
(1993) and EMM with Gallant and Tauchen (1996). The differences between the three  
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methods lie in the way in which the matching of moments between actual and simulated 
data proceeds.  
  In indirect estimation, the matching of moments is accomplished via specifying an 
auxiliary model which acts as an approximation to the true likelihood function. The 
auxiliary model is chosen to capture the key empirical characteristics of the data which are 
needed to identify the unknown parameters. The first set of conditions is based on a 
VAR(1) of the levels of the premia, where the moments are given by the product of the 
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This is of dimension (1x144). The second set of moment conditions corresponds to the 
variance of the level of the premia. Formally,  
12
, ,  1,2,...,12.  ti t kP i =≥    (3.10) 
The third set of moment conditions captures the AR(1) structure of the changes in the 
premia, 
2
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The fourth and fifth set of moment conditions capture conditional volatility in the premia 
arising from the GARCH characteristics of the data discussed in Section II. It comprises 
AR(1) and AR(2) loadings for the squared changes in the premia. In a similar manner to 
Diebold and Nerlove (1989), the number of overidentifying conditions is controlled by 
including only the ‘own’ squared autocorrelations of the change in the premium. These 
additional expressions contain a total of 12 elements each 
32 2 2 2
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Collecting all (144+12+12+12+12) time series from (3.9) to (3.13) into a (1x192) vector  
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and taking the sample average of gt defines all of the moment conditions that summarize 
the auxiliary model at time t. 
  Analogous to the moment conditions based on the sample data, a set of moment 
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where 
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4
h k are the analogs of equations (3.9) to (3.13) with the actual data 
replaced by the simulated data for the h
th simulation of the premia,  , ih P . 
Letting  θ be the set of unknown parameters of the latent factor model, the indirect 
estimator,  ˆ θ , is the solution of: 
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where  g  and  h v  are respectively the sample means of equations (3.14) and (3.15). The 
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  are the Newey-West weights. In constructing this weighting matrix, the blocks are 
assumed to be independent. 
  The indirect estimator in equation (3.16) is solved using the gradient algorithms in 
OPTMUM, GAUSS version 3.2, where the gradients are computed numerically. The 
simulations are based on normal random numbers using the GAUSS procedure RNDN.
 13 
7   Empirical Results 
  To examine the differences between the transmission of contagion from the Russian 
crisis and the LTCM recapitalization announcement, the unconditional variance 
decomposition estimates using equation (3.8), are presented in Table 2, and summarized in 
                                                 
13 All results are based on H=500 simulation paths in (3.16) with a convergence tolerance of 0.001 and a 
lag window of L=5 in equation (3.17).   




14 Total volatility is decomposed into the contribution due to the world factor, 
regional factors, country-specific factors and the contagion effects from Russia and the 
LTCM recapitalization announcement shocks.  
The results in Table 2 indicate that the dominant factor in the volatility 
decomposition of the change in the bond premia is the world factor, pointing strongly 
towards commonality in the movements in premia experienced over the sample period 
(Figures 1 and 2). This result is consistent with the view that increasing financial market 
integration has led to high (and expected) co-movements in asset prices. The world factor 
accounts for between 82 percent (Netherlands) and 99.7 percent (U.K. and Mexico) of total 
volatility. A corollary of this is that the regional factors have little influence on volatility, 
with all accounting for less than one percentage point of total volatility. Country-specific 
factors are relatively important for the U.S. (11.8 percent) and Argentina (12.7 percent), 
with the contribution to all the other countries being relatively small at less than 6 percent 
of total volatility.  
The contagion effects recorded in Table 2 are consistent with Proposition A in 
Section 2.2, that contagious links exist during the crisis period. Most of the contagion 
effects in the results are sourced from Russia. The empirical results also show that 
contagion affects a wide range of countries across the regions investigated. Of the 
industrial nations, the Netherlands experiences almost 17 percent of its total volatility from 
contagion originating in Russia. The other developed markets experience less than 4 
percent. These results provide support for Proposition B in Section 2.2, that financial 
exposure to the Russian markets made economies vulnerable to contagion. The U.S. 
financial exposure to Russia is also partly evident in the results, with contagion 
representing 3 percent of total U.S. volatility. 
                                                 
14 Experiments extending this class of models to allow for contagion from the Latin American and Asian 
regions in conjunction with contagion from the U.S. and Russia, were undertaken to allow for the most 
general specification. However, this line of research was not pursued due to an undesirable amount of 
parameter instability inherent in estimating the larger models. The present model is an extension of the model 
investigated in Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2002b) which allowed for contagion effects 





The Russian crisis results provide some support for the regional proposition, 
Proposition C in Section 2.2. Contagion from the Russian crisis was most consistently 
present in Eastern Europe, where it represents 5 and 7 percent of volatility for Poland and 
Bulgaria.     
  In contrast, contagion from the LTCM recapitalization announcement shock is very 
small as a proportion of total volatility, although its effects are nonetheless widespread 
across countries and regions. The largest contagion effect from the LTCM recapitalization 
announcement shock is under 4 percent of total volatility, experienced by Korea. It is 
possible that the relatively small LTCM recapitalization announcement effects are the 
result of the coordinated action of the U.S. Fed to halt its spread. 
Table 2: Volatility Decomposition of Changes in the Premia 
(contribution to total volatility, in percent) 
   Contagion 






   
Latin America   
Argentina  86.828  12.676 0.045 0.352 0.099  0.451 
Brazil  83.153 0.184 0.004  16.410 0.249  16.659 
Mexico  99.736 0.001 0.006 0.148 0.109  0.257 
Asia   
Indonesia  98.847 0.269 0.205 0.299 0.381  0.679 
Korea  88.853 4.950 0.880 1.571 3.746  5.317 
Thailand  90.521 1.318 0.376 6.181 1.603  7.784 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria  91.334 0.204 0.516 7.573 0.374  7.946 
Poland  93.708 0.046 0.659 5.314 0.273  5.587 
Russia  94.733 5.058 0.107  - 0.102  0.102 
Industrial        
Netherlands 82.289  0.520  - 16.941  0.251  17.191 
U.K. 99.735  0.013  -  0.099  0.153  0.252 
U.S.  84.972  11.833 -  3.196 -  3.196 
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Figure 3: Volatility Decomposition of Changes in the Premia 
(contribution to total volatility, in percent) 
 
The results for Indonesia, Brazil, and Argentina are worthy of further examination. 
Indonesia drew comment as the hardest hit by contagion effects in currency markets during 
the 1997 Asian crisis; see for example discussions by Radelet and Sachs (1998) and 
Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). However, the contagion effects in Indonesian 
bond markets during 1998, as measured here, are relatively small. Contagion may still have 
been transmitted to Indonesia through asset markets other than the bond market, possibly 
due to illiquidity in the sovereign bond market during the political turmoil prevailing in 
Indonesia. An alternative interpretation is that Indonesia became extremely sensitive to 
global financial events in this period, consistent with a large value of λi in equation (3.7), 
compared with the East Asian crisis. 
  The Brazilian results show a relatively large proportionate effect of contagion, 
predominantly sourced from Russia, consistent with the view developed by Baig and 
Goldfajn (2000) that the withdrawal of foreign capital from Brazil during the Russian crisis 
precipitated the Brazilian crisis of January 1999. The relatively large contagion effect to 
Brazil may be a reflection of the vulnerability of Brazilian fundamentals, consistent with 























markets as a sovereign issuer and let domestic interest rates fall to stimulate the 
economy. In response to the Russian shock it experienced sharp capital outflows as foreign 
investors withdrew, which eventually promoted higher domestic interest rates and a tighter 
fiscal stance. However, the relief was short-lived as these reforms came to be viewed as 
unsustainable in the light of the depreciation of the Brazilian real (International Monetary 
Fund (2001)). 
  Argentina experienced relatively small contagion effects in 1998. Krueger (2002), 
notes that Argentina appeared in relatively good economic condition at that time, which is 
consistent with the fundamentals proposition. The International Monetary Fund (2001: p.9) 
pointed out that Argentina had not had access to financial markets to meet its current 
financing commitments during the crisis period. It was only later that the combination of 
policy settings was revealed to be unsustainable. In light of this it is noteworthy that the 
factors determining total volatility in the sample period for Argentina are more like those 
determining the U.S. than the other countries examined. In particular, the contributions to 
total volatility coming from the country-specific factors in Argentina and the U.S. are the 
largest of the countries examined. This may reflect the fact that Argentina was the only 
emerging economy in our sample with a currency board regime that appeared to be credible 
during this time.  
  The results provide little evidence to support the proposition that contagion 
emanating from Russia is confined to developing nations, or that contagion emanating from 
the LTCM recapitalization announcement was confined to developed markets, as suggested 
by the Committee on the Global Financial System (1999: p.7-8). However, it is difficult to 
derive any stylized facts to support or refute the contention that emerging markets are more 
affected by contagion than developed markets. The evidence presented here suggests that 
both types of markets can be affected by contagion to varying degrees. For example, 
countries where the effect of contagion from Russia is less than one percentage point 
include the Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia and the United Kingdom. 
  To address these issues further, we transform the results in Table 2 into their 
squared basis point equivalent by multiplying the values in Table 2 by the variance in the 
changes in the premia for each country (i.e. the square of the standard deviations which are  
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reported in Table B.2 in Appendix B). The estimated variance decompositions in squared 
basis points are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Volatility Decomposition of Changes in the Premia 
(contribution to total volatility, in squared basis points) 
 
       Total 
  World Country  Regional Contagion 
   
Latin America   
Argentina 984.339  143.707 0.505 5.118 
Brazil 2923.097  6.472 0.138 585.600 
Mexico 525.311  0.006 0.034 1.352 
Asia   
Indonesia 3085.454  8.385 6.408 21.210 
Korea 728.813  40.602 7.219 43.616 
Thailand 452.579  6.591 1.882 38.918 
Eastern Europe   
Bulgaria 9138.896  20.378 51.620 795.107 
Poland 494.421  0.245 3.479 29.476 
Russia 55685.890  2973.197 62.971 59.942 
Industrial   
Netherlands 23.907  0.151 -  4.994 
U.K. 13.876  0.002 -  0.035 
U.S. 6.380  0.888 -  0.240 
      
 
  Comparing the results in Tables 2 and 3 highlights the differences between 
emerging and developed markets. Consider the Netherlands. In proportionate terms in 
Table 2, contagion contributes 17 percent to volatility in the Netherlands. However, in 
Table 3, this corresponds to 5 squared basis points
15, only greater than the other developed 
markets and Mexico. On the other hand, Brazil, which had the second greatest 
proportionate contribution from contagion, also has the second greatest squared basis point 
contribution, at around 590 squared basis points. The largest squared basis point 
contribution from contagion was experienced by Bulgaria. Bulgaria had a proportionate 
                                                 
15 This result may also reflect the choice of the corporate bond used for the Netherlands, it would be 





contribution from contagion of almost 8 percent, similar to that for Thailand, but 
contagion contributed 795 squared basis points in Bulgaria, compared with 39 squared 
basis points in Thailand. The bond markets of emerging countries experienced a greater 
squared basis point contribution from contagion than the developed countries due to their 
absolute higher levels of volatility. 
8   Conclusion 
  The international spillover effects stemming from the Russian debt default and the 
LTCM recapitalization announcement in 1998 seemed to be different from those of other 
financial crises in the 1990s. In 1998, bond markets in both developed and emerging 
economies experienced a significant widening of spreads between long-term bonds and 
their corresponding risk-free rate of return. In other episodes of financial crisis during the 
1990s, the impact of crises seemed to be limited to emerging markets, or even a regional 
subset of them. 
  This paper examined the crises associated with the Russian bond default in August 
1998, and the LTCM recapitalization announcement in September 1998. Using a latent 
factor model, the change in the premia of twelve bond markets was decomposed into 
components associated with a common world factor, country-specific factors, regional 
factors and contagion effects. Contagion was defined as the contemporaneous effect of 
idiosyncratic shocks transmitting across country borders. This definition of contagion is 
consistent with those offered in a substantial portion of the literature on this topic, 
including Masson (1999 a,b,c), Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and Forbes and Rigobon 
(2001, 2002). The contribution of this paper is both in the application to bond markets and 
that we provide numerical estimates of the contribution of contagion to volatility in those 
markets.  
  The results show clear evidence of contagion effects from Russia, to both emerging 
and developed countries, while the global contagion effects from the LTCM 
recapitalization announcement tended to be smaller. In proportionate terms, contagion 
effects from Russia were particularly substantial for the Netherlands, Brazil, Bulgaria and 
Thailand, ranging from 8 percent to about 17 percent of total volatility. The results showed  
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that the strength of market fundamentals and the extent of offshore exposures of countries 
to Russia were important factors in determining the strength of contagion across national 
borders. Further, there is also strong evidence that contagion operated within regions, with 
the Russian bond default affecting the bonds markets of Poland and Bulgaria. 
  The absence of substantial contagion from the LTCM recapitalization 
announcement, as a global liquidity shock, is somewhat surprising given the anecdotal 
evidence offered by traders surveyed by the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(1999: chapter 3). However, these results may reflect the short duration of the LTCM 
recapitalization announcement period (spanning about three weeks) as the Fed acted to 
contain a potential credit crunch by easing monetary policy aggressively. The evidence also 
suggests that while the U.S. experienced some contagion from Russia, contagion from the 
LTCM recapitalization announcement crisis to Russia was very small.  
  The proportion of volatility in the premia attributed to contagion did not provide 
clear evidence as to whether the crises had a greater effect on emerging or developed 
markets. When the results were transformed to squared basis point effects, the evidence 
generally supported the contention that contagion was greater in emerging markets, due to 
the overall higher degree of volatility typically experienced in those markets. While most 
of the literature on contagion generally espouses the notion that contagion is only a concern 
for emerging countries, the results in this paper suggest that contagion can also be 
meaningful for developed economies, at least in the bond market. 
  The results also give support to the view that Brazil was affected by contagion prior 
to its currency crisis in January 1999. The relatively large contagion effects from Russia to 
Brazil, may be a reflection of the vulnerability of this country. That the contagion to Brazil 
is evident in the data prior to its own crisis provides scope for interesting future work in 





 A   Data Definitions and Sources 
Argentina: Republic of Argentina bond spread over U.S. Treasury. 
  Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Brazil:  Republic of Brazil bond spread over U.S. Treasury. 
  Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Mexico: JP Morgan Eurobond Index Mexico Sovereign spread over U.S. Treasury. Source: 
U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Indonesia: Indonesian Yankee Bond Spread over U.S. Treasury.  
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Korea: Government of Korea 8 7/8%  4/2008 over U.S. Treasury. 
Source: Bloomberg (50064FAB0) 
Thailand: Kingdom of Thailand Yankee Bond Spread over U.S. Treasury. 
  Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. (The longer series used in Figure 1, 7.75% 15/04/07, 
comes from Credit Swiss First Boston). 
Bulgaria: Bulgarian Discount Stripped Brady Bond Yield Spread over U.S. Treasury. 
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Poland: Poland Par Stripped Brady Bond Yield Spread over U.S. Treasury. 
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
Russia: Government of Russia  9.25% 11/2001 over U.S. Treasury. 
Source: Bloomberg (007149662). 
Netherlands: Akzo Nobel NV 8% 12/2002 yield spread over NETHER 8.25% 6/2002. 
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve. 
U.K.: U.K. Industrial BBB Corporate 5-year Bond Spread over Gilt. Source: Bloomberg 
(UKBF3B05) 
U.S.: U.S. Industrial BBB1 Corporate 10-year Bond Spread over U.S. Treasury. Source: 
Bloomberg (IN10Y3B1) 
The data obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve was for the Bank for International Settlements, 
Committee on Global Financial System to aid in their enquiry into the turmoil of 1998 (Bank for 
International Settlements, Committee on the Global Financial System (1999)). The data will not 
necessarily represent trades enacted. The estimation is based on daily data on spreads from 
February 12 to January 1, 1999. The bond spreads, or “risk premia,” are constructed by taking a 
representative long-term sovereign bond issued in U.S. dollars by an emerging country and 
subtracting from it a U.S. Treasury bond of comparable maturity. For developed economies, the 
risk premia are constructed by taking a representative long-term corporate bond in domestic 
currency and subtracting from it a Government Treasury bond of comparable maturity. 
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Missing observations were dealt with by removing all contemporaneous observations for that date 
across countries. The original sample of 231 observations was reduced to 209 observations after 
accounting for missing observations. The exact details of the missing observations are contained in 
Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2002b). 
 
B   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics of Premia (in levels) 
 
  Latin America     Asia 
            
Statistics  Argentina Brazil  Mexico    Indonesia Korea  Thailand 
            
            
Mean   534.70   744.07   469.70   959.67   486.26   423.17 
Maximum   
1061.00 
 1438.00   868.33   1865.80   965.88   916.30 
Minimum   374.00   415.00   297.66   537.10   306.70   270.20 
Std. Dev.   140.62   291.13   155.61   369.50   163.88   167.48 
AR(1)  0.97  0.98  0.99  0.99 0.98 0.99 
AR(2)  0.94  0.96  0.97  0.97 0.96 0.98 
Skewness   1.26   0.61   0.66  0.97  1.26  1.16 















            
            
 Eastern  Europe    Industrial 
             
  Bulgaria Poland  Russia    Netherlands  U.K.  U.S. 
            
            
Mean   951.72   261.21   2871.81   58.59   122.92  106.06 
Maximum   2279.00   521.00   6825.78   109.10   203.00  153.00 
Minimum   535.00   162.00   392.35   34.20   76.00  67.00 
Std. Dev.   431.92   75.73   2512.65   20.38   36.26  28.85 
AR(1)  0.97 0.95 0.99  0.96  0.99  0.99 
AR(2)  0.94 0.90 0.98  0.93  0.98  0.98 
Skewness  1.35 0.95 0.28  0.95  0.72  0.44 

























   
Asia 
 
         
        
Argentina 33.67    Indonesia 55.87 
Brazil 59.29    Korea 28.64 
Mexico 22.95    Thailand 22.36 
        
 
Eastern Europe 
   
Industrial 
 
        
Bulgaria 100.03    Netherlands 5.39 
Poland 22.97    U.K.  3.73 
Russia 242.45    U.S.  2.74 
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Table B3: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and  
Phillips Perron (PP) Unit Root Tests of the Premia 
 
 Latin  America    Asia 
            
Statistic  Argentina Brazil  Mexico    Indonesia Korea Thailand 
             
             
ADF  Test  -1.700 -1.138 -1.183    -1.219  -1.302  -1.129 
PP  Test  -1.818 -1.283 -1.273    -1.216  -1.433  -1.081 
            
 Eastern  Europe    Industrial 
            
  Bulgaria Poland  Russia    Netherlands  U.K.  U.S. 
              
ADF  Test  -1.379 -2.287 -0.727    -1.256  -0.605  -0.602 
PP  Test  -1.685 -2.299 -0.741    -1.540  -0.577  -0.641 
            
MacKinnon critical values for rejection of the hypothesis of a unit root for the ADF test are: 
1% critical value -3.4634 (* represents rejection at the 1% level of significance) 
5% critical value -2.8756 (** represents rejection at the 5% level of significance) 
MacKinnon critical values for rejection of the hypothesis of a unit root for the PP test are: 
1% critical value -3.4631 (* represents rejection at the 1% level of significance) 




Table B.4 presents the results from estimating an integrated GARCH(1,1) model for 
changes in each of the premium series. The changes are examined in order to highlight the 
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Table B4: Univariate Integrated GARCH (1,1) Parameter Estimates 
(QMLE standard errors in brackets) 
 
Country Parameter   
  ρ0  α0  α1  ln L 
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Chapter 4: Contagion in Global Equity Markts 1
1 Introduction
The year 1998 was a time of tremendous turmoil in ￿nancial markets. Throughout this
year market reports presented evidence of continuous nervousness about the Russian
banking and ￿nancial sectors culminating with the suspension of payment on sovereign
debt and the ￿ oat of the rouble in August. These events were soon followed by the not
unrelated near-default of the US hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).
The shocks during this period had far reaching e⁄ects on global ￿nancial markets and
to some observers the period represented the worst turbulence in international ￿nancial
markets that had occurred in the past decades (Upper (2001), and BIS Committee on
the Global Financial System (1999)).
While the primary shocks in the Russian and LTCM crises began in bond markets,
their repercussions were felt throughout the ￿nancial sector, and much volatility ap-
peared in international equity markets. This paper looks at the transmission of crises
during 1998 in international equity markets and ￿nds results that di⁄er substantially
from those for international bond markets. In equity markets the majority of the trans-
mission of the shocks across international borders is attributable to contagion e⁄ects
whereas in bond markets contagion e⁄ects are relatively small, although in both cases
contagion e⁄ects are signi￿cant.
The empirical results also show that the most in￿ uential source of contagion e⁄ects
di⁄ers across the two asset types during this period: the majority of the contagion
e⁄ects in equity markets are sourced through the US equity market, while in bond
markets contagion is primarily associated with events in Russia, as discussed in chapter
3 of this thesis. The importance of the US market in distributing equity market shocks
supports the hypothesis of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) that large markets act as
centres in distributing shocks to the periphery markets.
The empirical results of this paper contribute to the existing literature that focuses
on the role of equity markets in acting as a conduit during the Russian bond crisis and
the LTCM￿ s near collapse, by adopting a more general model that looks at a range of
1This chapter is published in Dungey, M., R. Fry, B. Gonzalez-Hermosillo, and V. Martin (2007a),
"Unanticipated Shocks and Systemic In￿ uences: the Impact of Contagion in Global Equity Markets
in 1998," American Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 18, Issue 2, August.Chapter 4 76
factors linking both industrial and emerging equity markets during the ￿nancial crises of
1998. The earlier work of the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (1999)
focuses on industrial countries, whereas Rigobon (2003) and HernÆndez and ValdØs
(2001) concentrate on emerging markets. More recently, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003)
look at the interrelationships between industrial and emerging markets, while Baig and
Goldfajn (2001) speci￿cally focus on the transmissions to Brazil. The e⁄ects of the
Russian and LTCM shocks on international bond markets are studied by Dungey,
Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2006), Jorion (2000) and the Committee on the
Global Financial System (1999).
To identify the linkages across international equity markets during ￿nancial crises,
a factor model is developed that extends the international capital asset pricing model
of Solnik (1974) and the multi-factor extensions proposed by King, Sentana and Wad-
hwani (1994). A feature of the model is that it allows for not only common and regional
factors but also for contagion; see Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) and Pericoli
and Sbracia (2003) for a review of de￿nitions of contagion. An important theoretical
extension over these earlier models is the identi￿cation of contagion through multiple
regime shifts in the factor structures. The approach represents a multivariate exten-
sion of the correlation change test of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and is also related to
the recent contagion tests proposed by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) based on threshold
models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A multi-regime factor model of
￿nancial crises is speci￿ed in Section 2. A number of preliminary empirical issues are
discussed in Section 3, including data ￿ltering, identi￿cation of equity market shocks,
and estimation strategies. The main empirical results are presented in Section 4, while
Section 5 contains some concluding comments and suggestions for future research.
2 A Model of Financial Turmoil in Equity Markets
During 1998
In this section a multi-regime factor model of equity markets is speci￿ed to identify the
transmission mechanisms of ￿nancial crises between international equity markets. The
model builds on the earlier work of Solnik (1974) and in particular, the factor model of
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contagion during the Russian and LTCM crises. An important theoretical extension
of this earlier class of factor models is the identi￿cation of contagion during the crisis
periods by allowing for multiple regime shifts in the factor structures.
Let si;t represent the equity returns of country i at time t. A total of 10 equity mar-
kets is used in the empirical analysis including 6 emerging equity markets (Argentina
(AR), Brazil (BR), Hong Kong SAR (HK), Thailand (TH), Poland (PO) and Russia
(RU)) and 4 industrial equity markets (Germany (GE), Japan (JA), United Kingdom
(UK) and the United States (US)).2 De￿ning st as a (10 ￿ 1) vector of all equity re-
turns, the dynamics of equity markets are assumed to be represented by the following
vector autoregression (VAR)
st = ￿ + A1st￿1 + A2st￿2 + ￿￿￿ + Apst￿p + ut; (4.1)
where ￿ is a (10 ￿ 1) vector of parameters to allow for non-zero means in equity returns,
Ai is a (10 ￿ 10) matrix of autoregressive parameters corresponding to the ith lag, and
ut is a (10 ￿ 1) multivariate disturbance process with zero mean, variance-covariance
matrix ￿; and Eutut￿k = 0;8k 6= 0: The length of the lag distribution of the VAR is
given by p:
The disturbance term ut in (4.1) represents shocks to equity markets which are
assumed to be derived from a set of factors. In specifying the factor structure, the
model distinguishes between a benchmark period where the factors represent the mar-
ket fundamentals which link international equity markets, and a crisis period where
the benchmark factor structure is augmented with additional linkages that capture
contagion caused by shocks which increase the comovements of international equity
markets. These factor structures are formally speci￿ed below.
2.1 A Benchmark Model




. . . ￿1
i
ft = ￿1ft; (4.2)
2The countries examined in this chapter are slightly di⁄erent from those in chapter 3 because
of an interest in examining countries known to have experienced a sharp correction in their equity
markets during the period of study, which appear to have been inmune to contagion in bond markets
(for example, Hong Kong). However, both chapters examine representative countries from emerging
markets in Asia, Latin America and Europe, as well as mature economies. Furthermore, a robustness
check is undertaken at the end of the chapter to examine di⁄erences between the data sets used in
chapters 3 and 4.Chapter 4 78
where ft represents the full set of factors
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The factor wt in (4.3) represents shocks that simultaneously impact upon all equity
markets with the size of the impact determined by the loading parameter ￿i: For
this reason this factor is referred to as a world factor. Typical examples of world
factors would be the global e⁄ects of changes in US monetary policy on world equity
markets (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or the simultaneous impact on international
equity markets of an oil price shock. One important di⁄erence between these choices
of factors is that wt in (4.3) is not assumed to be observable, but is treated as a latent
factor.
The model in (4.3) contains two factors to distinguish emerging and developed mar-
kets, which are represented by et and dt respectively (see also Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2002), and the Committee on the Global Financial System (1999). The factor et; cap-
tures those shocks which speci￿cally a⁄ect the six emerging markets where the size of
the impact is governed by the parameter ￿i: The factor dt captures those shocks which
just a⁄ect the four industrial equity markets, with the size of the impact controlled by
the parameter ￿i:Contagion in Global Equity Markets 79
To allow for shocks which solely capture a common regional interest, such as pro-
posed by Glick and Rose (1999), the factor rt impacts only upon Argentina (AR),
Brazil (BR) and the US, with loading parameters given by  i. There are insu¢ cient
countries in any other common regional grouping to warrant the inclusion of further
regional factors in the set of equity markets used in the empirical application.
The last set of factors in (4.3) are given by vi;t; which represent shocks that are
speci￿c to each of the 10 equity markets with loading parameters given by ￿i. The
full set of factors can be classi￿ed into two broad groups, with the ￿rst four factors
(wt;et;dt;rt) representing systematic factors whose risks are not diversi￿able, whilst the
country speci￿c factors (vi;t) represent idiosyncratic factors whose risks are diversi￿able
(Solnik, 1974).3
To complete the speci￿cation of the benchmark model, the set of systematic and
idiosyncratic factors are assumed to be independent with zero means and unit variances
ft ￿ (0;1): (4.5)
In this speci￿cation, the variance of the series is assumed to be homoskedastic. This
choice of the normalization of the factors provides a convenient decomposition of equity
volatility into the contributions of each of the underlying factors during the benchmark
period











2.2 A Model Incorporating Contagion
The crisis model of equity shocks is characterized by the inclusion of additional trans-
mission mechanisms linking global equity markets during periods of crisis, over and
above the mechanisms identi￿ed by the benchmark model in (4.2). The approach to
modelling these additional linkages is to include the Russian (vRU;t) and US (vUS;t)
idiosyncratic shocks de￿ned in (4.2), into the factor structure of the remaining coun-
tries during periods in which crises are present. Following Masson (1999), Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo,
and Martin (2006), these linkages are referred to as contagion as they represent addi-
tional shocks over and above the shocks that occur during the benchmark period linking
3The choice of factors is based on some preliminary empirical analysis. Some robustness checks
and tests of the speci￿ed factors stucture are discussed in the empirical section.Chapter 4 80
equity markets, which contribute to the volatility of asset markets during periods of
crisis.
2.2.1 Incorporating Contagion from Russia




. . . ￿2
i
ft = ￿2ft; (4.7)
where A and ft are respectively given in (4.4) and (4.3), and ￿2 is speci￿ed as
￿2 =
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; (4.8)
where blank cells represent zeros. The strength of contagion from Russia to interna-
tional equity markets is controlled by the parameter ￿i. Equation (4.7) also allows
for the e⁄ect of Russian idiosyncratic shocks to di⁄er across regimes by allowing the
parameter ￿RU in (4.4) to di⁄er from ￿RU in (4.8). Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo
and Martin (2005) interpret this as an idiosyncratic structural break.
Following the benchmark decomposition of the variance in (4.6), equity market
volatility with contagion from Russia is decomposed as













This suggests that the contribution of contagion to volatility in the ith country when
there is potentially contagion from Russia compared with the benchmark model isContagion in Global Equity Markets 81
simply
￿V ar(ui;t) = ￿
2
i: (4.10)
Hence, a test of contagion emanating from the Russian equity market can be performed
by testing the restriction
H0 : ￿i = 0; 8i 6= RU: (4.11)
The speci￿cation in (4.8) allows for an exogenous change in the volatility of idio-
syncratic shocks in Russia between the benchmark and Russian crisis period. This
constitutes a structural break in the Russian idiosyncratic factor which can be tested
via the restriction
H0 : ￿RU = ￿RU: (4.12)
2.2.2 Incorporating Contagion from LTCM
An important feature of the LTCM crisis is that it occurs in conjunction with the
Russian crisis, but is of shorter duration. The LTCM liquidity crisis is viewed to have
ended at the time of the surprise inter-FOMC meeting to cut interest rates on October
15th (see Committee on the Global Financial System, 1999). The implication of this
characteristic of the twin-crisis periods, is that the contagious channel used to model
the transmission of shocks from Russia, is still active during the LTCM crisis period.
This feature of the problem imposes additional structure on the factors across the
regimes.
Following the approach to modelling contagion during the Russian period, conta-
gion emanating from the LTCM crisis is modelled by including US equity shocks vUS;t
during the time of the LTCM crisis as well as the Russian shocks vRU;t in the factor
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i
ft = ￿3ft: (4.13)Chapter 4 82
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where blank cells represent zeros. The strength of contagion from LTCM to interna-
tional equity markets is controlled by the parameter ￿i: As in the case of the model
including contagion from Russia, the speci￿cation of the LTCM crisis model allows for
a structural break in the idiosyncratic shock of the US, with the parameter ￿US in
(4.14) being allowed to di⁄er from the parameter ￿US in (4.4). As the LTCM crisis
coincides with potential contagion from the Russian crisis, the Russian idiosyncratic
shock vRU;t; is also included in the factor speci￿cation of the other equity markets to
re￿ ect the twin nature of the crises during the time of the LTCM crisis. A comparison
of (4.7) and (4.13) shows that the parameters measuring the strength of contagion from
Russia (￿i) to equity markets are the same across the two regimes.
During the LTCM crisis the decomposition of equity market volatility is given by















The change in volatility between the benchmark and LTCM crisis periods is





which shows that the total contribution of contagion to volatility during the LTCM
crisis period can be decomposed into two elements, emanating from the Russian basedContagion in Global Equity Markets 83
shocks and the US based LTCM shocks. A test of contagion emanating from the LTCM
shock can be performed by testing the restriction
H0 : ￿i = 0; 8i 6= US: (4.17)
A joint test of contagion from both Russia and the US is given by
H0 : ￿i = 0;￿j = 0; 8i 6= RU; j 6= 8US: (4.18)
A test of a structural break in the US idiosyncratic factor is given by testing the
restriction
H0 : ￿US = ￿US: (4.19)
3 Empirical Issues
3.1 Data
The sample consists of daily share prices (Pi;t) on 10 countries, beginning January 2,
1998 and ending December 31, 1998, a total of T = 260 observations. Local equity
market data are used which are sourced from Bloomberg.4 Extending the sample
period either before or after 1998 would complicate estimating the model as it would
involve including additional regimes to capture the East Asian currency crisis and the
Brazilian crisis of 1999 respectively.
Daily percentage equity returns of the ith country at time t are computed as
si;t = 100(ln(Pi;t) ￿ ln(Pi;t￿1)): (4.20)
Missing observations are treated by using the lagged price.5 To capture di⁄erences in
time zones of equity markets, a 2-day moving average is chosen following the approach
of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), with the ￿rst observation of the moving average set
equal to the realized returns on January 5th.6 Thus, the e⁄ective sample of returns data
begins January 5, 1998 and ends December 31, 1998, a total of T = 259 observations.
4The particular stock market indices used are: Argentina Merval Index, Brazil Bovespa Stock
Exchange, Hang Seng Stock Index, Thai SET Index, Warsaw Stock Exchange Total Return Index,
Russian RTS Index $, Deutsche Borse DAX Index, Nikkei 225 Index, FTSE 100, Dow Jones Industrial
Index.
5Filling in missing observations by use of a linear interpolation between observed prices does not
change the qualitative results of the estimated factor model.
6Another approach to addressing the problem of di⁄erent time zones is to follow Dungey, Fry,
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2003b) and treat time zones as a missing observation problem.
This makes estimation more involved as it requires simulating a high frequency model to generate
￿ hourly￿data which is converted into ￿ daily￿data and then calibrated with the actual data.Chapter 4 84
The benchmark period is chosen to begin on January 5 and end July 31, while
the crisis period is taken as the second half of 1998, beginning August 3 and ending
December 31. The start of the Russian crisis on August 3, is chosen to begin before
Russia￿ s unilateral debt restructuring on August 17, and to take into account the early
concerns of investors about the underlying stability of the Russian government debt
market (GKO), as well as the ongoing problems in the Russian economy.7
The LTCM crisis period is chosen as a sub-period of the overall crisis period, running
from August 31 to October 15. The start of this crisis is chosen to re￿ ect that the plight
of LTCM had gradually became more public by the end of August, culminating in the
public announcement of a recapitalization package in late September. The LTCM crisis
is taken to end with the surprise cut in US interest rates between FOMC meetings on
October 15, 1998; see Kumar and Persuad (2002), Upper and Werner (2002) Committee
on the Global Financial System (1999). A full chronology of these events is given by
Lowenstein (2001), Jorion (2000) and Kharas, Pintos and Ulatov (2000).
The choice of the crisis dates is clearly partly subjective. This choice is also compli-
cated by the occurrence of other events over the period, such as the period of August 14
to 28 where the Hong Kong Monetary Authority intervened in the Hong Kong equity
market to support the Hong Kong currency board (Goodhart and Dai (2003)). As the
dating of the regimes is important in identifying the parameters of each regime, some
robustness checks are discussed in the empirical section where the model is reestimated
for alternative crisis dates.
Some descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 1 for the three sample
periods, with variances and covariances given in Table 2. Inspection of the covariances
show the increase in comovements between equity returns between the benchmark and
crisis periods. The diagonal elements in Table 2 reveal that volatility in equity returns
increased for most countries in the Russian crisis period, and increased even further
during the LTCM crisis.
7Even though many of the investments in Russia were hedged by forward rouble contracts with
the Russian banking system, those very exposures contributed to the fragility of the banking system
itself (Steinherr (2004)).Contagion in Global Equity Markets 85
3.2 GMM Estimator
The model is estimated using generalized method of moments (GMM); see also Rigobon
and Sack (2004) for a recent application, and Sentana and Fiorentini (2001) for iden-
ti￿cation conditions. This has the advantage of not having to specify the distribution
of the factors in (4.5). Let the sample periods for the three regimes be respectively T1
(benchmark), T2 (Russian crisis) and T3 (LTCM crisis). Associated with each regime























where ut is the (10 ￿ 1) vector of shocks from the VAR in (4.1).
The factor model is compactly written as
ut = ￿kft; k = 1;2;3; (4.22)
where ￿1; ￿2 and ￿3 are de￿ned in equations (4.2), (4.7) and (4.13) respectively and ft
is the set of all factors de￿ned in equation (4.3). Using the property that the factors are
independent with zero means and unit variances, as in equation (4.5), the theoretical





k; k = 1;2;3: (4.23)
The total number of unknown parameters in ￿1;￿2 and ￿3 is 53. The GMM estimator is
obtained by choosing the parameters of the factor model in ￿1;￿2 and ￿3; and matching
the empirical moments in (4.21) with the theoretical moments in (4.23). Associated
with each empirical variance-covariance matrix are 10 ￿ 11=2 = 55 unique moments.
In total there are 3 ￿ 55 = 165 moments across all three regimes. As the LTCM crisis
period is relatively short, it is necessary to control the number of moments used in
the GMM procedure. The strategy is to choose for the LTCM crisis period the 10
variances, the 9 covariances between the US and the remaining countries, and the 8
covariances between Russia and the remaining countries, excluding the US. This means
that there are 2 ￿ 55 + 27 = 137 empirical moments used to identify the 53 unknown
parameters, a total of 84 excess moment conditions.Chapter 4 86
De￿ning the set of excess moment matrices for the three regimes as
M1 = vech(￿1) ￿ vech(￿1￿
0
1)
M2 = diag (￿2) ￿ diag (￿2￿
0
2) (4.24)
M3 = diag (￿3) ￿ diag (￿3￿
0
3)
the GMM estimator is obtained by choosing the parameters of the factor model to














where W1;W2 and W3 represent the optimal weighting matrices corresponding to the
respective regimes (Hamilton, 1994) which correct the standard errors for heteroskedas-
ticity in each regime. Equation (4.25) is minimized with ut in (4.21) replaced by the
residuals of the estimated VAR in (4.1) where the lag structure is set at p = 1 lags.s 8
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
The GMM point estimates of the factor model in (4.2), (4.7) and (4.13) are given in
Table 3 with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. An overall test of the
model is given by testing the 84 over-identifying restrictions. Under the null hypoth-
esis that the restrictions are satis￿ed, the value of the objective function in (4.25) is
asymptotically distributed as ￿2 with 84 degrees of freedom. The reported value of the
test statistic is 97:785. This yields a p-value of 0:144; showing that the restrictions are
not rejected at conventional signi￿cance levels. A test of the factor speci￿cation of the
benchmark model is given by testing the 55 ￿ 33 = 22 over-identifying restrictions in
the non-crisis period. The test statistic is given by the ￿rst term in (4.25) which has a
value of 29:177: The p-value is 0:140; showing that the benchmark factor structure is
not rejected at the 5% level.
The parameter estimates associated with the common factors highlight the factor
structure underlying international equity returns during the benchmark period. The
parameter estimates of the common factor (￿i) show that all equity markets react in
8The computations are performed using the BFGS algorithm in GAUSS Version 7, with a conver-
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the same direction to world shocks, with the e⁄ects on emerging equity markets tending
to be larger than on industrial equity markets. A similar result occurs for the emerging
market factor where the parameter estimates (￿i) show that all emerging equity markets
respond in the same direction. The parameter estimates of the industrial factor (￿i),
show that Germany, the UK and the US all respond in the same way by a similar
amount. In contrast, Japan moves in the opposite direction (￿JA = ￿0:323); although
this parameter estimate is statistically insigni￿cant with a standard error of 0:356: The
parameter estimates of the regional factor ( i), show that the Latin American countries
experience more than double the impact of shocks compared with the United States.
A comparison of the contagion parameter estimates stemming from Russia (￿i);
shows that the e⁄ects of contagion on international equity markets during the Russian
crisis is selective, although it does a⁄ect both emerging and industrial equity markets.
The largest (absolute) impact is felt by Germany (0:686) and the UK (0:459); which are
both statistically signi￿cant at conventional signi￿cance levels. This result picks up the
fact that most international lenders to Russia were European-based. Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2003) document that German banks had a heavy exposure of loans to
Russia. Performing a joint test of no contagion from Russia to all 4industrial equity
markets in Table 4, shows that these restrictions are rejected at the 5% level.
Of the emerging markets during the Russian crisis, the strongest contagion channels
from Russia are to Argentina (0:294) and Thailand (￿0:313), although Table 3 shows
that neither parameter estimates are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. However,
a joint test of no contagion from Russia to the 5 emerging equity markets given in
Table 4, is rejected at the 5% level.
In contrast to the Russian contagion results, the e⁄ects of contagion from the LTCM
crisis (￿i) on emerging and industrial countries are more widespread. The greatest
impact of contagion during the LTCM crisis is on the two Latin American countries. An
overall test of contagion from the US to all emerging equity markets presented in Table
4 is found to be statistically signi￿cant. The industrial countries, Germany, Japan and
the UK, experience contagion levels less than the two Latin American countries, but
these linkages are nonetheless individually (Table 3) and jointly (Table 4) statistically
signi￿cant.Chapter 4 88
4.2 Volatility Decompositions
An alternative way of identifying the relative importance of contagion is by computing
the variance decompositions in (4.6) for the benchmark period, and (4.9) and (4.15) in
the Russian and LTCM crisis periods respectively. The results of the volatility decom-
position in the benchmark period are given in Table 5, where the decompositions are
expressed as a percentage of the total. This table shows the importance of idiosyncratic
shocks in explaining equity market volatility in many of the countries investigated, with
Russia (73:45%) followed by Poland (64:45%) exhibiting the highest proportions.
The volatility decompositions during the Russian crisis reported in Table 6 support
the previous results showing that equity markets in Germany (57:18%) and the UK
(48:67%) are the most a⁄ected of all equity markets by contagion from Russia. The
maximum a⁄ect of contagion from Russia on the emerging markets during this period
is felt by Argentina (10:38%): In contrast, US equity markets (3:05%) appear to be
hardly a⁄ected by contagion from Russia.
The volatility decompositions during the LTCM crisis reported in Table 7 further
highlight the relative importance and widespread e⁄ects of contagion from the US dur-
ing this period. Of the emerging markets, Argentina (71:74%) and Brazil (82:16%) are
particularly a⁄ected by contagion from the US, as is Poland (55:76%). Hong Kong
(24:90%) and Thailand (14:86%) are proportionately less a⁄ected by contagion from
the US, suggesting that an important component of their volatilities are the result of
idiosyncratic factors. This is particularly true for Thailand where the contribution of
the idiosyncratic shock is 45:22% during the LTCM crisis. Russian equities (0:44%)
show no e⁄ect of contagion from the US, which are still dominated by their own idio-
syncratic shocks (88:64%): Of the industrials, Japanese (74:59%) equity markets are
the most a⁄ected by contagion from the US, followed by Germany (37:39%) and the
UK (32:66%).
4.3 Structural Break Tests
Table 4 also gives the results of two structural break tests. The ￿rst is a test of
a structural break in the Russian idiosyncratic parameter. The increase in volatility
caused by the Russian crisis is highlighted in Table 3 where the idiosyncratic parameter
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(￿RU = 2:265) in the Russian crisis period. The p-value of this structural break test
is 0:008 showing evidence of a signi￿cant structural break. The second structural
break test reported in Table 3 is for the U.S. idiosyncratic parameter. Finally, the test
yields a p-value of 0:179 showing that the null of no structural break is not rejected at
conventional signi￿cance levels.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The robustness of the empirical results is investigated by subjecting the multi-regime
factor model to a number of robustness checks. To save space, the results are summa-
rized below with the output available from the authors upon request.
The ￿rst robustness check consists of extending the factor structure to allow for
an additional common factor in the benchmark model. The results of the variance
decompositions show no qualitative change to the results reported above. The biggest
contribution to the variance decomposition in the second common factor is for Russia
where the weight is 6:937 percent.
The second robustness check consists of reestimating the model for di⁄erent cri-
sis dates. In each case, the variance decompositions reported above did not change
qualitatively. In addition, for the alternative sample periods investigated, the value of
the objective function from the GMM procedure is maximized using the sample period
chosen above.
4.5 Comparison with Bond Market Transmissions
Chapter 3 of this thesis measures the e⁄ects of contagion on international bond markets
using a similar framework to the approach adopted in this chapter, though the choice of
countries is slightly di⁄erent. In addition, the LTCM sample period in the bond market
chapter is slightly shorter than in the current chapter, where the start of the LTCM
crisis period is de￿ned to coincide with the public recapitalization announcement on
23 September. To enable a comparison of the results for the two markets, the model
in chapter 3 is reestimated using the same de￿nition of the LTCM crisis period used in
this chapter.9 The results are given in Table 8 which gives the contribution of contagion
as a proportion of total volatility during the Russian and LTCM crisis periods for the
9Consistent with the original paper, the bond market model in this paper is estimated using Gauss
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bond market, together with the equity market results which are taken from Table 7.
Dashes indicate countries not included in a particular study.
Inspection of Table 8 shows that contagion from both Russia and the United States
dominates the observed volatility in equity market returns of most countries, while
the e⁄ects in bond markets are smaller, but still not insubstantial. In the case of
Argentina, Brazil, Poland, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, the contribution
of contagion to total volatility in equities is over 50%: The largest contributions of
contagion to bond market volatility are in Argentina, Poland and Russia, where the
total contribution is just under 50%:
The main source of contagion in most equity markets is from the United States.
In the case of Germany and the United Kingdom, the contributions of contagion from
Russia and the US are similar at between 32% and 37%. A similar result occurs in bond
markets where the main contributor to bond market volatility is contagion from the
US. Two exceptions are Brazil where the contribution from Russia is 23:64% compared
to 1:31% from the United States, and to a lesser extend, the Netherlands where the
contribution from Russia is 11:04% compared to 4:6% from the United States.
A comparison of the equity market and bond market results shows that Brazil is
a recipient of contagion from the United States in equity markets, and from Russia
in bonds. This suggests that in the case of Brazil at least, crises may be propagated
di⁄erently through di⁄erent asset markets, across the same geographical borders. This
also implies that the in￿ uences of trade and other regional considerations such as
suggested in Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), where
transmission is based on trade or ￿nancial linkages, cannot constitute the entire story.
The evidence presented suggests that the nature of particular assets or asset markets
may hold important information on the transmission of shocks.
5 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a framework for modelling the transmission of contagion in
international equity markets during the complex period of the Russian bond default and
the LTCM crisis in 1998. The model was based on extending the existing class of latent
factor models commonly adopted in ￿nance by allowing for additional transmission
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from contagion. Contagion was identi￿ed as the impact of shocks from either Russia
or the United States on global equity markets, having conditioned on both world and
regional factors, as well as country speci￿c shocks in equity markets. A property of the
model was that the volatility of equity returns could be decomposed in terms of the
underlying factors, thereby providing a measure of the relative strength of contagion.
A number of hypothesis tests of contagion and structural breaks were also carried out.
The model was applied to 10 equity markets consisting of four developed markets, and
six emerging markets from three regions (Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe),
using daily equity returns over 1998. A GMM estimator, which matched the theoretical
moments of the factor model with the empirical moments of the data across regimes,
was presented.
The key result of the paper was that contagion was signi￿cant and widespread
to a variety of international equity markets during the LTCM crisis, with the e⁄ects
of contagion being strongest on the industrial markets and the geographically close
Latin American markets. The contagion transmission mechanisms emanating from
the Russian equity market tended to be more selective during the Russian crisis, but
nonetheless still impacted upon both emerging and industrial equity markets. More-
over, rather than the Russian crisis being seen as an emerging market phenomenon, as
suggested by the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (1999, pp.7-8), con-
tagion from Russia was found to be more statistically signi￿cant in industrial countries
than in emerging markets.
In related work on contagion during the Russian and LTCM crises, chapter 3 of this
thesis found that contagion in bond markets also a⁄ected a wide variety of economies.
The combination of the results suggest that it would be informative to construct a
more general model of asset markets, combining both bonds and equities to test jointly
the importance of contagious transmission mechanisms between markets across inter-
national borders. A step in this direction, for di⁄erent case studies, has been recently
undertaken in Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2005), while Granger, Huang and
Yang (2000) and Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2004) focused on bivariate re-
lationships between asset markets during ￿nancial crises.
An important feature of the proposed model is the speci￿cation of a multiple regime
model to allow for multiple crises. This suggests that the framework could be appliedChapter 4 92
to model several crises simultaneously by extending the sample period adopted in
the current application. Although still ongoing at the time of writing, extending the
framework to encompass the current U.S. subprime and liquidity crisis, and contrasting
this event to previous crises, should give some insights as to how ￿nancial crises are
alike or not. This issues are examined in chapter 5 below.Contagion in Global Equity Markets 93
Table 1:
Descriptive statistics of daily percentage equity returns in 1998 for selected sample
periods.(a): the sample mean (Mean), the standard deviation (SD), the maximum
(Max) and the minimum (Min).
Statistic Country
AR BR HK TH PO RU GE JA UK US
Benchmark Period: Jan. 5 to Jul. 31
Mean -0.005 0.045 -0.259 -0.200 0.018 -0.562 0.252 0.011 0.130 0.090
SD 1.120 1.284 1.549 1.779 1.224 2.553 0.709 0.828 0.599 0.511
Max 3.304 2.638 4.320 8.756 3.040 10.548 1.998 2.558 1.664 1.254
Min -4.359 -4.909 -6.462 -4.108 -3.687 -8.476 -2.485 -2.119 -1.467 -1.814
Russian Crisis Period: Aug. 3 to Dec. 31
Mean -0.408 -0.345 0.465 0.025 -0.214 -0.950 0.072 -0.097 0.045 0.061
SD 1.858 2.506 1.852 1.715 2.596 3.100 1.253 1.088 0.904 0.769
Max 3.104 6.210 6.891 4.653 7.496 6.469 2.497 2.500 1.899 1.789
Min -6.442 -6.547 -2.874 -3.979 -6.922 -12.828 -3.324 -2.734 -2.156 -2.333
LTCM Crisis Period: Aug. 31 to Oct. 15
Mean 0.512 -0.200 0.505 0.772 -0.450 -0.764 -0.473 -0.131 -0.276 -0.205
SD 2.994 4.129 1.956 1.825 2.053 3.475 1.782 1.217 1.255 1.173
Max 5.344 10.653 4.872 5.422 3.219 9.496 2.841 2.785 2.515 2.174
Min -8.522 -10.844 -3.783 -2.090 -5.352 -7.478 -5.003 -2.720 -2.517 -4.225
(a) Equity returns are ￿ltered for time-zone e⁄ects using a 2-day moving average.Chapter 4 94
Table 2:
Variance-covariance matrices of daily percentage equity returns in 1998 for selected
sample periods.(a)
AR BR HK TH PO RU GE JA UK US
Benchmark Period: Jan. 5 to Jul. 31
AR 1.246
BR 0.873 1.638
HK 0.837 0.817 2.384
TH 0.599 0.859 1.640 3.143
PO 0.609 0.488 1.047 0.972 1.489
RU 1.016 1.507 1.309 1.489 1.368 6.473
GE 0.138 0.267 0.512 0.402 0.214 0.505 0.499
JA 0.142 0.211 0.482 0.470 0.257 0.099 0.123 0.682
UK 0.210 0.375 0.373 0.477 0.278 0.680 0.247 0.096 0.356
US 0.290 0.390 0.393 0.347 0.206 0.435 0.192 0.055 0.197 0.259
Russian Crisis Period: Aug. 3 to Dec. 31
AR 3.406
BR 3.728 6.198
HK 1.053 0.859 3.384
TH 1.730 1.936 1.216 2.902
PO 1.578 1.976 1.105 1.010 6.650
RU 3.950 4.777 0.329 2.048 1.308 9.484
GE 1.570 1.546 0.973 1.094 0.578 1.965 1.550
JA 1.119 1.512 0.524 0.759 1.029 1.610 0.316 1.168
UK 1.081 0.978 0.914 0.744 0.841 1.291 0.813 0.466 0.807
US 1.060 1.295 0.600 0.672 0.656 1.164 0.618 0.387 0.453 0.584
LTCM Crisis Period: Aug. 31 to Oct. 15
AR 8.702
BR 10.406 16.549
HK 1.721 0.494 3.714
TH 0.691 0.445 1.977 3.233
PO 1.159 0.024 2.218 1.344 4.089
RU 3.586 2.532 2.544 0.952 2.099 11.720
GE 2.975 2.444 1.819 0.339 2.572 3.726 3.082
JA 0.985 0.596 0.819 0.43 1.352 0.635 1.022 1.437
UK 1.972 1.891 1.585 0.709 1.736 2.436 1.909 0.751 1.528
US 2.665 3.397 0.911 0.674 0.758 1.515 1.043 0.265 0.795 1.335
(a) Equity returns are ￿ltered for time-zone e⁄ects using a 2-day moving average.Contagion in Global Equity Markets 95
Table 3:
GMM parameter estimates of the multi regime factor model in equations (2), (7) and
(13), with standard errors based on the optimal weighting matrix in parentheses.
Country Common Factors Idiosyncratic Contagion from
(i) World Emerging Industrial Regional Factors Russia LTCM
￿i ￿i ￿i  i ￿i ￿i ￿i
AR 0.370 0.266 - 0.636 0.369 0.294 1.455
(0.147) (0.135) (0.088) (0.105) (0.312) (0.307)
BR 0.444 0.205 - 0.610 0.677 -0.083 2.226
(0.158) (0.161) (0.108) (0.074) (0.478) (0.527)
HK 0.699 0.544 - - 0.660 0.091 -0.638
(0.110) (0.131) (0.079) (0.219) (0.337)
TH 0.592 0.604 - - 0.960 -0.313 -0.550
(0.165) (0.137) (0.113) (0.172) (0.583)
PO 0.340 0.399 - - 0.706 0.080 0.991
(0.091) (0.095) (0.057) (0.175) (0.360)
RU 0.526 0.596 - - 1.322 2.265 0.160
(0.166) (0.184) (0.135) (0.320) (0.359)
GE 0.416 - 0.135 - 0.401 0.686 -0.701
(0.069) (0.117) (0.034) (0.128) (0.195)
JA 0.345 - -0.323 - 0.431 0.127 1.117
(0.086) (0.356) (0.316) (0.186) (0.194)
UK 0.362 - 0.160 - 0.255 0.459 -0.458
(0.051) (0.081) (0.039) (0.099) (0.161)
US 0.258 - 0.175 0.243 0.223 0.080 0.109
(0.057) (0.117) (0.039) (0.053) (0.122) (0.062)Chapter 4 96
Table 4:
Joint tests of contagion and structural breaks. Wald statistics based on the
unconstrained parameter estimates reported in Table 3.
Test Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value
No contagion from Russia to
All other ￿i = 0;8i;i 6= RU 78.114 9 0.000
Industrial ￿i = 0;8i;i = GE;JA;UK;US 31.051 4 0.000
Emerging ￿i = 0; 16.573 5 0.005
i = AR;BR;HK;TH;PO
No contagion from LTCM to
All other ￿i = 0;8i;i 6= US 151.827 9 0.000
Industrial ￿i = 0;i = GE;JA;UK 56.323 3 0.000
Emerging ￿i = 0; 45.448 6 0.000
i = AR;BR;HK;TH;PO;RU
Joint test of
No contagion ￿i = ￿j = 0;i 6= RU;j 6= US 250.960 18 0.000
No structural break in idiosyncratic factor of
Russia ￿RU = ￿RU 7.036 1 0.008
US ￿US = ￿US 1.806 1 0.179Contagion in Global Equity Markets 97
Table 5:
Variance decomposition of equity returns in proportions (%): Benchmark period.
Row totals sum to 100%. Based on (6).
Country Common Factors Idiosyncratic
World Emerging Industrial Regional Factors
AR 18.32 9.45 - 54.04 18.19
BR 18.45 3.91 - 34.79 42.85
HK 40.03 24.24 - - 35.74
TH 21.42 22.30 - - 56.28
PO 14.95 20.60 - - 64.45
RU 11.61 14.93 - - 73.45
GE 49.07 - 5.20 - 45.73
JA 29.13 - 25.57 - 45.31
UK 59.07 - 11.57 - 29.36
US 32.28 - 14.90 28.66 24.16Chapter 4 98
Table 6:
Variance decomposition of equity returns in proportions (%): Russian crisis period.
Row totals sum to 100%. Based on (4.9).
Country Common Factors Idiosyncratic Contagion from
World Emerging Industrial Regional Factors Russia
AR 16.42 8.47 - 48.44 16.30 10.38
BR 18.34 3.89 - 34.57 42.58 0.63
HK 39.76 24.07 - - 35.49 0.68
TH 20.22 21.04 - - 53.11 5.63
PO 14.83 20.43 - - 63.92 0.83
RU 4.80 6.17 - - 89.04 0.00
GE 21.01 - 2.23 - 19.58 57.18
JA 28.03 - 24.60 - 43.60 3.76
UK 30.32 - 5.94 - 15.07 48.67
US 31.30 - 14.45 27.79 23.43 3.05Contagion in Global Equity Markets 99
Table 7:
Variance decomposition of equity returns in proportions (%): LTCM crisis period.
Row totals sum to 100%. Based on (4.15).
Country Common Factors Idiosyncratic Contagion from
World Emerging Industrial Regional Factors Russia US
AR 4.64 2.39 - 13.69 4.61 2.93 71.74
BR 3.27 0.69 - 6.17 7.60 0.11 82.16
HK 29.86 18.08 - - 26.66 0.51 24.90
TH 17.21 17.92 - - 45.22 4.80 14.86
PO 6.56 9.04 - - 28.28 0.37 55.76
RU 4.78 6.14 - - 88.64 0.00 0.44
GE 13.16 - 1.39 - 12.26 35.80 37.39
JA 7.12 - 6.25 - 11.08 0.96 74.59
UK 20.42 - 4.00 - 10.15 32.78 32.66
US 38.08 - 17.58 33.81 6.82 3.71 0.00Chapter 4 100
Table 8:
Variance decomposition of daily equity returns and daily bond market premia in
proportions (%) for various countries during the LTCM crisis period.(a)
Country Equity Markets Bond Markets
Contagion from: Russia US Total Russia US Total
Argentina 2.93 71.74 74.67 0.03 45.37 45.40
Brazil 0.11 82.16 82.27 23.64 1.31 24.95
Mexico - - - 0.01 2.74 2.75
Hong Kong 0.51 24.90 25.41 - - -
Indonesia - - - 0.08 0.01 0.09
Korea - - - 0.36 2.10 2.46
Thailand 4.80 14.86 19.66 1.41 27.78 29.19
Bulgaria - - - 8.32 1.22 9.54
Poland 0.37 55.76 56.13 0.05 46.18 46.23
Russia - 0.44 0.44 - 42.00 42.00
Netherlands - - - 11.04 4.60 15.64
Germany 35.80 37.39 73.19 - - -
Japan 0.96 74.59 75.55 - - -
UK 32.78 32.66 65.44 0.22 6.67 6.89
US 3.71 - 3.71 1.65 - 1.65
(a) The bond market results are based on reestimating the model in chapter 3 of this thesis, by
extending the LTCM period from 23 September 1998 to 15 October 1998, and from 31 August
1998 to 15 October 1998. Some of the bond market results reported in this table di⁄er from
those in chapter 3. Given the robustness properties of the equity markets presented above,
this suggests that the bond markets are more sensitive to changes in crisis dates. The equity
market results are based on Table 7.Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 101
Chapter 5: Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets,
and Across National Borders 1
1 Introduction
There is a common presumption that ￿nancial crises are not alike as the triggers of
crises di⁄er, and the economic and institutional environments in which crises take place
vary amongst countries. Recent triggers for crises include sovereign debt default (the
Russian crisis in August 1998), risk management strategies (the near collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management, LTCM, in September 1998), sudden stops in capital ￿ ows
(Brazil in early 1999), collapses of speculative bubbles (the dot-com crisis in 2000),
inconsistencies between fundamentals and policy settings (as in Argentina in 2001)
and a liquidity squeeze (associated with the pressure in the U.S. subprime mortgage
market from mid-2007).2 These examples include countries with highly developed
￿nancial markets as well as a number of emerging markets.
This lack of commonality amongst crisis a⁄ected countries is re￿ ected in the devel-
opment of theoretical models of ￿nancial turmoil, where there now exist three broad
classes of models. The ￿rst generation models emphasize the role of macroeconomic
variables in causing currency crises when countries adopted ￿xed exchange rates (Flood
and Marion (1999)); the second generation models focus on the role of speculative at-
tacks; while the third generation of models focus on institutional imbalances and infor-
mation asymmetries (Allen and Gale (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003), Kodres
and Pritsker (2002), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) and Yuan (2005)).
The identi￿cation of shocks triggering a crisis is just one dimension to understanding
￿nancial crises. A second, and arguably more important dimension, is to identify the
transmission mechanisms that propagate shocks from the source country across national
borders and across ￿nancial markets. These links are emphasized in third generation
crisis models, where channels over and above the market fundamental mechanisms that
link countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods appear during a crisis. These
additional linkages are broadly known as contagion (see Dornbusch, Park and Claessens
1Joint work with Dungey, M., R. Fry, B. GonzÆlez-Hermosillo, V. Martin, and C. Tang (2007b),
mimeograph, International Monetary Fund.
2Further analysis of these crises are given in Lowenstein (2001); Jorion (2000); Baig and Goldfajn
(2000); and del Torre, Levy, Yeyati and Schmulker (2003).Chapter 5 102
(2000); Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin
(2005), for surveys of this literature).
It is not entirely straightforward to combine existing theoretical models into a gen-
eral empirical framework in which to model and test the relative strengths of alternative
transmission mechanisms operating during ￿nancial crises.3 The strategy followed in
this paper is to adopt a broader approach and focus on the factor structures of the
transmission mechanisms linking international asset markets. Formally, the model is
based on the theoretical framework of Kodres and Pritsker (2002). This leads to a
latent factor structure which is transformed into a model that admits three broad con-
tagious transmission mechanisms according to the classi￿cation proposed by Dungey
and Martin (2007). The ￿rst corresponds to shocks originating in a particular asset
market within a particular country (Idiosyncratic) which transmit to all ￿nancial mar-
kets. The second represents mechanisms originating in a speci￿c asset market class
(Market), for example, stocks or bonds, that jointly impact alternative classes of as-
set market. The third mechanism represents shocks beginning in a particular country
which impact upon the asset markets of other countries (Country). If the structure of
these three transmission mechanisms is found to be common across di⁄erent ￿nancial
crises, this would suggest that all crises are indeed alike regardless of the nature of the
initial shock and the economic and institutional environments of the a⁄ected country.
Alternatively, if the propagation mechanisms vary across crises, perhaps as a result of
the development of new strains of contagion, this would suggest that crises are indeed
unique at least across their source and their transmission mechanism.
The factor model is successfully implemented for a series of ￿ve crises across six
countries over the period 1998 to 2007; the Russian/LTCM crisis; the Brazilian crisis;
the dot-com crisis; the Argentinian crisis and the recent U.S. subprime mortgage and
credit crisis.4 A key empirical result is that a general model can be speci￿ed to explain
the contagious linkages operating over a broad array of ￿nancial crises. Moreover, as
all possible transmission mechanisms are found to be statistically signi￿cant in each
3Some previous attempts are by van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who focus on banking channels;
Glick and Rose (1999) who look at regional linkages; and Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006) who
emphasise liquidity e⁄ects. Perhaps the most extensive recent work is by Kaminsky (2006) who
considers a broad range of variables, classi￿ed according to alternative theoretical crisis models.
4Other ￿nancial crisis have also occured during this period including Iceland and Turkey (mid
2006) and China (late February 2007). To control the dimension of the empirical application the
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crisis investigated, this suggests that the ￿nancial crises of the past decade are similar.
However, crises are not the same in terms of the relative contribution of each channel
to the volatility of returns in asset markets which varies across crises.. The crises which
generated the most contagion are the Russian/LTCM and U.S. subprime crises, which
both began in credit markets and spread to stock markets.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The theoretical model is speci￿ed in
Section 2 where asset returns are speci￿ed in term of a set of latent factors. The
form of these factors are discussed in Section 3. The factors are expressed (rotated)
in terms of the classi￿cation proposed by Dungey and Martin (2007). Section 4 pro-
vides a discussion of the data, key empirical results are reported in Section 5, while
some additional robustness checks and sensitivity analyses are conducted in Section 6.
Concluding comments are provided in Section 7. The Appendices contain the mathe-
matical details of the derivation of the theoretical model, data sources and additional
empirical results.
2 A Model of Contagion
In this section a theoretical model of contagion is developed whereby excess returns
on ￿nancial assets for N countries are expressed in terms of a set of latent factors.
These factors capture a range of channels that link asset markets including common
factors that simultaneously impact upon all asset markets, idiosyncratic factors that are
speci￿c to a single market, and contagion which transmits through additional channels
arising during times of ￿nancial stress. The approach is related to the work of Kodres
and Pritsker (2002) with one important di⁄erence: the solution is derived in terms
of asset returns instead of asset prices. Formally this is achieved by changing the
preference function of agents and the underlying distributional assumptions of the
model.
The model consists of heterogeneous international agents who choose portfolios
from N risky assets with return vector R; and a risk-free asset Rf; across a set of coun-
tries. Three groups of agents consist of informed investors (denoted as I), uninformed
investors (denoted as U) and noise traders. The informed and uninformed investors are
assumed to derive portfolios based on optimising behaviour, whereas the noise traders
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endowment economy with a ￿xed net supply XT; that provides one risky asset. This
assumption is relaxed in the empirical application where the number of risky assets of
each country is extended to two assets. Investors in each economy trade assets in the
￿rst period at a price vector P; and consume the liquidation value v, of assets in the
second period. Market equilibrium is where the supply of the risky asset XT; equals





UW1 + ln￿; (5.1)
where ￿I and ￿U are respectively the number of informed and uninformed investors, ￿￿
k
is a (N ￿ 1) vector of the optimal proportions of risky assets held by investor k = I;U;
and W1 is period 1 wealth. The term ￿I￿￿
IW1 is the optimal demand for risky assets of
informed agents, ￿U￿￿
UW1 is the optimal demand for risk assets of uninformed agents,
and ln￿ is the total demand of risk assets of noise traders.
In period 1, the informed and uninformed investors are assumed to choose between
the proportion of the portfolio held in risky assets and the proportion of the portfolio
held in a risk free asset (1 ￿ ￿0














; k = I;U; (5.2)
subject to the wealth constraint
W2 = (1 + Rp)W1; (5.3)
where ￿ is the relative risk aversion parameter, W1 is period 1 wealth, and
Rp = ￿
0
kR + (1 ￿ ￿
0
k{)Rf; (5.4)
is the return on the portfolio where { is a (N ￿ 1) vector of ones. The information set
of investor k = I;U; is represented by ￿k.
The return on the ith risky asset is de￿ned as the percentage di⁄erence between the





; i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;N: (5.5)Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 105
The liquidation values of the asset are determined by two factors, ￿ and u; according
to
lnv = ln￿ + lnu: (5.6)






while u is driven by a set of K macroeconomic (lnf) and N idiosyncratic (ln￿) factors
lnut+1 = ￿ lnft+1 + ln￿t+1; (5.7)
with loadings ￿, and
lnft+1 = lnft + ln￿t+1
ln￿t+1 ￿ N (0;￿￿) (5.8)
ln￿t+1 ￿ N (0;IN);
show that the macroeconomic factors are integrated processes of order one.
The optimal solution to the portfolio problem of the informed and the uninformed













￿1 ; k = I;U; (5.9)
where r = ln(1 + R) and rf = ln(1 + Rf) represent logarithmic returns. In contrast
to the informed and uninformed investors, noise traders are assumed to buy and sell
assets based solely on their own idiosyncratic need for liquidity which does not depend
upon the fundamental value of assets (v).
The information set of the informed investor is de￿ned as
￿I = fln￿;lnPg; (5.10)
in which case the conditional moments in (5.9) are given by (see Appendix A2)
E [rj￿I] = ln￿ + ￿ lnf ￿ lnP
V ar[rj￿I] = ￿￿
0 + ￿￿: (5.11)
The information set of the uninformed investor is de￿ned as
￿U = flnPg; (5.12)Chapter 5 106
in which case the conditional moments in (5.9) are given by (see Appendix A3)




































To complete the speci￿cation of the demand for risky assets in (5.1), the net demand
of noise traders, ln￿, is assumed to have the distribution
ln￿ ￿ N(0;￿￿):
To derive an expression of the model in terms of asset returns, let
y = lnP2 ￿ lnP1 ￿ rf;
represent the vector of N realized excess returns, where P1 and P2 are the price vectors
in periods 1 and 2 respectively. In Appendix A4, it is shown that in equilibrium the
solution of the model is characterized by y being expressed in terms of the latent factors
fln￿;ln￿;lnf;ln￿g
y = C0 + C1 ln￿ + C2 ln￿ + C3 lnf + C4 ln￿; (5.14)
where ln￿ = lnP2 ￿ E [lnvjU] is an expectations error which is assumed to be iid:
The Ci matrices are functions of the parameters of the model and the conditional
expectations expressions in (5.11) and (5.13) (see Appendix A4 for details). This
speci￿cation represents a multifactor model of asset markets similar to the class of
empirical contagion models proposed by Dungey and Martin (2007). An important
implication of this equation is that the e⁄ect of contagion during ￿nancial crises is to
change the structure of the Ci matrices. For example, in a noncrisis period where there
is no contagion, this is represented by ￿￿
0 and ￿￿ in (5.7) and (5.8) being diagonal
matrices, with the model reducing to the class of factor models used in international
￿nance to price assets in ￿normal times￿as proposed by Bekaert and Hodrick (1992),
Solnik (1974), Dumas and Solnik (1995) and Longin and Solnik (1995).Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 107
3 Empirical Factor Speci￿cation
The empirical factors are identi￿ed using the approach of Dungey and Martin (2007)
which involves expressing the N excess returns (yt) by rotating the factors in (5.14)
into global (wt), market (mt); country (ct) and idiosyncratic (vt) components. In the
empirical analysis N = 12; which consists of six countries Argentina (A), Brazil (B),
Canada (C), Mexico (M), Russia (R) and the United States (… U), each with two asset
markets stocks (st) and bonds (bt). Of the six countries used in the empirical analysis,
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Russia represent the emerging ￿nancial markets, and the
U.S. and Canada represent the industrial ￿nancial markets. In the second quarter of
2007, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina accounted for 46 percent of total emerging market
bond trading. Russia accounted for an additional 4 percent. Thus, the four emerging
countries examined here account for about 50 percent of the total emerging market
debt (see EMTA Survey (2007)).
In specifying the empirical factor model, care is taken to distinguish between the
factors operating during noncrisis and crisis periods. Five crisis speci￿cations are con-
sidered corresponding to the Russia/LTCM crisis in 1998, the Brazilian crisis in early
1999, the dot-com crisis in 2000, the Argentinian crisis 2001-2005, and the recent U.S.
subprime crisis beginning mid 2007. The choice of crisis dates is discussed in Section
4.2 below.
3.1 Noncrisis Speci￿cation
The factor speci￿cation during the noncrisis period isChapter 5 108
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All variables on the right hand-side of (5.15) are classi￿ed into the four sets of factors.
The ￿rst set of factors are referred to as the common factors. The ￿rst two factors
within this set (w1
t;w2









for asset market j = s;b; in country i: The third factor in the common
set of factors (w3
t) represents the set of emerging markets where crises originated during






. The second set of
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given by cA;t;cB;t;cC;t;cM;t;cR;t;c￿ U;t; which represent shocks speci￿c to both the stock
and bond market of each of the six countries where the loadings for the ithcountry are
￿s
i (stocks) and ￿b









; which represent shocks that are speci￿c to a particular asset market
in a particular country.
The noncrisis factor speci￿cation in (5.15) is conveniently expressed as
yt = Awwt + Ammt + Acct + Avvt; (5.16)
where yt is the (12 ￿ 1) vector of excess returns, wt is the (3 ￿ 1) vector of common
factors, mt is the (2 ￿ 1) vector of market factors, ct is the (6 ￿ 1) vector of country
factors, and vt is the (12 ￿ 1) vector of idiosyncratic factors. The Aj; j = w;m;c;v; are
parameter matrices of conformable order to the empirical factors wt;mt;ct and vt;and
correspond to those in (5.15).
3.2 Crisis Speci￿cation
The crisis model is an extension of the noncrisis model by allowing for additional
channels representing contagion, which link international asset markets during ￿nancial
crises. Three broad channels are speci￿ed following Dungey and Martin (2007):
1. Market shock: the shock originates in a speci￿c class of asset markets globally,
which impacts simultaneously on all other asset markets.
2. Country shock: the shock originates in a particular country which transmits to
the asset markets of other countries.
3. Idiosyncratic shock: the shock originates in a speci￿c asset market of a country
which impacts upon global asset markets.
3.2.1 The Russian/LTCM Crisis
The Russian crisis is speci￿ed to begin in the Russian bond market. The LTCM
crisis is interpreted as a credit shock and is assumed to originate in the U.S. bond
market. It is not possible to separate out the two crises and model the full set of
transmission mechanisms for each as a result of the shortness of the LTCM crisisChapter 5 110
period.5 The strategy adopted is to model both crises jointly by including idiosyncratic
shocks arising from the Russian bond market and the U.S. bond market, together with
the asset market and country contagion channels. The sample period is taken as the
Russian crisis period, namely August to the end of 1998. This may have the e⁄ect of
underestimating the importance of the LTCM crisis as its e⁄ects may be diluted by
using a longer sample period than is necessary.
The Russian/LTCM crisis model is speci￿ed as
yt = Bwwt + Bmmt + Bcct + Bvvt; (5.17)
where the parameter matrices are de￿ned as
Bw =
2
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5Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2006, 2007) separate the e⁄ects of the Russian and
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The parameter matrices are speci￿ed by augmenting the noncrisis parameter matrices
in (5.15) and (5.16) to allow for contagion as well as structural breaks in the factor
structures during the crisis period. The market contagion channels are represented by
the parameter ￿
b
i;s in the matrix Bm which measures the strength of the stock market
factor in the crisis period on the bond market in country i; while the parameter ￿
s
i;b
measures the strength of the bond market factor on the stock market in country i: The
country contagion channel from Russia to asset market j in country i; is controlled
by the parameter ￿
j
i;R: The strength of the idiosyncratic contagion channel from the









: All structural breaks in the factors during the crisis period
are controlled by the parameter ~ ￿: For example, the e⁄ects of a structural break in the
stock and bond market factors during the crisis period on country i; are respectively
given by ~ ￿
s
i and ~ ￿
b
i: The common factors (wt) are assumed not to exhibit structural
breaks during the crisis period.
3.2.2 The Brazilian Crisis
The speci￿cation of the Brazilian crisis model is similar to the Russian/LTCM crisis
model in (5.17), with the exception that there is just one idiosyncratic shock now
arising from the Brazilian bond market. The two market channels of contagion are as
before, which are represented by the 2nd and 8th rows of the Bm matrix in (5.17). The
country channel of contagion switches from the 5th column (Russian country factor) to
the 2nd column (Brazilian country factor) of Bc. The idiosyncratic contagion channelChapter 5 112
arising from the Brazilian bond market shock is speci￿ed by switching column 11 in
Bv in (5.17) to column 8 (Brazilian bond), and deleting the cells of column 12 with the
exception of the parameter ￿
b
￿ U.
3.2.3 The Dot-Com Crisis
The dot-com crisis model has a similar structure to the Brazilian crisis model. The
country channel of contagion is now found in the 6th column of Bc (U.S. country factor),
and the idiosyncratic contagion channel is speci￿ed in column 6 of the Bv matrix (U.S.
stock) in (5.17).
3.2.4 The Argentinian Crisis
The Argentinian crisis model follows the same form as the previous two models. The
country channel of contagion is now found in the 1st column of Bc (Argentinian country
factor), and the idiosyncratic contagion channel is speci￿ed in column 7 of the Bv matrix
(Argentinian bond) in (5.17).
3.2.5 The U.S. Subprime Mortgage and Credit Crisis
The speci￿cation of the U.S. subprime mortgage and credit crisis is similar to the
dot-com crisis speci￿cation with one exception. In the dot-com crisis there is a single
idiosyncratic channel of contagion operating through the U.S. stock market as it is
clear that this crisis originated in the U.S. stock market. The U.S. subprime mortgage
and credit crisis is characterized by turbulence that spread from subprime mortgage
markets to credit markets more generally, and then to short-term interbank markets
as liquidity dried up in certain segments of the markets, particularly in structured
credits. As the U.S. crisis manifested itself mainly in credit markets, this suggests that
contagion should run from bond markets to stock markets in the model speci￿ed here.
To test this proposition, both bond and stock idiosyncratic channels of contagion are
allowed for in the subprime crisis speci￿cation.
4 Data
The data consist of daily excess returns on stocks and bonds, all expressed in U.S.
dollars, beginning 31st of March 1998 and ending 3rd of September, 2007. The dailyContagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 113
data are constructed from bond yields and stock indices. All data sources and formal
de￿nitions of the variables are given in Appendix B.
The U.S. and Canadian bonds are modelled using 10 year corporate BBB yields,
with the Canadian yields converted into U.S. dollars. Bond returns are constructed for
the two developed markets as
bt = ￿n(rn;t ￿ rn￿1;t￿1); (5.18)
where rn;t is the yield on a bond with term to maturity, n = 10 years. That is, returns
are computed simply by taking the ￿rst di⁄erence of the yields, multiplying this change
in yields by the maturity and then changing the sign (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay
(1997)).6
Emerging market bonds are represented by U.S. dollar denominated sovereign debt
to avoid the lack of liquidity in emerging market domestic currency denominated bonds.
As bonds are issued only sporadically in the emerging countries it is not possible to
derive a daily 10-year bond series as with the developed countries. The approach
adopted is to choose a 10 year bond issued near the start of the sample period for
an emerging country and track this bond over the sample period. For these bonds,
the returns are computed using (5.18) with the term to maturity, n, now declining
monotonically over the sample. However, as the sample covers approximately 9 years,
this bond will become less liquid as it approaches maturity near the end of the sample.
In the case of the Argentinian bond used, this bond actually matures before the end
of the sample period. To circumvent potential liquidity problems the approach is to
choose another set of 10 year bonds begining 1st of July, 2004 and track these bonds
through the remaining part of the sample. Although this involves using bonds of
di⁄ering maturities, by working with returns instead of yields, or even yield changes,
makes the returns data on bonds commensurate.
The stock market indices are those for the major indices in each country, given in
Appendix B. All indices are expressed in domestic currencies and converted into USD
equivalents using daily exchange rates. Missing observations arising from the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001 are replaced by the previously observed price. Stock
returns are computed by taking the ￿rst di⁄erence of the natural logarithm of the
6The formula for converting bond yields into returns is just an approximation, but as the data are
daily the error from using the approximation should be small (Craine and Martin (2007)).Chapter 5 114
stock prices.
All bond and stock returns are expressed in terms of excess returns by subtracting
the returns on a risk-free rate, as represented by the U.S. Treasury 10-year benchmark
bond yield. The excess returns are expressed in percentage terms by multiplying each
series by 100. There are ￿ve crises investigated, whose dates are discussed below.
4.1 Filters
Two ￿lters are applied to the raw returns before estimating the model. First, all excess
returns are adjusted for any dynamics by estimating a 12-variate VAR(1) consisting
of all six stock and bond excess returns together with a constant. Higher order lags
do not qualitatively change the empirical properties of the model. All ￿ltered returns
have zero sample means as a result of including a constant in the VAR to ￿lter returns
for lags and the identi￿ed institutional changes discussed.
Second, the VAR contains a set of dummy variables to capture institutional changes
which have a once-o⁄big impact on excess returns. A dummy variable is included in the
Russian bond equation of the VAR to account for the large fall in excess bond returns
from 57:73% to 44:97%, arising from the change in the Russian Finance Minister on
May 25th of 1999. Inspection of the excess returns of Argentinian bonds shows that
there are ￿ve large spikes which occur during the Argentinian crisis: the dates are
April 4th and October 4th in 2002, April 4th and October 6th in 2003, and April 6th
in 2004. These dates correspond to the coupon dates after all Argentinian sovereign
debt went into default, with the price for these bonds declining because of uncertainty
surrounding the scheduled coupon payment. To correct for these outliers a dummy
variable is included in the Argentinian bond equation of the VAR, which has a value
of one on the ￿ve dates and zero otherwise. Finally, there are a number of crises that
have occurred which are potentially too small to be able to model individually. To
condition the results on these crises, additional dummy variables are also included into
the VAR speci￿cation. The dummy variables consist of the Turkish crisis May 1st to
June 30th in 2006, and the large movements in asset returns on February 27th and
March 13th in 2007 during the concerns over Chinese stock markets.
The residuals from estimating the VAR are taken to be the ￿ltered excess returnsContagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 115
subsequently used in the empirical analysis.7 The ￿nal data set of ￿ltered excess returns
comprises 2;458 observations across bond and stock markets for the six countries.
4.2 Crisis Dates
The choice of the dates of the crisis periods are summarized in Table 1. This choice is
based on important institutional events surrounding each crisis, together with empirical
pre-testing and sensitivity analysis to ￿ne-tune the timing of the crisis dates. Details of
the empirical methods together with some additional sensitivity analysis of the chosen
dates, are presented below in Section 6. The Russian crisis is chosen to begin with
the announcement of the Russian Government￿ s deferral of its bond repayments on
August 17, 1998, while the end of the crisis is taken as the end of 1998, following
chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis for commensurability. The LTCM crisis begins when
the Federal Reserve orchestrated the bailout of LTCM on September 23, and ends with
the inter-FOMC Federal Reserve rate cut on October 15; see also Committee on the
Global Financial System (1999).
The start of the Brazilian crisis is chosen as January 7, 1999, before the e⁄ective
devaluation of the real on January 15, 1999, which followed the loss of nearly US$14
billion of reserves in two days. The end of the crisis occurs in the next month on
February 25, after several new governors of the Central Bank had been appointed and
prior to the agreement of a revised IMF program in early March 1999.
The dating of the dot-com crisis is based on inspection of stock returns, which shows
that the main impact of the crisis occurs in the second quarter of 2000, especially in the
case of the stock markets of the U.S., Canada and Mexico. Combined with econometric
sensitivity analysis, the dot-com crisis is chosen to begin on February 28, 2000, and
end on June 7, of the same year.
The start of the crisis in Argentina is chosen to begin October 11, 2001. This date
occurs one month prior to the introduction of the partial deposit freeze (corralito)
and capital controls (Cifarelli and Paladino (2004)), but occurs after the increase in
7Further ￿ltering of the data could be entertained, such as allowing for time-varying volatility
during each sub-period. Some strategies would be to incorporate GARCH speci￿cations either using
the approach of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), or the factor GARCH speci￿cation of Dungey and
Martin (2004) and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2006). However, conditional mo-
ment tests of conditional volatility applied to the VAR standardized residuals given in Section 6 of the
paper, show little evidence of time-varying volatility within asset markets during the crisis periods.
Empirically this result is partly a re￿ ection of the small duration of the crisis periods.Chapter 5 116
volatility that began following the ￿mega-swap￿announced on June 3, 2001. The end
of the crisis is taken as 3 March 2005, commensurate with the agreement for debt
rescheduling and Argentina￿ s return to the voluntary market.8
Turbulence in the U.S. subprime mortgage markets became severe by mid-2007.
By late-Spring 2007, a broad range of markets worldwide began to experience a sharp
decline in risk appetite and in liquidity. By August, credit spreads had widened sub-
stantially, stock markets had fallen signi￿cantly, and spreads in interbank markets rose
sharply. The European Central Bank (ECB) injected extraordinary amounts of liq-
uidity on August 10, 2007 and U.S. Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds rate
sharply by 50 basis points on August 18, reducing volatility in stock and credit mar-
kets. However, liquidity and solvency concerns persisted. Indeed, what began as a
fairly contained crisis in collateralized debt obligations (CDO) backed by U.S. sub-
prime mortgages, quickly transformed into a liquidity crisis and even metastasized into
credit concerns for a number of systematically important ￿nancial institutions. In this
chapter, the U.S. subprime crisis period is assumed to begin on July 26, 2007. The
end of the sample is September 3, 2007.9
The noncrisis period is constructed by combining together all of the data between
the crisis dates in Table 1. Selected descriptive statistics of the ￿ltered excess returns
on stocks and bonds during the noncrisis and crisis periods are presented in Tables 2
and 3 respectively.
5 Empirical Results
The crisis and noncrisis models speci￿ed in the previous section are estimated using
a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. This involves computing the
unknown parameters by equating the theoretical moments of the model to the empirical
8The period of the Argentinian crisis also coincides with an increase in volatility in the Brazilian
asset markets during the Brazilian Presidential election campaign of the ￿rst part of 2002. As the
duration of this increase in volatility is very short and primarily limited to Brazil, it is not modelled
here as a separate regime.
9There is considerable uncertainty as to when exactly the recent U.S. mortgage subprime and
liquidity crisis began. The excesses that led to the crisis were evident from 2005 when the U.S.
housing market reached a peak. However, it was not until June 15th, 2007 that news broke that two
of Bear Stearns￿hedge funds were facing ￿nancial di¢ culties. On July 9th, 2007, credit rating agencies
began downgrading higher-rated assets. Markets were in a full-blown crisis by late July 2007. Various
robustness checks were undertaken for sensitivity to the di⁄erent potential starting dates, with no
signi￿cant change in the results.Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 117
moments of the data for both the noncrisis and the crisis periods. As a result of the
large number of parameters in the model, the full system containing the noncrisis model
and the ￿ve crisis models are not estimated jointly. The approach is to estimate the
noncrisis model jointly with each of the crisis models one at a time.10
The objective function of the GMM estimator is speci￿ed as
q = M
0WM; (5.19)
where M is a vector containing the di⁄erences between the empirical and theoretical
moments and W is the optimal weighting matrix.11
An overall test of the model is based on testing the number of overidenti￿cation
restrictions using Hanson￿ s J-statistic
J = Tq; (5.20)
where q is de￿ned in (5.19) and T is the sample size. The results of the overidenti￿-
cation test for the full model are presented in Table 4 for each crisis, in the column
corresponding to three common factors. The speci￿cation of the model satis￿es this
test at the 5% level for all crises, and at even the 10% level for all crisis models with the
exception of the Argentinian crisis model where the p-value of the overidenti￿cation
test is 0:099:
Further tests of the number of common factors underlying the factor structure of
each crisis model are presented in Table 4. Apart from testing the most general common
factor structure, which corresponds to a three common factor model, tests of two, one
and no common factors are also presented. These tests amount to imposing restrictions
on the parameters in the matrices Aw and Bw in (5.16) and (5.17) and testing if the
restrictions are consistent with the data using the J-statistic in (5.20). Reducing the
number of common factors from three to two, is satis￿ed for the Brazilian and U.S.







were found to be small, in which case they were restricted to be zero. The restriction ￿s
￿ U = ￿b
￿ U = 0;
means that there is no U.S. country factor. Setting ￿
s
￿ U = 0 in (5.15) has the e⁄ect of making the U.S.
equity market the common equity market factor.
11All calculations are undertaken using the library MAXLIK in GAUSS Version 7.0. The GMM
estimates are computed by iterating over the parameters and optimal weighting matrix W, using the
BFGS algorithm with the gradients computed numerically.Chapter 5 118
subprime crisis models at the 5% level where the p-values of the test are respectively
0:717 and 0:524; and at the 1% level for the Argentinian crisis models where the p-
value is 0:027: This restriction is not satis￿ed for the Russian/LTCM and dot-com
crisis models. Further restricting the number of common factors from two to one leads
to a clear rejection of the null hypothesis for all crisis models with the exception of the
Brazilian model where the p-value is 0:089 and the U.S. subprime crisis model where
the P-value is 0:050: Further testing of the Brazilian and U.S. subprime crisis models
for no common factors is clearly rejected where both the p-values are 0:000: Given that
the approach adopted in this chapter is to specify a model that is common for all crises,
the number of common factors is chosen to be three for all crisis models in the rest of
the chapter.
5.1 Evidence of Contagion
In presenting the results, the relative strength of contagion is highlighted in terms of its
contribution to the total volatility of asset returns during the crisis periods. Given the
independence and normalization assumptions of the factors, the (12 ￿ 12) theoretical













where it is assumed that yt is standardized to have zero mean. The variance decompo-
sitions are simply the individual components of the diagonal terms of (5.21), expressed
as a percentage of the total, with the parameter values replaced by their GMM para-
meter estimates. For example, from (5.17) the contribution of the bond market factor

























































Complete variance decompositions which contain both noncrisis and crisis factor con-
tributions for the ￿ve crisis periods, are given in Appendix C.Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 119
Table 5 gives the percentage contribution of contagion to total volatility in stock and
bond markets for the ￿ve crisis periods. For comparative purposes, the table also gives
the sample variance. This table highlights three important points concerning the over-
all size of contagion from 1998 to 2007. First, the Russian/LTCM crisis is widespread
as it a⁄ects all countries, developed and emerging, and both asset markets, stocks and
bonds. The stock markets hit hardest during this crisis are Brazil (96:93%); the United
States (67:64%); Argentina (61:02%); Mexico (46:97%); Canada (39:94%); with Rus-
sia (12:68%) being the least a⁄ected. The bond markets most a⁄ected during this crisis
are Brazil (92:71%); Mexico (88:57%); Canada (45:47%); Argentina (39:04%) and the
United States (31:02%): The low contribution of contagion to Russian bonds (13:30%)
in Table 5, simply re￿ ects that the Russian crisis originated in this market. In the case
of Brazil, these results support Baig and Goldfajn (2000) and Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-
Hermosillo and Martin (2006) who document the portfolio e⁄ects of the Russian crisis
on Brazil.
Second, comparison of the relative importance of contagion during the ￿nancial
crises between Russia/LTCM and the U.S. subprime crisis, shows that the strength
of contagion tends to dissipate, with the e⁄ects becoming more fragmented across
asset markets and national borders. The Brazilian crisis mainly impacts emerging
markets, with the e⁄ects on the developed markets except U.S. stocks being relatively
small. In particular, there are strong e⁄ects on Russian stock (89:80%) and bond
(63:24%) markets, potentially re￿ ecting an overhang of the Russian crisis. There are
also important e⁄ects on the stock market in Argentina (62:70%) and the bond market
in Mexico (81:01%). During the dot-com and Argentinian crises, the main e⁄ects are on
stocks, with very little impact on bond markets. The South American stock markets
are a⁄ected most during the dot-com crisis where the contributions of contagion to
total volatility are Argentina (93:75%); Mexico (88:36%) and Brazil (55:86%): The
Canadian stock market (22:18%) is also a⁄ected by dot-com, whereas Russia (1:36%)
is not. These results not only con￿rm that the dot-com crisis is a crisis in stocks,
but also suggest that Russian asset markets had ￿nally settled down after the Russian
crisis. There is a further reduction in the overall relative impact of contagion on South
American stock markets during the Argentinian crisis compared to the dot-com and
previous crises, where now the largest impact occurs in U.S. stocks (52:03%); followedChapter 5 120
by stock markets in Brazil (32:32%) and Canada (25:74%):
Third, and in stark contrast to the diminishing strength of contagion channels
during the previous ￿nancial crises and the apparent immunity of bond markets to
contagion during the dot-com and Argentinian ￿nancial crises, the e⁄ects of contagion
during the U.S. subprime crisis are widespread with no country immune. The exception
is Brazilian asset markets. Stock markets in the United States (80:62%) are hardest hit
re￿ ecting the origin of the crisis. Stock markets in general are severely a⁄ected by this
crisis, with four of the six countries having contagion e⁄ects of greater than 67:00%
percent of volatility. There is also strong evidence that contagion has ￿ owed through
to international bond markets with Argentina (96:87%) being a⁄ected the most. Given
that the Russian asset markets are largely immune to the dot-com and Argentinian
crises, it is interesting to observe that Russia is also a⁄ected by the subprime crisis,
albeit relatively less than other countries in terms of volatility. Approximately one
quarter of volatility in Russian stocks (22:67%) and bonds (27:84%) is the result of
contagion.12
5.2 Comparison of Contagion Channels Across Crises
The previous discussion highlights the changes in the relative importance of contagion
in contributing to asset market volatility across crises. In this section the estimated
factor model is used to breakdown the relative contribution of contagion into its sepa-
rate components. Tables 6 and 7 provide the variance decompositions of the contagion
transmission mechanisms for stocks and bonds respectively, due to market, country
and idiosyncratic channels, across the ￿ve crisis periods.
The Russian/LTCM crisis results in Table 6 show that idiosyncratic bond shocks
and Russian country shocks are important in transmitting contagion to stock markets.
The dominant mechanism is the country channel where stocks in the United States
(54:86%); Argentina (44:86%) and Mexico (30:70%) are hardest hit, whilst Brazilian
stocks (54:47%) are a⁄ected by the direct link from Russian bonds. In the case of bond
markets, Table 7 shows that all channels are operating, with U.S. bonds being the
least a⁄ected by the crisis. The most a⁄ected country during the LTCM phase of the
Russian/LTCM crisis is Brazil, where stocks (29:62%) and bonds (22:45%) are a⁄ected
12Both the Argentine and Russian central banks injected liquidity into their respective ￿nancial
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directly by U.S. bonds. The Canadian (28:28%) and Mexican (18:79%) bond markets
are also a⁄ected by the LTCM crisis through the idiosyncratic U.S. bond channel, but
their stock markets are not.
The Russian asset markets are the most a⁄ected by the Brazilian crisis again re￿ ect-
ing the volatility in Russian asset markets following its own crisis in the previous year.
There is an idiosyncratic channel and channels through the bond and stock market
channels. Other asset markets a⁄ected by this crisis are the Argentinian stock market
(51:04%) and the Mexican bond market (76:72%); where it is the country channel that
transmits contagion.
All three contagion channels are at play in transmitting the dot-com crisis to stock
markets. The largest e⁄ect is on the stock markets in Argentina (88:03%) through the
country channel, and Mexico (75:90%) through the bond market channel. The e⁄ects
on Brazilian (27:58%) and Canadian (21:42%) stocks through the idiosyncratic channel
from U.S. stocks, are relatively larger than they are for Argentina and Mexico. Russian
stocks are immune to the dot-com crisis as are all international bond markets.
The contagion channels operating during the Argentinian crisis are even more selec-
tive than they are in the previous crises, with just the stock market in Brazil (25:77%)
through the bond market channel, and the stock market in the United States (45:79%)
and to a lesser extent Canada (18:88%) through the idiosyncratic channel from the
Argentinian bond market, in operation. However, as the results in Table 7 show that
bond markets are immune to the Argentinian crisis, suggesting that the market link-
age transmitting contagion to the Brazilian stock market is dominated by shocks in
Argentina￿ s bond market, and thus also represents an idiosyncratic channel.
Table 6 shows that during the subprime crisis in the United States it is the bond
market and idiosyncratic linkages that transmit the crisis to stock markets. The lack of
any strong idiosyncratic channel from U.S. stocks strongly supports the classi￿cation
of this crisis as a credit crisis. The results for the bond markets in Table 7 show that
the e⁄ects of the subprime crisis are less widespread, with the main e⁄ects felt by
Argentina (92:57%) through the idiosyncratic U.S. stock market channel, and Russia
(27:78%) through the U.S. bond market idiosyncratic channel. The U.S. bond market
(22:86%) is also a⁄ected through the U.S. idiosyncratic stock market channel, which
represents a second-round e⁄ect of the credit market shock that occurred ￿rst in theChapter 5 122
U.S. bond market.
5.3 Testing the Channels of Contagion
The variance decompositions discussed above provide a descriptive measure of the
relative impact of contagion on the volatility of asset returns during ￿nancial crises.
To formalize the strength of these mechanisms, Wald tests of the statistical signi￿cance
of the market, country and idiosyncratic contagion channels for each crisis period, are
presented in Table 8.13 As an example of the way the Wald test is performed, in the
case of the Russian/LTCM crisis, the Wald test of contagion from the stock market
factor to the six bond markets consists of testing that the joint restriction ￿
b
i;s = 0 8i in
the matrix Bm in (5.17). Testing in the reverse direction from the bond market factor
to the six stock markets is given by testing the joint restriction ￿
s
i;b = 0 8i in the matrix
Bm in (5.17). The test of the country channel from Russia to the 10 non-Russian asset
markets is given by testing the parameter ￿
j
i;R in the matrix Bc in (5.17). The test of
the idiosyncratic contagion channel from Russian bonds to the other 11 asset markets




i;Rb = 0; whereas the test of the idiosyncratic contagion
channel from U.S. bonds to the other 11 asset markets during the LTCM crisis, is given
by testing ￿
s
i;￿ Ub = ￿
b
i;￿ Ub = 0: The form of the tests is similar for the other three crises.
The results of the Wald tests given in Table 8 reveal that all contagion channels
are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. These tests provide strong support for the
importance of all contagion channels operating during all crises. These results also
highlight the fact that whilst some of the channels may not be economically signi￿cant
given the results of the variance decompositions presented above, nonetheless these
channels may still be statistically signi￿cant.
6 Robustness Checks and Additional Testing
In this section a number of additional robustness checks and diagnostic tests are per-
formed on the factor model speci￿cation.
13Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005) show the relationship between testing for
contagion using the factor model, and existing tests of contagion.Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 123
6.1 Crisis Dating: Sensitivity Analysis
The empirical results presented are based on joint estimation of the model over a
noncrisis and crisis period. To examine the sensitivity of these results to the choice of
crisis dates, the P-values from performing the moment overidenti￿cation test based on
the J-statistic in (5.20) are examined to determine possible changes in the start and
the end dates of the ￿ve crises. A maximum window of 5 days is chosen where either
the start of the crisis period or the end of the crisis period are adjusted. A zero day
signi￿es the crisis dates given in Table 1. The U.S. subprime crisis end date is not
extended by 5 days as this crisis is assumed to continue until the end of the sample.
The P-values are qualitatively insensitive to changes in the dating of the ￿ve crises.14
6.2 Conditional Moment Tests
Conditional moment tests of autocorrelation and conditional volatility in the standard-
ized residuals of the VAR, are given in Table 9. The results of these tests are reported
in terms of P-values, for di⁄erent crisis models. In practically all cases considered, the
P-values are greater than 0:05; showing that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation
or no conditional volatility can not be rejected at the 5% level.
6.3 Structural Break Tests
The speci￿cation of the model allows for the idiosyncratic parameters to exhibit a
structural break between the noncrisis and crisis periods. Tests of the signi￿cance of
the structural break are presented in Table 10 using a Wald test. In the case of the
Russian/LTCM crisis, from equation (5.17) the structural break tests are performed































restrictions hold for the other three crisis models. All tests are calculated using a Wald
test that the parameter ~ ￿ is zero. Under the null hypothesis of no structural break, this
14The variance decompositions of the relative importance of the factors are computed for each of
the P-values, but they not reported here to save space. In general, the variance decompositions are
insensitive to the choice of the crisis dates for the window of dates investigated.Chapter 5 124
amounts to the parameters associated with each factor being the same in the noncrisis
and crisis periods.
The results in Table 10 show strong evidence of structural breaks in practically all
factors investigated, across all ￿ve ￿nancial crises, with all P-values being less than
0:05: The structural break tests also show no evidence of a structural break in the
idiosyncratic U.S. bond shock during the U.S. subprime crisis, whilst the P-value of
the structural break test of the idiosyncratic stock market shock during the same crisis
is just on the margin with a P-value of 0:05: The strength of these results are consistent
with the empirical ￿ndings of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who emphasize the important
of allowing for increases in volatility in the source country when testing for contagion
(see also Dungey, Fry, GonzÆlez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005a)).
7 Conclusions
This paper investigated the possibility that ￿nancial crises were alike by considering
whether a single modelling framework could ￿t multiple distinct crises. On this basis,
￿nancial crises during the past decade were all alike. The framework introduced three
potential channels for contagion e⁄ects during a ￿nancial crisis, and the empricial
evidence showed that statistically each of these operated during every crisis examined
- again on this basis, ￿nancial crises are alike. Economically, however, the importance
of the channels of contagion di⁄ers across crises.
The modelling framework was derived by respecifying the theoretical model of Ko-
dres and Pritsker (2002) for solution in terms of asset returns rather than prices. The
empirical implementation was a latent factor representation of the equilibrium solution
of that model.
The three potential channels for contagion e⁄ects were simultaneously identi￿ed and
quanti￿ed. These channels were: idiosyncratic channels which provided a direct link
from the nominated source asset market to international asset markets; market channels
which operated through either the bond or stock markets; and country channels which
operated through the asset markets of a country jointly.
The empirical investigation considered a common dataset of stock and bond market
returns over the period March 1998 to September 2007 for six countries; Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Russia and the United States. The sample period covered ￿veContagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 125
major crisis instances, from the Russian and LTCM crises in 1998, the Brazilian crisis
in 1999, the dot-com crisis in 2000, the Argentinian crisis in 2002-2005 to the recent
crisis associated with the U.S. subprime market. The Russian/LTCM crises had a wide-
spread impact. All three contagion channels were active in this period, although the
country channel dominated e⁄ects on stock markets. The Brazilian crisis had greater
impact on emerging markets than developed markets, with the major e⁄ect on Russian
asset markets, via all but the country channel. Russian stock markets, however, were
immune to the dot-com crisis, which mainly e⁄ected stock markets. Although all three
contagion channels operated during the dot-com crisis the e⁄ects on bond markets were
limited. Bond markets were also little a⁄ected by the Argentinian crisis, despite all
three contagion channels being present and statistically signi￿cant.This was not the
case in the U.S. subprime crisis, where not only were all contagion channels statisti-
cally signi￿cant, but the e⁄ects of contagion were widespread across asset markets and
countries. Contagion e⁄ects were greatest in the Russian/LTCM crisis, and dissipated
in the subsequent Brazilian, dot-com and Argentinian crises, but returned with vehe-
mence in the U.S. subprime crisis. Using the extent of contagious e⁄ects as a metric,
the most systemic crises of the past decade were the Russian/LTCM crisis in 1998 and
the recent 2007 U.S. subprime crisis, which interestingly both began in bond markets.Chapter 5 126
Table 1:
Summary of crisis dates.
Crisis Origin of Shock Start of Crisis Date End of Crisis Date
Russia Russian bonds 17 August 1998 31 December 1998
LTCM U.S. bonds 23 September 1998 15 October 1998
Brazil Brazilian bonds 7 January 1999 25 February 1999
Dot-com U.S. stocks 28 February 2000 7 June 2000
Argentina Argentinian bonds 11 October 2001 3 March 2005
U.S. subprime U.S. bonds, stocks 26 July 2007 3 September 2007Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 127
Table 2:
Descriptive statistics of ￿ltered excess stock returns for selected periods.
Period/Crisis Statistic Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia 17 August 1998 - 31 December 1998
Max. 7.947 10.990 4.933 11.540 39.787 4.149
Min. -9.319 -9.539 -6.875 -11.852 -58.715 -3.561
St. dev. 3.120 3.955 1.686 3.334 11.843 1.439
LTCM 23 September 1998 - 15 October 1998
Max. 6.835 5.351 4.933 6.265 10.056 3.726
Min. -6.327 -5.873 -5.263 -9.014 -12.082 -3.561
St. dev. 3.417 3.459 2.489 3.877 6.806 1.684
Brazil 7 January 1999 - 25 February 1999
Max. 6.724 12.553 2.548 6.095 8.910 2.661
Min. -8.254 -11.623 -2.261 -6.169 -10.067 -4.154
St. dev. 2.708 5.035 1.152 2.434 4.180 1.275
Dot-com 28 February 2000 - 7 June 2000
Max. 2.738 4.857 4.474 6.979 6.968 4.427
Min. -5.125 -5.802 -4.792 -8.503 -7.249 -4.222
St. dev. 1.617 1.912 1.698 2.663 3.350 1.464
Argentina 11 October 2001 - 3 March 2005
Max. 15.791 13.375 5.053 4.916 8.295 6.040
Min. -32.503 -8.131 -3.835 -6.407 -10.833 -5.354
St. dev. 3.011 2.325 1.130 1.341 2.051 1.307
U.S. subprime 26 July 2007 - 3 September 2007
Max. 7.377 6.580 4.383 4.982 4.680 3.220
Min. -5.534 -7.594 -3.692 -5.174 -4.215 -3.679
St. dev. 2.981 3.610 2.012 2.636 2.005 1.864
Non-crisis
Max. 11.281 9.956 5.185 7.410 16.452 3.863
Min. -9.382 -12.028 -8.539 -5.852 -21.635 -6.005
St. dev. 1.907 2.135 1.218 1.661 2.947 1.025Chapter 5 128
Table 3:
Descriptive statistics of ￿ltered excess bond returns for selected periods.
Period/Crisis Statistic Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia 17 August 1998 - 31 December 1998
Max. 9.038 15.656 4.003 9.273 42.465 1.796
Min. -16.599 -14.767 -4.245 -8.615 -115.655 -3.400
St. dev. 3.345 5.505 1.213 2.383 19.264 0.570
LTCM 23 September 1998 - 15 October 1998
Max. 9.038 8.688 4.003 4.900 17.995 1.796
Min. -3.641 -13.611 -4.144 -3.508 -11.902 -1.253
St. dev. 3.001 5.191 1.820 2.144 8.847 0.639
Brazil 7 January 1999 - 25 February 1999
Max. 9.813 16.825 1.595 7.853 30.260 0.547
Min. -11.181 -12.789 -2.393 -4.944 -58.994 -0.832
St. dev. 3.033 5.674 0.886 2.234 13.902 0.299
Dot-com 28 February 2000 - 7 June 2000
Max. 7.063 3.056 2.294 1.682 19.067 0.585
Min. -3.367 -3.520 -2.325 -2.211 -14.952 -0.723
St. dev. 1.362 1.239 0.920 0.777 3.796 0.254
Argentina 11 October 2001 - 3 March 2005
Max. 29.454 16.961 2.987 2.636 12.009 2.205
Min. -40.488 -37.978 -2.086 -2.676 -4.677 -1.445
St. dev. 6.382 2.598 0.737 0.601 1.240 0.349
U.S. subprime 26 July 2007 - 3 September 2007
Max. 10.853 3.955 1.520 1.772 2.955 0.644
Min. -14.518 -1.655 -1.214 -0.812 -1.397 -0.894
St. dev. 5.307 1.312 0.623 0.627 1.059 0.397
Non-crisis
Max. 33.484 10.623 2.618 5.069 55.995 1.847
Min. -33.666 -5.449 -3.701 -4.252 -44.637 -1.368
St. dev. 3.417 1.208 0.661 0.653 4.366 0.259Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 129
Table 4:
Overidenti￿cation tests for common factors based on the J-statistic.
(Unrestricted model given by the column headed ￿Three common factors￿ . The
restrictions for ￿Two common factors￿are based on ￿
j
i = 0: The restrictions for ￿One




i = 0: The restrictions for ￿No common






i = 0: The last set of restrictions amounts to
restricting the matrices Aw and Bw in (5.16) and (5.17) respectively, as null matrices.)
Crisis Statistic Number of Common Factors
Three Two One None
Russia/ J-statistic 29.358 47.758 68.367 329.202
LTCM dof 22 27 39 51
P-value 0.135 0.008 0.003 0.000
Brazil J-statistic 22.449 33.525 65.046 326.526
dof 34 39 51 63
P-value 0.935 0.717 0.089 0.000
Dot-com J-statistic 41.586 69.755 94.775 356.846
dof 34 39 51 63
P-value 0.174 0.002 0.000 0.000
Argentina J-statistic 44.943 57.750 95.781 361.129
dof 34 39 51 63
P-value 0.099 0.027 0.000 0.000
U.S. subprime J-statistic 20.680 37.82 68.627 330.203
dof 34 39 51 63
P-value 0.965 0.524 0.050 0.000Chapter 5 130
Table 5:
Contribution of contagion to stock and bond market volatility during ￿nancial crises:
percentage of total volatility.
(The percentage contribution of the non-contagion component to volatility is obtained
by subtracting the reported contagion contribution from 100. For comparison the
variance of actual returns for stock and bonds for each country are also reported.)
Crisis Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Russia/ Contagion (%) 61.02 96.93 39.94 46.97 12.68 67.64
LTCM Variance 9.74 15.64 2.84 11.12 140.25 2.07
Brazil Contagion (%) 62.70 9.56 6.93 13.48 89.80 18.28
Variance 7.33 25.35 1.33 5.93 17.47 1.63
Dot-com Contagion (%) 93.75 55.86 22.18 88.36 1.36 0.48
Variance 2.61 3.66 2.88 7.09 11.22 2.14
Argentina Contagion (%) 11.33 32.32 25.74 6.89 8.78 52.03
Variance 9.06 5.40 1.28 1.80 4.20 1.71
U.S. subprime Contagion (%) 67.03 16.10 73.73 68.08 22.67 80.62
Variance 8.89 13.04 4.05 6.95 4.02 3.47
Bond Markets
Russia/ Contagion (%) 39.04 92.71 45.47 88.57 13.30 31.02
LTCM Variance 11.19 30.30 1.47 5.68 371.11 0.32
Brazil Contagion (%) 14.12 18.02 7.68 81.01 63.24 8.24
Variance 9.20 32.20 0.78 4.99 193.26 0.09
Dot-com Contagion (%) 0.04 7.60 18.41 0.15 11.60 11.27
Variance 1.86 1.54 0.85 0.60 14.41 0.06
Argentina Contagion (%) 5.80 0.13 7.23 8.86 0.81 7.00
Variance 40.73 6.75 0.54 0.36 1.54 0.12
U.S. subprime Contagion (%) 96.87 16.77 14.53 15.91 27.84 34.31
Variance 28.17 1.72 0.39 0.39 1.12 0.16Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 131
Table 6:
Breakdown of the contribution of contagion channels to overall contagion in stock
markets during ￿nancial crises: percentage of total volatility.
( ￿n.a.￿represents not applicable.).
Crisis Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia/ Market (bond) 0.90 12.14 6.65 9.00 0.09 5.99
LTCM Country (Rus.) 44.86 0.71 21.81 30.70 n.a. 54.86
Idio. (Rus. bond) 12.75 54.47 0.91 0.01 1.17 0.03
Idio. (U.S. bond) 2.52 29.62 10.58 7.27 11.42 6.77
Total contagion 61.02 96.93 39.94 46.97 12.68 67.64
Variance 9.74 15.64 2.84 11.12 140.25 2.07
Brazil Market (bond) 2.24 2.49 0.28 0.00 55.33 2.23
Country (Brz.) 51.04 n.a. 1.53 12.40 n.a. 2.31
Idio. (Brz bond) 9.42 7.07 5.12 1.08 34.47 13.75
Total contagion 62.70 9.56 6.93 13.48 89.80 18.28
Variance 7.33 25.35 1.33 5.93 17.47 1.63
Dot-com Market (bond) 0.01 21.19 0.28 75.90 0.17 0.48
Country (U.S.) 88.03 7.09 0.48 2.04 0.01 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 5.71 27.58 21.42 10.42 1.18 n.a.
Total contagion 93.75 55.86 22.18 88.36 1.36 0.48
Variance 2.61 3.66 2.88 7.09 11.22 2.14
Argentina Market (bond) 9.70 25.77 2.01 1.23 0.17 0.08
Country (Arg.) n.a. 2.96 4.85 0.58 1.69 6.16
Idio. (Arg. Bond) 1.64 3.60 18.88 5.08 6.92 45.79
Total contagion 11.33 32.32 25.74 6.89 8.78 52.03
Variance 9.06 5.40 1.28 1.80 4.20 1.71
U.S. subprime Market (bond) 28.33 5.06 30.88 28.59 8.33 36.05
Idio. (U.S. stock) 2.93 3.74 2.48 2.30 0.75 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. bond) 35.77 7.30 40.37 37.20 13.59 44.57
Total contagion 67.03 16.10 73.73 68.08 22.67 80.62
Variance 8.89 13.04 4.05 6.95 4.02 3.47Chapter 5 132
Table 7:
Breakdown of the contribution of contagion channels to overall contagion in bond
markets during ￿nancial crises: percentage of total volatility.
( ￿n.a.￿represents not applicable.)
Crisis Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia/ Market (stock) 31.65 9.30 9.15 26.32 0.47 5.91
LTCM Country (Rus.) 0.74 29.55 4.61 18.22 n.a. 7.47
Idio. (Rus. bond) 5.77 31.42 3.43 25.23 n.a. 17.64
Idio. (U.S. bond) 0.87 22.45 28.28 18.79 12.83 n.a.
Total contagion 39.04 92.71 45.47 88.57 13.30 31.02
Variance 11.19 30.30 1.47 5.68 371.11 0.32
Brazil Market (stock) 0.16 18.02 0.80 1.87 28.63 3.25
Country (Brz.) 13.92 n.a. 6.26 76.72 5.62 3.98
Idio. (Brz bond) 0.04 n.a. 0.62 2.42 29.00 1.01
Total contagion 14.12 18.02 7.68 81.01 63.24 8.24
Variance 9.20 32.20 0.78 4.99 193.26 0.09
Dot-com Market (stock) 0.01 4.13 9.62 0.06 4.20 7.18
Country (U.S.) 0.01 0.21 0.49 0.02 0.06 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 0.02 3.26 8.30 0.07 7.34 5.09
Total contagion 0.04 7.60 18.41 0.15 11.60 11.27
Variance 1.86 1.54 0.85 0.60 14.41 0.06
Argentina Market (stock) 5.80 0.01 4.76 0.74 0.04 1.42
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.08 2.33 1.33 0.03 0.28
Idio. (Arg. Bond) n.a. 0.04 0.14 6.79 0.74 5.29
Total contagion 5.80 0.13 7.23 8.86 0.81 7.00
Variance 40.73 6.75 0.54 0.36 1.54 0.12
U.S. subprime Market (stock) 2.15 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.00 11.45
Idio. (U.S. stock) 92.57 1.03 0.43 0.90 0.06 22.86
Idio. (U.S. bond) 2.15 15.59 14.07 14.99 27.78 n.a.
Total contagion 96.87 16.77 14.53 15.91 27.84 34.31
Variance 28.17 1.72 0.39 0.39 1.12 0.16Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 133
Table 8:
Wald tests of contagion channels: P-values in brackets.
Test Degrees of Crisis
freedom
Russia Brazil Dot-com Argentina U.S.
/LTCM subprime
Market (stock) 6 5475.53 1795103.28 30.05 37.60 3.85
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:697)
Market (bonds) 6 49180.17 494665.10 90158.10 120.46 424.23
(0:001) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Country 10 2789.53 370838.88 112956.68 167.87
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Idiosyncratic 11 154327.77
(Rus. bonds) (0:000)
Idiosyncratic 11 104016.36 660.29
(U.S. bonds) (0:000) (0:000)
Idiosyncratic 11 2122141.10
(Bra. bonds) (0:000)
Idiosyncratic 11 20842.49 292.75
(U.S. stock) (0:000) (0:000)
Idiosyncratic 11 247.82
(Arg. bonds) (0:000)
Joint 44(a), 33(b) 455321.86 4779749.06 646829.77 609.72 1354.27
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
(a) Degrees of freedom for the Russian/LTCM crisis.
(b) Degrees of freedom for the Brazilian, dot-com, Argentinian and U.S. subprime crises.Chapter 5 134
Table 9:
Conditional moment tests of the standardized VAR residuals (zt) for selected periods:












Crisis Statistic Asset Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia AR(1) Stocks 0.352 0.899 0.175 0.761 0.477 0.182
AR(1) Bonds 0.118 0.795 0.237 0.669 0.380 0.790
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.485 0.215 0.489 0.419 0.285 0.207
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.372 0.686 0.499 0.190 0.748 0.195
LTCM AR(1) Stocks 0.362 0.288 0.073 0.913 0.801 0.667
AR(1) Bonds 0.322 0.083 0.108 0.470 0.643 0.435
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.973 0.673 0.924 0.429 0.898 0.112
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.415 0.319 0.236 0.022 0.601 0.559
Brazil AR(1) Stocks 0.752 0.571 0.429 0.216 0.205 0.470
AR(1) Bonds 0.145 0.331 0.827 0.048 0.165 0.457
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.599 0.426 0.768 0.472 0.223 0.412
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.190 0.981 0.073 0.538 0.921 0.609
Dot-com AR(1) Stocks 0.080 0.472 0.959 0.968 0.687 0.936
AR(1) Bonds 0.203 0.301 0.385 0.895 0.557 0.459
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.746 0.074 0.598 0.528 0.014 0.685
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.252 0.525 0.393 0.405 0.041 0.746
Argentina AR(1) Stocks 0.360 0.067 0.986 0.394 0.024 0.607
AR(1) Bonds 0.116 0.678 0.027 0.002 0.394 0.328
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.243 0.097 0.072 0.004 0.061 0.039
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.006 0.048 0.263 0.027 0.067 0.001
U.S. subprime AR(1) Stocks 0.660 0.551 0.132 0.433 0.375 0.096
AR(1) Bonds 0.438 0.860 0.443 0.888 0.358 0.549
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.688 0.206 0.980 0.237 0.260 0.823
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.461 0.295 0.558 0.325 0.462 0.678Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 135
Table 10:
Wald tests of structural breaks: P-values in brackets.
Test Degrees of Crisis
freedom
Russia Brazil Dot-com Argentina U.S.
/LTCM subprime
Market (stock) 6 918.92 27992.76 1689.69 159.16 44.64
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Market (bonds) 6 13677.70 1117223.14 46.55 44.99 15.46
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:017)




Idiosyncratic 1 8.62 0.05







Joint 16(a), 15(b), 34398.96 1188511.63 1783.28 449.79 77.98
12(c), 14(d) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
(a) Degrees of freedom for the Russian/LTCM crisis.
(b) Degrees of freedom for the Brazilian and Argentinian crises.
(c) Degrees of freedom for the dot-com crisis.
(d) Degrees of freedom for the U.S. subprime crisis.Chapter 5 136
A Model Derivations
A.1 Optimal Portfolio Weights
For a normally distributed random variable x, E [expx] = exp
￿




De￿ning y ￿ expx; then lnE [y] = E [lny] + 1
2V ar[lny]: Assuming that period 2


















2 V ar[ln(1 + Rp)j￿k]
￿
; (5.22)
by substituting out W2 in the objective function using the budget constraint in (5.3),
and where E [lnW1j￿k] = lnW1 and V ar[lnW1j￿k] = 0; as W1 is known at time 1.
Using the de￿nition of the portfolio return in (5.4) and some algebraic manipulation,
the ln[1 + Rp] term in the objective function in (5.22) is expressed as
ln[1 + Rp] = ln[1 + ￿
0
















+ ln[1 + Rf]:
or, in terms of log excess returns
rp ￿ rf = ln[1 + ￿
0
k [exp(r ￿ rf) ￿ 1]];
where rp ￿ ln(1 + Rp); r ￿ ln(1 + R); rf ￿ ln(1 + Rf); represent the respective
logarithm of returns. The excess portfolio return is approximated by taking a Taylor
series expansion around zero excess return (r ￿ rf = 0)
rp ￿ rf ’ ￿
0





k (r ￿ rf)(r ￿ rf)
0 (1 ￿ ￿
0
k{);
where the third and higher order terms are assumed to be small.
Taking expectations of the excess portfolio return conditional on the information
set of the kth investor, and rearranging gives
E [(rp ￿ rf)j￿k] ’ ￿
0













E [rpj￿k] ￿ rf ’ ￿
0





kV ar[(r ￿ rf)j￿k](1 ￿ ￿
0
k{)
E [rpj￿k] ’ ￿
0





kV ar[rj￿k](1 ￿ ￿
0
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and
V ar[(rp ￿ rf)j￿k] ’ V ar[(￿
0
k (r ￿ rf))j￿k]
V ar[rpj￿k] ’ ￿
0
kV ar[rj￿k]￿k: (5.24)
Upon substituting (5.23) and (5.24) into (5.22), together with the de￿nition of log
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Di⁄erentiating (5.25) with respect to ￿k yields the optimal solution to the portfolio














A.2 Informed Conditional Expectations
Using r ￿ ln(1 + R) combined with the de￿nition of R = v￿P
P in (5.5) and the liqui-
dation value de￿nition in (5.6), gives
r = ln￿ + lnu ￿ lnP: (5.27)
Now taking conditional expectations based on the information set ￿I in (5.10), yields
the following conditional expectations of the informed investor
E [rj￿I] = ln￿ + E [lnuj￿I] ￿ lnP = ln￿ + ￿ lnft ￿ lnP; (5.28)
and
V ar[rj￿I] = V ar[lnuj￿I] = ￿￿
0 + ￿￿; (5.29)
where





V ar[lnuj￿I] = ￿V ar[lnft+1j￿I]￿






Substituting (5.28) and (5.29) into the optimal solution of the informed investor￿ s










A.3 Uninformed Conditional Expectations
The conditional expectations of (5.27) based on the information set ￿U in (5.12), are
E [rj￿U] = E [lnvj￿U] ￿ lnP;
and
V ar[rj￿U] = V ar[lnvj￿U]:
The solution to the uninformed investor￿ s optimization problem given in (5.9) with








Unlike the conditional expectations of the informed investor, calculation of the
uninformed investor￿ s conditional expectations are more involved as it is now necessary
to form expectations of ￿; as well as ￿. To achieve this, consider the market equilibrium







where ￿I and ￿U are respectively the number of informed and uninformed investors.











E [lnvj￿U] ￿ lnP ￿ rf + 1
2V ar[lnvj￿U]
￿V ar[lnvj￿U]
W1 + ln￿: (5.30)
Rearranging this equation in terms of those variables not contained in the information
set of the uninformed investor as a function of lnP, gives










4 XT ￿ ￿U
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To ensure that uninformed investor￿ s expectations conditional on equilibrium prices
are consistent with that conditional on the information revealed by S (P), the following
￿belief consistency￿conditions are imposed
E [lnvj￿U] = E [lnvjS (lnP)]
= E [lnv] + Cov [lnv;S (lnP)](V ar[S (lnP)])
￿1
￿(S (lnP) ￿ E [S (lnP)])






















V ar[lnvj￿U] = V ar[lnvjS (lnP)]




















which represent the required conditional expectations of the uninformed investor.
A.4 Returns Equation
The derivations of the model given above are based on the return on the asset R; which
is unknown as it is a function of the asset￿ s liquidation value v, which by de￿nition
is unknown. To derive an expression of the observed or realized return on the asset,
the following steps are adopted. Substitute the conditional expectations in (5.31) into
the market-clearing condition in (5.30), and rearrange to generate an expression of the
current price in terms of the factors
lnP = ’ + ￿ ln￿ + ￿ln￿ + ￿ lnf; (5.32)Chapter 5 140
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Now let P2 be the realized price in the next period, formally the realization from
the distribution of v, be given by
lnP2 = E [lnvj￿U] + ln￿;
where ln￿ is the expectations error which under the assumption of rational expectations
is assumed to be iid. Then the realized return is
lnP2 ￿ lnP = E [lnvj￿U] + ln￿ ￿ lnP
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where the last step is based on using the expression for E [lnvj￿U] in (5.31) and the
expression for lnP in (5.32). Or, in terms of excess returns, lnP2￿lnP ￿rf; the factor
equation becomes




















































This is the most general factor representation of excess returns during ￿nancial crises
as it includes both ￿normal￿and contagious transmission mechanisms. In a non-crisis
period where there is no contagion, this is represented by ￿￿
0 and ￿￿ being diagonal
matrices.Chapter 5 142
B Data Sources and De￿nitions
Table B1: Data sources and de￿nitions.
Country Bonds Stocks Exchange rates
(issued in U.S. dollars) (local currency) (against USD)
Argentina 11% coupon: MERVAL Index
Issued October 9, 1996
Matures October 9, 2006
Bloomberg 007022140 ARGMERV(PI) ARGPES$
11.375% coupon:
Issued March 15, 2000
Matures March 15, 2010
Bloomberg 010909899
Brazil 9 3/8% coupon: BOVESPA Index
Issued March 31, 1998
Matures April 7, 2008
Bloomberg 105756AG5 BRBOVES(PI) BRACRU$
10.25% coupon:
Issued June 17, 2003
Matures June 17, 2013
Bloomberg 017062875
Canada Corporate BBB S&P/TSX Index
Bloomberg C28810Y TTOCOMP(PI) CNDOLL$
Mexico 8 5/8% coupon BOLSA Index
Issued March 5, 1998
Matures March 12, 2008
Bloomberg 8534713 MXIPC35(PI) MEXPES$
6.375% coupon
Issued January 16, 2003
Matures January 16, 2013
Bloomberg 016113468
Sources: Bloomberg Datastream DatastreamContagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 143
Table B1 (continued): Data sources and de￿nitions.
Country Bonds Stocks Exchange rates
(issued in U.S. dollars) (local currency) (against USD)
Russia 3% coupon: RSF EE MT Index
Issued May 14, 1993
Matures May 14 2008
Bloomberg TT3182314 RSMTIND(PI) CISRUB$
3% coupon:
Issued May 14, 1996
Matures May 14, 2011
Bloomberg 008170363
U.S. Corporate BBB bond rate Dow Jones Index
Bloomberg C00910Y DJINDUS(PI)
Risk free Yields on the U.S. Treasury 10 year bond
Federal Reserve Board of Governors: Table 15 tcm10y
Sources: Bloomberg Datastream DatastreamChapter 5 144
C Additional Variance Decompositions
Table C1: Variance decompositions, Russian/LTCM crisis: percentage of total.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 1.07 0.34 0.05 0.95 7.52 14.64
Common 2 9.83 0.58 14.96 4.79 5.07 16.81
Emerging 1.18 0.43 n.a. n.a. 9.00 n.a.
Market (stock) 2.31 1.19 1.12 4.16 16.85 0.91
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 2.14 0.15 18.44 1.21 10.68 n.a.
Idio. 22.45 0.39 25.49 41.92 38.19 n.a.
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.90 12.14 6.65 9.00 0.09 5.99
Country (Russia) 44.86 0.71 21.81 30.70 n.a. 54.86
Idio. (Rus. bond) 12.75 54.47 0.91 0.01 1.17 0.03
Idio. (U.S. bond) 2.52 29.62 10.58 7.27 11.42 6.77
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 9.74 15.64 2.84 11.12 140.25 2.07
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.04 1.68 0.00
Common 2 3.76 4.84 4.79 8.00 9.50 0.00
Emerging 0.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.62 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.52 0.02 8.55 0.01 0.12 68.80
Country 1.22 0.77 15.04 0.94 52.36 n.a.
Idio. 55.10 1.63 25.83 2.45 20.41 0.18
Contagion Market (stock) 31.65 9.30 9.15 26.32 0.47 5.91
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (Russia) 0.74 29.55 4.61 18.22 n.a. 7.47
Idio. (Rus. bond) 5.77 31.42 3.43 25.23 n.a. 17.64
Idio. (U.S. bond) 0.87 22.45 28.28 18.79 12.83 n.a.
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 11.19 30.30 1.47 5.68 371.11 0.32Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 145
Table C2: Variance decompositions, Brazilian crisis: percentage of total.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 8.64 4.12 20.87 6.51 0.11 31.99
Common 2 2.33 4.58 0.44 2.98 0.31 14.53
Emerging 1.17 3.84 n.a. n.a. 0.24 n.a.
Market (stock) 1.23 0.25 7.09 10.71 8.23 35.20
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 6.29 76.86 41.53 0.84 0.02 n.a.
Idio. 17.64 0.80 23.14 65.49 1.31 n.a.
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 2.24 2.49 0.28 0.00 55.33 2.23
Country (Brazil) 51.04 n.a. 1.53 12.40 0.00 2.31
Idio. (Brz. bond) 9.42 7.07 5.12 1.08 34.47 13.75
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 7.33 25.35 1.33 5.93 17.47 1.63
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 5.18 3.10 8.78 10.85 0.04 0.66
Common 2 0.09 0.08 1.15 0.27 0.01 0.01
Emerging 0.48 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.01 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.47 1.58 0.02 3.28 36.14 0.04
Country 0.51 76.95 19.46 2.71 0.11 n.a.
Idio. 79.15 0.27 62.91 1.88 0.45 91.07
Contagion Market (stock) 0.16 18.02 0.80 1.87 28.63 3.25
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (Brazil) 13.92 n.a. 6.26 76.72 5.62 3.98
Idio. (Brz. bond) 0.04 n.a. 0.62 2.42 29.00 1.01
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 9.20 32.20 0.78 4.99 193.26 0.09Chapter 5 146
Table C3: Variance decompositions, dot-com crisis: percentage of total.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.05 0.86 0.01 0.03 11.59 41.15
Common 2 0.65 1.81 16.42 0.16 10.71 42.18
Emerging 0.08 1.45 n.a. n.a. 8.32 n.a.
Market (stock) 3.94 38.83 11.63 10.23 0.88 2.25
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 0.01 1.11 11.28 0.01 67.10 0.79
Idio. 1.54 0.08 38.48 1.21 0.03 13.15
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.01 21.19 0.28 75.90 0.17 0.48
Country (U.S.) 88.03 7.09 0.48 2.04 0.01 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 5.71 27.58 21.42 10.42 1.18 n.a.
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 2.61 3.66 2.88 7.09 11.22 2.14
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.07 0.29 0.14 0.39 0.69 0.03
Common 2 5.52 60.63 8.44 71.11 6.26 0.62
Emerging 0.46 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.34 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.02
Country 93.36 3.70 48.64 22.95 0.02 0.21
Idio. 0.56 27.69 24.36 5.30 80.09 86.85
Contagion Market (stock) 0.01 4.13 9.62 0.06 4.20 7.18
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (U.S.) 0.01 0.21 0.49 0.02 0.06 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 0.02 3.26 8.30 0.07 7.34 5.09
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 1.86 1.54 0.85 0.60 14.41 0.06Contagion Across Bond and Equity Markets and Across National Borders 147
Table C4: Variance decompositions, Argentinian crisis: percentage of total.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 1.26 0.01 0.42 0.59 3.58 19.39
Common 2 15.42 0.03 20.00 8.35 4.21 28.06
Emerging 1.67 0.03 n.a. n.a. 9.18 n.a.
Market (stock) 0.20 67.57 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.52
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 32.05 0.01 22.49 0.40 68.73 n.a.
Idio. 38.08 0.03 31.18 83.65 5.27 n.a.
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 9.70 25.77 2.01 1.23 0.17 0.08
Country (Arg.) n.a. 2.96 4.85 0.58 1.69 6.16
Idio. (Arg. bond) 1.64 3.60 18.88 5.08 6.92 45.79
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 9.06 5.40 1.28 1.80 4.20 1.71
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.80 4.78 1.08 3.71 1.37 0.01
Common 2 12.17 61.60 7.32 60.63 3.54 0.54
Emerging 1.26 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.26 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 43.58 0.40 10.01 0.00 0.01 0.78
Country 30.66 14.32 29.05 24.25 0.02 n.a.
Idio. 5.73 18.78 45.32 2.56 94.00 91.67
Contagion Market (stock) 5.80 0.01 4.76 0.74 0.04 1.42
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.08 2.33 1.33 0.03 0.28
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 0.04 0.14 6.79 0.74 5.29
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 40.73 6.75 0.54 0.36 1.54 0.12Chapter 5 148
Table C5: Variance decompositions,U.S. subprime mortgage crisis: percentage of total.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 2.80 2.49 0.35 1.55 13.10 3.49
Common 2 7.07 1.60 5.95 2.33 3.36 11.33
Emerging 1.05 1.81 n.a. n.a. 8.80 n.a.
Market (stock) 0.57 75.93 0.74 1.23 0.28 1.21
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 2.08 0.21 7.37 0.20 0.23 n.a.
Idio. 19.40 1.86 11.86 26.60 51.56 3.34
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 28.33 5.06 30.88 28.59 8.33 36.05
Idio. (U.S. stock) 2.93 3.74 2.48 2.30 0.75 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. bond) 35.77 7.30 40.37 37.20 13.59 44.57
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 8.89 13.04 4.05 6.95 4.02 3.47
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.00 2.57 1.34 2.73 0.70 0.01
Common 2 0.05 46.54 6.73 51.47 1.63 15.17
Emerging 0.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.59 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 2.25 10.03 8.79 7.70 44.53 26.61
Country 0.01 22.71 27.00 22.12 12.34 n.a.
Idio. 0.81 1.38 41.61 0.07 12.37 23.90
Contagion Market (stock) 2.15 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.00 11.45
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 92.57 1.03 0.43 0.90 0.06 22.86
Idio. (U.S. bond) 2.15 15.59 14.07 14.99 27.78 n.a.
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 28.17 1.72 0.39 0.39 1.12 0.16 
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“When U.S. stocks are volatile, EMBI spreads widen. They narrow again 
when U.S. stocks calm down. That suggests that emerging market debt is 
not being driven by judgments of governments’ creditworthiness.”   
        Financial Times, 10/26/07 (p. 15) 
 
1   Introduction 
The typical assumption is that spreads on sovereign bonds reflect the default risk of that country, 
which in turn are determined by its economic fundamentals. However, fundamentals do not change 
from one day to the other, unless new information is revealed periodically affecting the 
expectations about the underlying drivers of that particular economy. Yet spreads on sovereign 
bonds vary constantly, sometimes substantially over very short intervals of time. As quoted above 
by a leading international financial newspaper, observers have noticed that bond spreads generally 
tend to move with changes in global financial conditions, such as volatility in equity markets. 
  One observed regularity is that  bond spreads tend to widen in a country facing financial 
stress, as investors price higher a risk in that country. But during periods of financial stress, spreads 
sometimes widen not only in the source country of the crisis, but also across other countries which 
appear to be unrelated. Indeed, shocks can transmit rapidly across global financial markets. One 
possible channel is that conditions in global financial markets affect international investors’ risk 
appetite, and changes in the latter may actually spread the original shock across global financial 
markets. Through this mechanism, seemingly unrelated asset markets across national boundaries 
may actually be affected by an otherwise unrelated shock. 
As evidenced by the U.S. subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis that begun in mid-2007, 
financial crises are not simply events from the past—although it has been several years since global 
financial markets experienced such a pervasive shock—and are not confined to emerging markets. 
This recent crisis was characterized by a drying up of liquidity across financial markets which was 
sparked by difficulties in the U.S. subprime mortgage market (see International Monetary Fund 
                                                 
1 The chapter is published in González-Hermosillo, B. (2007b), “The Role of International Investors’ Risk 





(2007)). Empirical analyses of this recent episode of global financial crisis are still scant, 
particularly in the context of other historical crises. In chapter 5 of this thesis it is found that the 
most acute episodes of systemic contagion across markets and countries in the past decade have 
been the Russia/LTCM crisis in 1998 and the U.S. subprime and liquidity squeeze in mid-2007. In 
both of these cases, the channel of contagion is primarily from credit markets to equity markets. 
They also find that there was contagion from U.S. credit markets to Russian and Argentinean credit 
markets, both of which had their central banks inject emergency liquidity during the U.S. subprime 
and liquidity crisis.
2 
  There is a rich literature on financial contagion which has tried to identify the channels 
through which shocks in one country transmit to financial markets in other countries (see 
Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000); Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Dungey, Fry, González-
Hermosillo and Martin (2005b), for surveys of this literature). The theoretical determinants of 
contagion are discussed in Kodres and Pritsker (2002). While most of the empirical literature on 
contagion has focused on emerging markets, a few exceptions have analyzed emerging markets and 
mature economies jointly for clues as to how shocks transmit globally during periods of financial 
stress, usually across the same asset market class (Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003); and chapters 3 to 
5 in this thesis). Analyses of spillover and contagion effects across emerging markets and mature 
economies, as well as across different asset market classes are even less common (one exception is 
Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, Martin and Tang (2007b)).  
  There may be several mechanisms for contagion whereby channels are established only 
during periods of stress that are over and above the market fundamental mechanisms, or spillovers, 
that link countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods. One such mechanism may be the 
presence of common international investors who react to a given shock by rebalancing their 
portfolios globally in assets and markets that would be otherwise seemingly unrelated. As investors 
become less willing to assume risk, they require a higher compensation for bearing such risk. This 
re-pricing of risk can effect the prices of other risky assets (Kumar and Persaud (2002)).  
  Observers often refer to this mechanism as investors’ increased risk aversion or reduced 
risk appetite. However, these two concepts are conceptually different.
3  Risk aversion measures the 
subjective attitude of investors with regard to uncertainty. Since the degree of investors’ risk 
aversion reflects entrenched preferences, it is usually assumed to be constant in asset pricing 
                                                 
2 Financial Times (9/26/07) and Fitch Ratings (10/18/07). 
3 In practice, it is clearly difficult to disentangle risk appetite from risk aversion. An increase in either one 
causes asset prices to decline and risk premia to increase. This issue is examined in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou 
(2004).  
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models. In contrast, the notion of investors’ risk appetite is more broad as it is also influenced by 
the amount of uncertainty about the fundamental factors that drive asset prices. Thus, the risk 
premia embedded in asset prices are influenced by both risk aversion and the riskiness of the asset 
in question. One potential channel for shifts in investors’ risk appetite is changes in global financial 
market conditions, a venue which is investigated empirically in this chapter. Gauging the degree of 
investors’ risk appetite is relevant from a global financial stability perspective as past episodes of 
brisk changes in risk premia, variations in market liquidity, and sharp movements in asset prices 
have been often associated with changes in investors’ risk appetite.    
Work analyzing the role of risk appetite as a transmission channel of financial crises 
include Kumar and Persaud (2002), Gai and Vause (2005), Coudert and Gex (2007), and Dungey, 
Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2003a). The first two papers analyze the relative importance 
of contagion due to shifts in risk appetite; the third paper analyzes the predictive power of several 
risk appetite indices; and the last one identifies the global market channels of financial crises.
4 
There is also a wide literature on the determinants of emerging market spreads. For example, 
Kashiwase and Kodres (2005) estimate a panel data model in which emerging market spreads are a 
function of liquidity risk and fundamental factors.  
This chapter quantifies the relative importance of potential determinants of spreads for 
emerging markets’ sovereign bonds and mature markets’ corporate bonds from 1998 through 2007, 
encompassing several episodes of financial market distress. A vector autoregression model is 
constructed to capture the dynamics of global bond spreads as a function of global market 
conditions, idiosyncratic factors and contagion effects. The identification of the factors is made 
through long-run restrictions which permit  quantifying the contribution of the various factors to the 
bond spreads during various periods of financial stress. 
In particular, four different global market risk factors are assumed to reflect the degree of 
risk appetite of international investors. The first risk factor is the funding liquidity premium, 
                                                 
4 The approach in this chapter is similar to Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2003a), with 
several important differences. First, the proxies for global market conditions in this paper are different and 
chosen to reflect, where possible, some of the newer instruments in financial markets. Second, the choice of 
countries is different and expanded, as they only examine emerging markets, while mature markets are also 
introduced here as part of a more global framework. As highlighted during the 2007 subprime mortgage 
meltdown and liquidity squeeze, global financial crises can also originate in mature markets. Third, this  
chapter covers a longer period January 1998 to August 2007, with a larger number of episodes of financial 
stress including the recent turbulence sparked by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. In contrast, in  Dungey, 
Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2003a) only nine emerging markets’ sovereign spreads are examined 
during three crises episodes (the Russian default (1998), the LTCM bail-out (1998), and the Brazilian 





proxied by monetary conditions. The second risk factor is default risk. The third factor is 
market liquidity risk, as investors prefer liquid instruments which can be transformed into other 
assets without a significant loss of value during times of stress. Market liquidity may be an 
especially important systemic factor during financial crises if a liquidity squeeze forces a 
generalized sale of assets, depressing their prices and resulting in additional default risks which 
may feed back into even more illiquidity. The final aggregate risk factor considered reflects 
volatility, as measured in equity markets and in future interest rate contracts. The four aggregate 
global market risk factors are used to explain daily movements in the sovereign bond spreads for 
thirteen emerging markets and the spreads in BBB investment grade corporate bonds for four 
mature markets from January 2, 1998 through August 9, 2007 (one day before the European Central 
Bank began a round of liquidity injections into the financial system, which was followed a few days 
later by the easing of monetary policy in other central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve).  
In addition, idiosyncratic and contagion effects from emerging markets are also estimated in the 
model. 
The results suggest that, while idiosyncratic factors explain a significant amount of the 
changes in bond spreads over time, global financial market conditions are fundamental driving 
forces at times of crisis. The relative importance of the various global risk factors depends on the 
crisis episode. An important result of this chapter is that, once global financial market factors are 
explicitly considered, contagion from emerging markets becomes very small or essentially not 
existent, suggesting that investors’ risk appetite may be the key channel of transmission of shocks 
across national boundaries and market classes, especially in increasingly integrated global financial 
markets. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the conceptual basis of risk appetite. 
Section 6.3 surveys the variables which have been used in the empirical literature and by 
practitioners to proxy investors’ risk appetite, and discusses the actual variables used in this paper. 
Section 6.4 discusses the identification and estimation strategy. Section 6.5 examines the 
unconditional variance decomposition. Section 6.6 discusses the spread decomposition and the 
empirical results. Section 6.7 concludes and offers suggestions for future research. Appendix A 
details the crises dates. Appendix B contains an explanation of the Data Sources as well as the 
Tables and Figures. 
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2   The Concept of Risk Appetite 
The investors’ degree of risk aversion reflects underlying preferences and, as such, it is 
expected to change infrequently over time. In contrast, risk appetite is likely to change more often 
as investors respond to changing levels of uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment. Thus, 
risk appetite depends on the subjective degree to which investors are willing to bear uncertainty and 
on the overall level of uncertainty about the fundamental factors which drive asset prices. 
  The standard treatment of asset pricing theory (e.g., Cochrane (2001) and also discussed in 
Gai and Vause (2005)) states that in an efficient market, with fully rational and informed investors, 
the current price of an asset, pt, should equal the expected discounted value of its possible future 
payoffs, xt+1. These payoffs comprise income (such as dividend payments) received over the long-
run horizon, plus the ongoing value of the asset as implied by its future price. More formally, 
( ) 11 tt tt pE mx ++ =⋅ ,                                                         (6.1) 
where xt+1 denotes the payoff in period t+1, and mt+1 denotes the discount factor—the marginal rate 
at which the investor is willing to substitute consumption at time t + 1 for consumption at time t. 
Both xt+1 and mt+1 vary across states of the world. Indeed, mt+1 is usually referred to as the stochastic 
discount factor.  
The basic asset pricing equation can also be expressed in terms of gross returns, Rt+1, by 
dividing equation (6.1) by current prices. Thus, 
( ) 11 1 tt t Em R ++ =⋅ .                                                         (6.2) 
Although, in general, different assets have different expected returns, all assets have the same 
expected discounted return in equilibrium (of unity). Since both the gross return and the stochastic 
discount factor are random variables, equation (6.2) can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1
risk-neutral component risk adjustment
1, tt tt tt t Em ER c o m R υ ++ + + =⋅+
                        
 .                                (6.3) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (6.3) reflects the mean return required by investors 
to hold the asset if they were indifferent to risk, the risk-neutral component. The second term is a 
risk adjustment required by risk-averse investors. Given that the gross risk-free rate can be denoted 
as  11 1/
f
tt t R Em ++ = , we can rearrange (6.3) to obtain the familiar expression 
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Equation (6.4) states that the expected return of a risky asset in excess of that available on a 
risk-free asset is proportional to minus the covariance of its state-contingent rate of return and the 
stochastic discount factor. 
The risk premium can, in turn, be decomposed into the quantity of risk, βi, inherent in each 
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                             (6.5) 
The price of risk, λt, is the expected excess return that, in equilibrium, investors require to hold each 
unit of risk. Risk appetite—the willingness of investors to bear risk—can therefore be defined as the 
inverse of the price of risk. So when an investor’s risk appetite falls, they require larger expected 
excess returns to hold risky assets. 
  It is apparent from equation (6.5) that risk appetite reflects variation in the stochastic 
discount factor, var(mt+1). Since the stochastic discount factor specifies the marginal rate at which 
the investor is willing to substitute uncertain future consumption for present consumption, risk 
appetite depends on the degree to which investors dislike uncertainty about their future 
consumption and on factors that determine the overall level of uncertainty surrounding consumption 
prospects. The degree to which investors dislike uncertainty corresponds to risk aversion. 
Accordingly, risk aversion reflects innate preferences over uncertain future consumption 
prospects—the curvature of individuals’ utility functions—that are unlikely to vary significantly 
over time. 
  The factors underpinning risk appetite can also be examined by imposing some structure on 
the stochastic discount factor. For example, if consumption growth is log-normally distributed with 
variance, ()
2
1 tt c σ + , and investors have power utility functions, then the price of risk is 
( )
2
1 tt t c λγ σ + =                                                       (6.6) 
where γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
5 So a rise in γ would mean a fall in risk appetite. 
But risk appetite will also fall if the uncertainty about future consumption growth (the expected 
volatility of future consumption) is amplified. The expected volatility of future consumption may 
depend on factors such as unemployment prospects, the stance of macroeconomic policy, global 
prospects and, more generally, global financial market conditions. In general, one would expect that 
                                                 
5 This is a standard result in asset pricing. See Cochrane (2001) for a detailed exposition.   
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the periodic shifts in market sentiment witnessed over time are more likely to be driven by the 
macroeconomic environment rather than by changes in the risk aversion of investors. 
 
3   Variables in the Empirical Model 
Investors’ risk appetite is, nevertheless, not directly observable. Yet, risk appetite is 
frequently cited as a factor explaining asset price movements and several indicators are typically 
used by market participants to measure it. These measures are often amalgamations of an array of 
different market-based indicators which are aggregated to produce a single index of “risk appetite.”  
Box 1 details some of the key market-based indicators typically used to gauge investors’ risk 
appetite.
6 
This plethora of market-based indicators are used routinely by market participants.
7 
However, they are less than ideal for analytical purposes as they essentially add up all the potential 
risk factors into a mix that creates an index of risk appetite. In addition, they do not generally 
examine potential linkages among the different risk components.  
  Thus, for example, it is not clear how to examine analytically measures of risk appetite 
which throw into the mix sovereign bond spreads for emerging markets, movements in commodity 
prices, in equity prices, in fixed income markets, and in exchange rate markets, in addition to 
measures of volatility and liquidity and other market data. The approach adopted in this chapter is 
more fundamental, based on a few representative variables which are viewed to reflect the key risk 
factors in global financial markets. In particular, the model includes sovereign bond spreads in 
representative emerging markets and roughly comparable investment grade BBB corporate bonds 
in developed economies, several risk premia in global financial markets that are assumed to 
represent the compensation that international investors demand to accept risk, idiosyncratic factors 
proxying for “fundamentals”, and any additional contagion effects from emerging markets. 
                                                 
6 The group of indicators summarized in Box 1 include: CBOE’s Volatility Index (VIX); JP Morgan’s 
Risk Tolerance indices −one global (JPM G-10 RTI) and another one for emerging markets (JPM EM RTI); 
UBS FX Risk Index (UBS FX); Westpac’s Risk Appetite Index (WP); Bank of America’s Risk Appetite 
Monitor (RAM); Merrill Lynch’s Risk Aversion Indicator (ML RAI); Dresdner Kleinwort’s Aggregate Risk 
Perception Index (ARPI); and Lehman Brothers’ Market Risk Sentiment Index (MARS). 
7 In addition to market-based indicators, another strand of the literature has examined financial 
CAPM−type models in a single financial market. These include the Goldman Sachs Risk Aversion Index and 
the Credit Suisse Global Risk Appetite Index. They are not considered here because they tend to rely on 
macroeconomic data only available in monthly or quarterly data frequencies, whereas the approach in this 
paper is to focus on financial market high-frequency data. For a survey of these indicators, see European 





Box 1. Survey of Market-Based Indicators of Risk Appetite 
Index   Components  Method 
VIX                               • Implied volatility of S&P500 Index   Based on a weighted average of the implied volatility from 
eight calls and puts on the index. 
JPM G-10 RTI  • US swap spread (liquidity risk) 
• VIX (equity market risk) 
• EMBI+ (credit risk in emerging markets) 
• Trade-weighted Swiss franc (risk appetite in currency 
markets) 
Constructed as an equally weighted average after having 
standardized the four components. 
JPM EM RTI   • VIX 
• EMBI+ 
A weighted average after standardizing the two components 
(weights: 30% VIX, 70% EMBI+). 
UBS FX  
 
• US Treasury relative to the U.S. stocks 
• Three-month foreign exchange option implied volatility 
(USD/JPY and EUR/USD) 
• Gold in EUR and USD 
• VIX 
• EMBI+ 
• US Treasury spread 
• Differences in stock returns between the S&P financials and 
utilities 
• High-yield corporate spreads relative to the US Treasury 




• An average of the three-month implied volatility for six 
major currencies 
• VIX index 
• US ten-year bond-swap spread 
• JP Morgan emerging markets bond spread 
• US BB1 industrial bond spread 
A 60-day z-score
1) of a base index calculated in three steps: 
the first step calculates the daily percentage change of each 
variable, then the figures obtained are averaged, and finally 
the index values are indexed to 100 on 1 January 1998. 
RAM 
 
• EMBI spread 
• Carry AUD/JPY 
• Corporate bond spread BB 
• Carry EUR/CHF 
• Spread MSCI EM Lccy 
The correlation (over a rolling six-week period) among a 
large sample of emerging economies for each of the three 
asset classes, multiplying them by a market direction measure 
(in order to distinguish between bullish or bearish periods). 
Finally, the correlation coefficients are aggregated with an 
equally weighted average. 
ML RAI 
 
• US high-yield spreads (US higher yield spread over 
Treasuries, expressed as % yield) 
• VIX implied volatility 
• TED spreads (three-month euro-dollar deposits minus three-
month T-bills) 
• US ten-year swap spreads, emerging market bond spreads 
(ML USD Emerging Markets Sovereign ‘Plus’ Index yield) 
• The trade-weighted Swiss franc, and emerging market 
equities (USD) 
• US small cap stock 
For each item, this takes the standard deviations from 52-
week moving averages. Then it sums the standard deviations 
of US high-yield spreads, VIX implied volatility, TED 
spreads, US ten-year swap spreads, emerging market bond 
spreads and the trade-weighted Swiss franc, while it subtracts 
those of EM equities and US small cap stock. 
ARPI 
 
Based on high-frequency data (mainly spreads and implied 
volatilities) from five asset classes: 
• Fixed income basket (global and political risk) 
• Equity basket (equity investment risk) 
• Liquidity basket (liquidity risk) 
• Commodity basket (energy risk) 
• Credit basket (credit risk) 
Based on a two-step principal component analysis (PCA), 
firstly within the baskets, and secondly between the principal 
components of these baskets. 
MARS 
 
• Market volatility (one-year FX implied volatility and equity 
implied volatility) 
• EM event risk (EM CDS spreads and EM equities) 
• Market liquidity (G3 swap spread) 
• Risk appetite ratios (equity to bond returns, gold price to 
gold equity returns, and US equity P/E ratio). 
Built on a four-step process: input transformation a rank 
transformation of each risk input relative to its past 20 day 
values), data aggregation (a simple equally weighted 
average), transformation of the average rank into a score 
between 0 and 1, and finally a computation of the two-day 
moving average of the aggregate index. 
1) The X-day z-score is defined as the value of a base index, net of its X-day mean, and divided by its X-day standard deviation. 
Source: European Central Bank (2007) 
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Given that the price and the quantity of risk that investors are willing to assume are not 
distinguishable from each other in the data, the observed risk premium demanded by investors is 
assumed to reflect their risk appetite. The overall risk premium in global financial markets, itself 
also not directly observable in one single indicator, is assumed to have several key components: a 
funding liquidity premium, a credit risk premium, a market liquidity premium and a market 
volatility premium.
8 In addition to these aggregate global factors, bond spreads can be also 
influenced by fundamental factors which are idiosyncratic and, potentially, by additional sources of 
contagion from emerging markets which are not already captured by the global financial market 
conditions that are assumed to condition investors’ risk appetite. 
Economic fundamentals are modeled rather simplistically in this chapter; essentially, as 
everything else that is not encompassed by the aggregate market factors or by the additional sources 
of contagion, discussed in more detail below, emanating from emerging markets. This trade-off is 
accepted because the objective is to analyze the role of changes in global market conditions based 
on high frequency data, whereas measures of economic fundamentals rely largely on monthly or 
quarterly data. Indeed, the objective of this chapter is to determine the relative importance of 
aggregate risk factors during periods of financial stress, rather than to provide a model that best fits 
bond spreads. Moreover, because bond spread across countries tend to be more strongly correlated 
during periods of stress (Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, Martin (2005b)) than during tranquil 
periods, common factors are likely to be particularly important during periods of stress.
9  
Below follows a more detailed discussion of the data and the proxies used for the various 
components determining the risk premia required by global investors. 
 
3.1   Bond Spreads 
The data for bond spreads in emerging markets are based on JP Morgan’s EMBI+ country-
specific indices. These indices contain U.S. dollar-denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds and other 
traded loans issued by sovereigns, rated Baa1/BBB+ or below, and which satisfy certain maturity 
                                                 
8 There is no theoretical model for the global transmission of shocks to guide the choice of the appropriate 
“global” variables for this paper. However, the actual selection of variables is based on the analysis of the 
financial position of a representative banking firm in González-Hermosillo and Li (2008, forthcoming) where  
market, liquidity and credit risks are viewed as fundamental. In addition, volatility risk is essential in equity 
and derivatives markets, while funding liquidity is related to credit conditions and the level of the risk-free 
interest rate. 
9 Of course, the interpretation that idiosyncratic factors represent what is not explained by common global 
factors or other sources of contagion requires caution since its appropriateness depends on the quality of the 






10  The spreads are calculated as the difference between the yield on 
the instruments and the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds of similar maturity. The sovereign spreads 
include Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South 
Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. For mature markets, the representative bond spread is 
constructed as the difference between the yields on 10-year BBB-rated corporate bond indices and 
government bond indices of similar maturity and currency.
11 The developed markets analyzed are 
the Canada, the Eurozone, Japan and the United States. 
 
3.2   Global Financial Market Conditions 
The choice of variables that reflect global financial markets is constrained by the need to 
have a parsimonious set of variables that is still able to reflect “global” market conditions. They are 
discussed below. 
3.2.1   Funding Liquidity Premium 
The first aggregate market risk factor considered is the funding liquidity premium or a 
proxy to measure the amount of credit availability in the global financial system. Finding proxies to 
measure the funding liquidity premium (denoted as FF) is particularly troublesome after 2004, as 
long-term interest rates have stayed relatively constant even as a number of central banks have 
increased short-term interest rates. In addition to traditional monetary aggregates like M1 and M2, 
more appropriate proxies for funding liquidity would need to also include measures of credit 
availability, fund flows, asset prices and leverage (Warsh (2007)). In addition to the fact that it 
would be extremely difficult to construct proxies for those broad liquidity conditions, most of them 
would not exist on the daily frequency needed in this model.
12 
  In this paper, the 3-month-ahead federal funds futures rate is used as a measure of global 
funding liquidity or monetary conditions.
13 The federal funds rate is the instrument used by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve to affect monetary conditions. This rate can affect risk spreads through two 
channels. A decline in the federal funds rate implies a lower cost of borrowing and therefore an 
                                                 
10 In particular, the instruments must have a maturity greater than 2 1/2 years, meet certain liquidity 
conditions and have a minimum issue size of US$500 million.  
11 The corporate bond indices are computed by Bloomberg, whereas the government bond indices are 
computed by DataStream. 
12 It is difficult to get a satisfactory proxy for global liquidity funding conditions reflected in daily data, 
especially for recent years as financial innovation has led to extraordinary leverage in financial markets. 
Estimates based on monthly frequency of the data have included monetary aggregates plus foreign official 
reserve holdings (Rasmus and Stracca (2006)). 
13 Kashiwase and Kodres (2005) also choose this proxy for funding liquidity.  
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rising level of funding liquidity in the economy. In addition, it reduces the return from safer assets. 
Everything else constant, these two channels would be expected to result in international investors 
seeking higher returns in risky assets. In contrast, higher expected interest rates make borrowing 
more expensive and drains funding liquidity from the system, increasing the probability that 
creditors will face difficulties. In this chapter, funding liquidity conditions are proxied by the 
implied federal funds rate in futures markets, rather than the actual federal funds rate, because the 
former captures the effects of anticipated changes in monetary policy at the time when they are 
anticipated, rather than when they actually take place. Another advantage of focusing on the 3-
month ahead federal funds futures rate is that it implicitly captures a segment of the yield curve that 
is longer than the spot overnight federal funds rate, while also exhibiting more daily variation than 
the actual federal funds policy rate. 
 
3.2.2   Credit Risk Premium  
Two different measures of aggregate credit or default risk are examined (denoted as DR 
and Def. in the tables). The most direct one, because it prices in the cost of buying insurance 
against default, is credit default swaps. In particular, the 10-year Itraxx Europe Crossover index is 
examined in this chapter and it measures the cost of buying insurance against default by European 
firms whose ratings are between investment and speculative grade.
14 Because credit default swap 
indices only exist after 2004, we also need to rely on other proxies of credit risk that cover a longer 
period. 
The proxy used to measure aggregate default risk over the longer sample is the 10-year 
USD swap spread which is the difference between the 10-year swap rate and the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury bond ( 10, 10, tt si − ).
15 
16 In a swap contract, one party agrees to pay a fixed interest rate in 
return for received an adjustable rate from another party. When an investor enters a swap agreement 
as a fixed receiver in a fixed-for-floating swap, the investor is promised to receive from the 
counterparty a series of semi-annual fixed payments in exchange for paying the counterparty a 
                                                 
14 There are many Itraxx indices and derivatives on Itraxx. The Itraxx crossover Europe index was chosen 
because of its relative liquidity and the fact that the 35 companies on which it is based are closer substitutes to 
emerging market bonds than other higher-rated indices. A similar  index exists for U.S. corporations (CDX), 
which moves similarly to Itraxx. Because most of the other “global” variables are largely U.S.-based, the 
choice of the Itraxx crossover Europe was thought to give the analysis a more global balance. 
15 Regarding the notation, the first subscript indicates the maturity of the instrument, while the second 
indicates the time period. Both the maturity and the period are denominated in years. 
16  A large universe of fixed-income securities, including corporate bonds and mortgage-backed securities, 





series of semi-annual floating payments. While the fixed payments are determined at the 
outset of the swap agreement, the floating payments are to be determined at later dates, based on 
the relevant maturity of the LIBOR rates prevailing at the beginning of each payment period.
17 The 
swap rate is the fixed payment on the notional amount. The swap rate examined here is based on 
contracts in which the variable rate is the 3-month LIBOR rate ( 1/4,t l ), and payments are made 
semi-annually. Ignoring liquidity premiums, the swap rate must be the expected average of future 
default-risky LIBOR rates. 
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Similarly, the 10-year US Treasury note must be the expected path of default-free 3-month 
Treasury bills.  
 












The difference between the yield on a Treasury note and the LIBOR rate is a short-term default-risk 
premium (DR). Thus the 10-year swap spread is the expected average of future short-term default 
premiums, reflecting not only current but also expected future default risk. 
 












The empirical literature on swap spreads has found that they also contain a liquidity premium. 
However, the liquidity premium component of swap spreads appears to be much more persistent 
than the default premium component (Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2006)), so most of the variation 
in swap spreads is expected to be caused by variations in default risk.
18 A proxy for movements in 
the market liquidity premium is discussed below. 
  
                                                 
17 The LIBOR rate is the rate at which banks lend to each other and it is recorded by the British Banking 
Association (BBA) each day at 11 a.m. London time. The composite rate is calculated based on quotes 
provided by a basket of reference banks selected by the BBA. 
18 It is worth noting that another potential candidate to measure credit risk could have been the so-called 
TED spread, or the difference between the 3-month U.S. dollar LIBOR and the yield on the 3-month U.S. 
Treasury bill. This spread behaves similarly to the 10-year USD swap spread discussed above, except that it 
captures only short-term movements and it is particularly difficult to separate the component originating from 
credit risk versus that related to market liquidity.  
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3.2.3   Market Liquidity Premium  
The measure of market liquidity premium examined here is the difference between the yield 
on the 20-year U.S. Treasury bond and the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note (denoted ML 
and Liq. in the tables). Since these two bonds are default-free, their yield is simply the expected 
average of future yields on Treasury bills plus a liquidity premium. Their difference must then be 
equal to: 
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It is reasonable to assume that the first term of the RHS is fairly constant because of the long 
horizon of the interest rates at these maturities, given the current information (i.e., the expected 
U.S. Treasury bond rates for 10-year and 20-year maturities are approximately the same in 
practice). Thus, movements in this spread will be largely driven by movements in liquidity 
premiums (LP). In particular, 10-year U.S. Treasury notes are usually used as a benchmark in the 
pricing of other financial assets and therefore are more liquid than 20-year bonds. In fact, yields on 
20-year U.S. Treasury bonds have sometimes been above those on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds 
(which is also fairly liquid), which could be hardly explained if not by the relative illiquidity of 20-




3.2.4   Market Volatility Premium 
The measure of market volatility used in this analysis is the Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, known as VIX (denoted as MV and Vol. in the tables). It 
measures the implied volatility from option prices on the S&P 500 equity index.
21 
                                                 
19  For example, during the LTCM crisis in the fall of 1998, spreads between the 30-year U.S. Treasury 
bond and the 29-year U.S. Treasury bond were unusually large, signaling market liquidity pressures 
(Committee on the Global Financial System (1999)). Yields on the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond are not used 
here because this maturity was discontinued for several years during the period examined. 
20 Another commonly used measure of liquidity is the difference between the yields of “on-the-run” and 
“off-the-run” U.S. Treasury bonds. However this measure has the disadvantage that it exhibits important 
variations caused directly by the timing of the auctions, and therefore it is not examined. 
21 This volatility index is largely U.S.-based, but it is widely used to measure global market volatility. One 
disadvantage of using this index is that it is based on an average of a few observations that are out-of-the-
money (the so-called “volatility smile”), rather than using all of the possible volatility and out-of-the-money 
strike price combinations. The problem with the way in which this index is calculated is that it does not take 
into account changes in the shape of the volatility smile that lead to a different curvature or a shift in the 






Another measure examined that also captures volatility risk is the uncertainty about 
the future path of interest rates (denoted as IV and Int. in the tables). This is proxied by the implied 
interest-rate volatility from swaptions  with maturities between one and six months.
22 
 
3.3   Contagion Effects 
As discussed earlier, the empirical literature has identified contagious effects during some 
of the recent crises (surveyed in Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000); Pericoli and Sbracia 
(2003); and Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2005)). This literature identifies the 
transmission mechanisms that propagate shocks from the source country across national borders 
and across financial markets, where channels over and above the market fundamental mechanisms 
that link countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods appear only during a crisis. In 
particular, an increase in a country’s spread can lead to extraordinary increases in the spreads of 
other countries. This transmission can happen through different channels. For example, a 
deterioration in the fundamentals of a particular country, or a certain shock (e.g., a terrorist attack, a 
natural disaster, etcetera), can cause a generalized reduction in investors’ risk appetite, requiring 
higher spreads in markets all across the globe. This is an increase in the price of risk, and should be 
captured by the aggregate risk variables discussed earlier. 
  But spreads can also increase for other reasons. The discovery of bad news about one 
country may cause investors to revise their expectations about the fundamentals of other specific 
countries which share similar features (i.e., not a generalized effect across the globe, as in the case 
of a decline in risk appetite). This other channel works through an increase in the (perceived) 
quantity of idiosyncratic risk.  
  In order to measure the contagion effects from emerging markets to a particular country, it 
is not practical to include spreads in other countries or an aggregate index of emerging market 
spreads directly into the model because this would induce multicollinearity. Instead, as a proxy for 
this country-specific contagion effect, for each country we construct the difference between the 
spread in the composite (aggregated) EMBI+ index for all emerging markets and the bond spread 
of the country in question. This variable is meant to measure how a particular bond spread is 
affected by the relative performance of bonds spreads in other similar countries (denoted as EM). 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
volatility indices for foreign exchange contracts. However, VIX was chosen because of its common use as 
representative of “global” volatility. 
22 A swaption is an option to enter into a swap contract.  
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4   Identification and Estimation 
The variables in the model can be expressed as the following expression: 
 
  ( )( ) { } ,, ,,,, , l o g / , l o g it t t t t t EMBI t it it Z FF DR ML MV IV Spread Spread Spread + =  (6.11) 
where  iindicates a particular bond spread, FF stands for the funding liquidity (or monetary 
conditions) proxy, DR stands for default risk, ML stands for market liquidity, MV stands for 
market volatility, and IV for interest-rate volatility. 
  The dynamics of each of the variables is captured by estimating a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model in which all seven variables are endogenous. This implies that there is immediate 
feedback among all variables in the short run. The structural innovations are identified by imposing 
restrictions on the long-run effects of the variables, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989).  In particular, 
it is assumed that in the long run: (i) bond spreads have no permanent effect on funding liquidity or 
on any other aggregate global market risk factor; (ii) feedback effects among default risk, market 
liquidity risk, and market and interest rate volatility risks are temporary;
23 and (iii) the contagion 
effects from emerging markets are temporary. 










Δ=+ ∑ , (6.12) 
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where  t Z Δ  is the vector of variables in first differences,  t e  is the vector of structural innovations, 
and I  is the identity matrix.  
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23 The long-term feedback effects of funding liquidity risk are not restricted a priori to be zero over the 
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= =∑ . Since  (0) AI = ,  (0) B I = , it follows 
that  (0) tt vCe = . Therefore, identification of  (0) C  allows us to recover the structural shocks from 
the residuals of the estimated VAR. In order to identify  (0) C  we first notice that 
() ( 0 ) () ( 0 ) ' Var v C Var e C = , which implies 
 
  (0) (0)' CC Ω = . (6.15) 
Second, since  () ()( 0 ) Cj Bj C = , it follows that 
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Several restrictions are imposed on the matrix of long-run multipliers, the LHS of (6.16), which is 
denoted by H . In particular, the identification restrictions discussed earlier imply that H must 
satisfy the following matrix: 
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where  ik h  is the long-run multiplier of an innovation to variable k  on variable i. The order of the 
variables follows that in (6.11). Once we have  ˆ(0) C  we can construct estimates of  t e  as 
1 ˆ ˆˆ (0) tt eC v
− = . 
The reduced-form VAR in equation (6.13) is estimated by ordinary least squares. We use 5 
lags, as suggested by the AIC criteria. Then the estimated coefficients  ˆ() A j  and the residuals  ˆt v  
are used to estimate  (0) C  and H  using the identifying restrictions (15) and (17). Since the model  
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is over-identified, we estimate the parameters in  (0) C  through maximum likelihood. The log-
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The model is estimated using two different samples. The first sample covers the period 
between January 2
nd, 1998 and August 9
th, 2007.
24 The bond spreads analyzed are sovereign spreads 
from Brazil, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Russia, and Venezuela, and the corporate 
spreads are from Canada and the United States. The proxy used for default risk is the 10-year USD 
swap spread. 
The second sample starts in mid-September 2004. Here, we are able to use newer financial 
instruments which did not exist before (a credit default swap index) to gauge default risk directly. 
In addition, we are able to analyze a larger number of developing countries and mature markets. 
The additional sovereign bond spreads correspond to Colombia, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Turkey, Ukraine. The additional corporate bond spreads in mature markets correspond to Japan and 
the Eurozone. 
 
5   Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition 
The analysis proceeds by decomposing the unconditional variance of the bond spreads. The 





th t th thj j ZE Z C j e
−
++ + − = Δ−Δ = ∑ . (6.19) 
Given the independence of the innovations, the h-step ahead forecast error variance of  t Z Δ  is 
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24 The sample ends one day before the European Central Bank injected €95 billion into the financial 
system, marking the first policy intervention aimed at bringing to an end the U.S. subprime mortgage and 





where  k I  is a matrix with 1 in its (,) kk cell and zeros elsewhere. Taking the limit of these 
expressions we can compute the unconditional variance decomposition. The results are presented in 
Tables 2 and 14. 
  The results suggest that, overall, the aggregate global market factors account for a 
relatively small fraction of the total variance over the 1998-207 period (Table 2). The extent ranges 
from only 8 percent in the United States, up to a maximum of 27 percent in Mexico. Contagion 
from emerging markets is generally very small (accounting for a maximum of 12 percent in the 
case of Bulgaria). 
  For the 2004-2007 sample (Table 14), aggregate global market factors explain a more 
significant fraction of the variance for some of the emerging markets, accounting for around 50 
percent for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines. However, aggregate market factors 
during this period explain a smaller fraction for some of the other bond spreads, with the smallest 
contribution being in the case of mature markets (7 percent for Japan, and approximately 15 percent 
for the United States and the Eurozone). Contagion effects from emerging markets are very small 
(accounting for less than 4 percent of the variance). 
These results suggest that idiosyncratic factors are generally the main drivers of bond 
spread changes over extended periods of time. We now turn to examining these trends, but for 
shorter periods known to have been distressful. 
 
6   Spread Decomposition 
For each period of financial stress (Appendix A details each period), the spreads are further 
decomposed into a benchmark spread, equal to the conditional expectation of the spreads during the 
period given information available before the start of the period, and the contributions of the 
structural innovations to the spreads during the period of stress. The purpose of this exercise is to 
examine how the different aggregate global market factors contribute to the bond spreads, relative 
to what they would have been if the crisis had not taken place. 
Let  T denote the first date of a crisis period. The change in the benchmark spread at 
dateTh + , given the pre-crisis information is 
  [] 12
1
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We can then decompose the changes in spreads into their pre-crisis conditional expectation and 
their forecast error, which is given by  
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Because some crises are preceded by a period which may already show a certain degree of 
financial stress, in most cases we compute conditional expectations using information up to several 
days or weeks before the start of the crisis. 
 
6.1   Empirical Results: Mean Spread Decomposition 
The results are presented in the tables containing the mean spread decompositions (Tables 
3-13 examine the 1998-2007 period, and Tables 15-18 the 2004-2007 period). The first three 
columns in these tables show the mean actual spread during the crisis episode, the mean benchmark 
spread during the same period,
25 and their difference or the mean forecast error. The columns that 
follow indicate the contribution of each factor innovation to the forecast error.
26  The cases 
examined comprise the main episodes of financial stress from 1998 to 2007. Some particular 
episodes were excluded from the empirical analysis if they had a relatively small impact on global 
financial markets, despite having an important repercussion domestically; some examples are 
Ecuador’s currency collapse (1999-2000), Argentina’s debt default (2001) and Iceland’s financial 
crisis (2006). The episodes of financial stress examined include the Russian default and the 
subsequent near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (1998), the devaluation of the 
Brazilian currency (1999), the NASDAQ bubble burst (2000), the Turkish crisis (2001), the 
terrorist attacks on September 11th (2001), the Brazilian elections and the WorldCom accounting 
scandal (2002), the beginning of the tightening cycle of the Federal Funds rate (2004), the rating 
downgrades of Ford and General Motors (2005), the Turkish crisis (2006), the Chinese stock 
market correction (2007), and the U.S. subprime mortgages and liquidity crisis (2007). The specific 
dates used to define the episodes are described in Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
25 Recall that benchmark spreads are computed as the conditional expectation, given pre-crisis 
information. 
26 Note that while actual and benchmark spreads are presented in basis points, the forecast error 
is () () [ ]
1 log log
it T it Spread E Spread
− − , and thus the contributions to the forecast error are presented in terms 





6.1.1   Russia’s Default and the LTCM Crisis (1998) 
In the first episode analyzed, the 1998 Russian default and the LTCM near-collapse are 
modeled jointly because of the proximity of the two events (Russia defaulted on August 17th, and 
the Fed-orchestrated rescue plan of LTCM was publicly disclosed on September 23rd). The results 
in Table 3 suggest that the main aggregate global financial market factors behind the increase in the 
spreads of all the countries considered in the sample, relative to their conditional expectations or 
benchmarks, are funding liquidity (proxied by U.S. monetary policy expectations), market volatility 
and default risk, which together account for almost 40 percent of the forecast error for some of the 
emerging markets and 23 percent for Canada. Among the three global financial market factors, 
volatility risk is the most important (accounting for up to 18 percent of the forecast error). The 
contribution of contagion from emerging markets is negligible for all countries, while the 
contribution of idiosyncratic factors (the residual in this specification) account for 58-85 percent of 
the forecast error. 
Given that Brazil was the next country to experience a crisis in early January 1999,  a few 
months after the Russian/LTCM crisis, it is interesting to examine the results during the August-
October 1998 period but for the particular case of Brazil (Table 3). This is of special interest 
because several empirical studies have found evidence of contagion from the Russian/LTCM crises 
to Brazil (Baig and Godfajn (2001), and Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2006, 
2007a)).
27 The results here suggest that global financial market conditions, proxying for investors’ 
risk appetite, represent about 42 percent of the difference between the conditional expectation of 
Brazil’s sovereign bond spread and its actual mean value. This difference represents 307 basis 
points, accounting for almost one-quarter of Brazil’s 1,295 basis point actual mean spread against 
the equivalent U.S. Treasury bond during that period. The idiosyncratic component (the residual in 
this specification) accounted for another 431 basis points (58.5 percent of the forecast error).  These 
results are consistent with the view that the contagion that was formerly found in previous studies 
may have been largely accounted for by the role of global investors’ risk appetite. At the same time, 
it appears Brazil’s fundamentals may have been reassessed, as captured by the significant size of 
the idiosyncratic component. Finally, contagion from emerging markets that is not already captured 
by global financial market conditions was negligible. However, it is somewhat puzzling that the 
                                                 
27 In particular, Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2006) provide evidence that the Brazilian 
bond market was impacted by the Russian crisis, while the results in Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and 
Martin (2007a) suggest that Brazil’s equity markets were affected by the near-collapse of LTCM.  
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Brazilian results are not that different from other emerging markets, most of which did not have a 
full-blown crisis in the months that followed the Russian/LTCM crisis. 
 
6.1.2   Brazil’s Crisis (1999) 
We now turn to examine the next crisis period marked by the devaluation of Brazil’s Real 
on January 12, 1999 (Table 4).  During this period, market volatility and funding liquidity are the 
main factors contributing to the forecast errors in emerging markets. Russia is unusual as the 
idiosyncratic contribution to the forecast error (the residual) is slightly negative, suggesting that the 
global market financial factors more than fully accounted for the forecast error. The effect from 
volatility risk, funding liquidity and default risk combined may have accounted for more than the 
350 basis point forecast error in Russia. One interpretation is that the Russian and the Brazilian 
crises were so close in time that there were actually feedback effects from the latter to the former 
through  a decline in investors’ appetite for risk, reflected in the global financial market factors. 
  Another interesting observation during this period is that mature markets were essentially 
unaffected by global financial factors, as their benchmark spreads are close to the actual spreads. 
These results support the view that the Brazilian crisis did not importantly affect other markets, as 
the forecast errors are generally much smaller during this period, particularly in the case of mature 
economies. Once again, contagion from emerging markets (not already accounted for by the 
common global financial market factors) is negligible. 
 
6.1.3   NASDAQ Bubble Burst (2000) 
During the NASDAQ bubble burst in 2000, default and funding liquidity risks are the main 
factors explaining most of the forecast errors considered (Table 5). It is interesting that volatility 
risk became very small during this period, in contrast to the previous periods of stress considered. 
The forecast errors are generally small for all the countries considered, except for Ecuador which 
was still suffering from its own financial crisis.
28 Also noteworthy is the result pointing to a 
negative forecast error for Russia during this period, less than two years after facing its own crisis. 
The model suggests that the improvement in Russia’s spreads during this period was not so much 
                                                 
28 Ecuador’s economy experienced a contraction in real GDP of 7 percent, an inflation rate of 60 percent 
and a 67 percent depreciation of the Sucre in 1999. Ecuador adopted  the U.S. dollar as the legal tender in 






due to improved fundamentals (recall that in this model, the residual is treated as 
“fundamentals”) but largely resulting from an improved risk appetite for Russian assets (measured 
by the negative contributions to the forecast error coming from global market risk factors, despite 
some increased risk coming from interest volatility).  
 
6.1.4   Turkey’s Crisis (2001) 
During Turkey’s crisis in 2001 (Table 6), all of the forecast errors become smaller as the 
benchmark conditional expectations are close to the actual spreads for most countries. Volatility is 
again an important risk factor and, indeed, all global market risk factors take increased importance 
during this period. In contrast, idiosyncratic factors often have the opposite effect, acting to reduce 
the spreads. The only exceptions are Bulgaria, Peru and the United States. 
 
6.1.5   September 11
th (2001) 
In the period following 9/11 in 2001, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks 
injected substantial amounts of liquidity into the financial system in anticipation of potential 
disruptions in global markets following the closing on the New York stock exchange after the 
attacks. This is reflected in a negative contribution to the premia coming from funding liquidity 
(Table 7). That, plus a reduction in the default risk helped to largely offset the increases in spreads 
caused by higher premia coming from market liquidity, market volatility and interest-rate volatility 
risks. All forecast errors are relatively modest. It is noteworthy that market volatility risk, in 
particular, surged during this period and became the single most important source of risk premia for 
all emerging markets. However, in the case of mature economies, the largest contributor to the 
spreads is due to market liquidity risk. 
 
6.1.6   WorldCom Scandal and Brazil’s Elections (2002) 
The next period of turbulence examined is the WorldCom accounting scandal, which 
roughly coincided with a period of uncertainty in the run-up to Brazil’s elections, during June-
October 2002 (Table 8). During this period, Brazil’s forecast error is quite large, at around 1,200 
basis points (the actual spread is 1,904 basis points and the conditional expectation is 709 basis 
points). The forecast error is explained mostly by a large contribution of idiosyncratic factors,  
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which is consistent with the fact that investors were nervous about the likely election of a 
seemingly ‘populist’ Lula government.
29 The forecast errors during this period were also relatively 
large for other Latin American countries (especially Ecuador and Peru) which may have been 
influenced by the ‘Lula-effect.’ During this period, funding liquidity is the main contributor to the 
forecast errors, followed by volatility and market liquidity. This may reflect the expectation among 
market participants that the U.S. Federal Reserve was about to start a new tightening cycle, after an 
extended period of declines in policy interest rates since early-2000, and uncertainty as to exactly 
when the new cycle would begin. The results suggest that there were no other contagion effects 
coming from emerging markets that were not already captured through the international investors’ 
risk appetite conduit. 
 
6.1.7   U.S. Federal Reserve Begins Tightening Cycle (2004) 
Indeed, the U.S. Federal Reserve began to tighten monetary conditions on June 30
th, 2004 
when it increased the federal funds policy rate by 25 basis points.  However, the run-up to the 
tightening of monetary policy in the United States appeared to be a period of uncertainty amid 
jitters in global financial markets. This episode, marking expectations and uncertainty about the 
forthcoming tightening in U.S. monetary policy, is assumed to begin following the release of strong 
payroll data (for March) on April 2
nd, 2004. Against increasing speculation and uncertainty as to 
when monetary conditions might be tightened, and in light of a scheduled FOMC meeting, 
emerging markets experienced a generalized sell-off on May 3
rd, 2004. This spike in spreads was 
short-lived, however, as spreads resumed their overall downward trend (which had started in the 
early part of the 2000s) after June 30
th, 2004 when the U.S. Federal Reserve actually increased its 
federal funds rate by 25 basis points for the first time in more than four years.  This episode of 
uncertainty about the exact timing of the monetary policy tightening is, therefore, assumed to end 
on June 30
th, 2004 when the U.S. Federal Reserve announced the change in its policy stance. 
Table 9 decomposes the period during the run-up to the U.S. Federal Reserve switching to 
a tightening stance. This period is characterized by relatively small forecast errors as the benchmark 
conditional expectations are close to the actual spreads (less than 200 basis points for all countries). 
Most of the forecast errors are attributed to funding liquidity risk, though with a much smaller 
contribution than in the previous episode of stress in 2002 (Table 8). Default risk also plays a role, 
                                                 
29 Lula was in fact elected on October 29
th, 2002, but his presidency turned out to be quite pragmatic and 





but market liquidity and volatility risks are generally very small or even negative (acting to 
offset the increase in spreads).  Idiosyncratic factors are fairly large in most cases (the exceptions 
being Venezuela and Bulgaria). Interest-rate uncertainty does not seem to be a very important 
factor. This is somewhat surprising, but it may be explained by the funding liquidity risk already 
capturing some of this uncertainty. Other contagion channels from emerging markets are, again, 
minuscule. 
 
6.1.8   Ford and General Motors Downgrades (2004) 
The Ford and General Motors downgrades in the spring of 2004 coincided with a general 
moderate (and temporary) increase in bond spreads (Figures 1-3). During this period, the forecast 
errors are modest (less than 110 basis points for emerging economies and below 12 basis points for 
mature economies) for all the countries considered (Tables 10 for the 1998-2007 period and Table 
15 for the 2004-2007 period). However, the funding liquidity and the default risk channels seem to 
be quite important. Interest rate risk is relatively small, but larger than in any other previous period. 




6.1.9   Turkey’s Crisis (2006) 
During Turkey’s crisis in May-July of 2006, spreads in other emerging markets widened 
significantly, albeit resuming their downward trend by the second half of 2006 (Figures 1-3).
31 The 
forecast errors are relatively small (less than 62 percent for emerging markets, and less than 7 basis 
points for mature markets) for all countries other than Turkey. This episode is characterized by 
funding liquidity risks and, by a lesser amount, default risk and market volatility (Tables 11 and 
16). Market liquidity and interest-rate risks are small or offsetting. The idiosyncratic components 
                                                 
30 Idiosyncratic factors move from positive during the 1998-2007 sample to negative in the shorter 2004-
2007 sample based on the actual cost of default insurance. Since the idiosyncratic factors in the specification 
are essentially the residuals, negative contributions suggest that the contributions of other risks may be 
overestimated. However, the forecast errors are fairly small in most of the specifications where idiosyncratic 
factors contribute negatively to the difference between the actual spread and the benchmark, which reduces 
the importance of negative idiosyncratic factors. 
31 The crisis in Turkey surfaced a few months after the March 2006 crisis in Iceland. However, the 
Icelandic episode is not analyzed explicitly in this paper because it appears that it did not have significant 
spillovers to other markets. It is interesting that the two crises were very close in time, suggesting that there 
might have been some spillovers from Iceland into Turkey—though the trigger for the problems in Turkey 
appear to have been largely driven by political factors.    
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are important for all countries, except the United States.  Other venues of contagion from emerging 
markets are minute or offsetting. 
 
6.1.10   China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange Correction (2007) 
Although short-lived, China’s Shanghai stock market went through a sizeable correction on 
February 27, 2007, dubbed in the international press as “black Tuesday”. Emerging markets also 
experienced a (short-lived) melt-down. During this episode, the forecast errors are again fairly 
small: for emerging markets, less than 70 basis points in the 1998-2007 sample (Table 13) and less 
than 30 basis points in the 2004-2007 sample (Table 17). The forecast errors for mature economies 
are tiny (less than 3 basis points). In terms of the forecast error decomposition, the risks that explain 
the increase in risk spreads relatively to the benchmarks are: funding liquidity (which is especially 




6.1.11   U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis (2007) 
The final episode of stress in global financial markets examined in this chapter is the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent liquidity squeeze in mid-2007. During this period, the 
forecast errors are relatively small (less than 70 basis points for emerging markets and less than 13 
basis points for mature markets), but larger than in any previous episode of global financial stress 
since the Ford/GM downgrades in 2004 (Tables 13 and 18). All risk factors except market liquidity 
seem to have a significant contribution to the forecast errors. Contagion effects from emerging 
markets seem to have little effect on spreads during this period, which is not too surprising since 
this crisis originated in mature economies. Idiosyncratic factors tend to be important in explaining 
the difference between benchmark and actual spreads. However, in a number of cases, idiosyncratic 
factors explain little, or even contribute negatively by offsetting the increase in spreads caused by 
aggregate global market factors. 
The result is that market liquidity was generally an unimportant contributor to explain the 
difference between the benchmark and the actual spreads is somewhat surprising since market 
illiquidity in certain segments of financial markets in mature economies was at the heart of the mid-
                                                 






33  However, this puzzle may be explained by the possibility that market 
illiquidity was only characteristic of certain asset market classes, some of which are not considered 
in this chapter. The data in this study focus on bond spreads for sovereigns in the case of emerging 
markets and BBB corporates for mature economies (see Table 1 for details). The pervasive 
illiquidity observed in the early part of the subprime crisis was largely in short-term funding 
instruments (e.g., asset-backed commercial paper and interbank lending rates) as banks hoarded 
liquid assets to cover for potential losses incurred by their special investment vehicles (SVI) and 
other conduits. These bank-related SVIs (which are off-balance sheet vehicles) held  mortgages 
which had been distributed after having been originated by banks. The SVIs and conduits funded 
themselves by issuing asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), which investors decided not to roll-
over when the subprime mortgage crisis was exposed. 
Thus, it may have been the case that market illiquidity was not a generalized phenomena in 
all financial markets everywhere during this period. The second potential explanation is that the 
mean decomposition provides a limited snapshot to analyze factors that change over time. As 
discussed in the next Section 6.2 below, when looking at this from this perspective, market liquidity 
appeared to be more important during this last crisis episode. The third potential explanation for 
this puzzle is that the sample period in this study is simply not long enough to explain a crisis 
episode that was still unraveling, with several waves developing, at the time of writing.
34  
 
6.2   Empirical Results: Spread Decomposition Over Time 
Figures 5-31 plot the spread decompositions over time, capturing the various crisis 
episodes discussed above by individual country. Figures 5-14 present the full period 1998-2007, 
while Figures 15-31 are based on the subsample 2004-2007 which rely on a larger number of 
countries and include credit default swaps. 
For example, Figure 5 summarizes the decomposition of Brazil’s sovereign bond spreads 
over time. The benchmark conditional expectation of Brazil’s spreads (in basis points) are taken 
before the beginning of each of the periods of stress in financial markets discussed above, with 
information available prior to that event. The difference between the benchmark and the actual 
spreads are then explained proportionally by the various global financial market factors, as well as 
                                                 
33 See International Monetary Fund (2007). 
34 However, extending the period after the policy interventions have been introduced (i.e. after the ECB 
injected substantial amount of funds on August 10
th, 2007 and other central banks followed suit), also poses 
some challenges as this would have changed monetary liquidity conditions in itself.  
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by other potential contagion from emerging markets and the idiosyncratic element.
35  The charts 
suggest, for example, that contagion from emerging markets was essentially not existent, 
contributing to less than 2 percent of the forecast error at any time, even during the Russian/LTCM 
crisis in 1998. This result is at odds with other studies that have found evidence of contagion to 
Brazil from the Russian/LTCM crisis (Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2006, 2007); 
and Baig and Goldfajn (2001)). However, those studies focused on the unusual comovements 
among emerging markets during crises periods to explain contagion, rather than considering the 
potential indirect effects from international investors’ changes in their risk appetite that may have 
resulted from the Russian/LTCM crisis. These results suggest that the spillovers observed to Brazil 
from the Russia/LTCM crisis may have indeed occurred through global financial market risk 
factors. 
In contrast to the 1999 crisis in Brazil, the 2002 period of financial stress occurred despite 
the fact that global default risk and volatility interest rate risk were largely offsetting factors during 
this period, possibly reflecting the significant easing of monetary liquidity conditions during 2001-
2002. As discussed earlier, this period was characterized by political uncertainty in Brazil (which is 
reflected in the idiosyncratic component). However, Brazil’s problems also coincided with the 
WorldCom accounting scandal which led to a certain amount of stress in global financial 
markets−reflected, for example, in elevated market liquidity and volatility risks (see Figure 4) 
which together may have accounted for about 15 percent of the difference between Brazil’s actual 
spreads and its conditional expectation (Figure 5).  However, it appears that the increase in spreads 
in Brazil in 2002 was largely due to idiosyncratic factors. 
The results from all countries throughout the key periods of financial stress during 
the past decade point to some stylized facts, discussed below. First, global financial market 
conditions appear to be significant in all the crisis episodes examined. These global market 
conditions are far from constant. The testing of exactly how these global risks interact with 
each other was not examined directly in this chapter, but it is clearly a fundamental 
question in need of further research.  However, this chapter went beyond the status quo 
which assumes that investors’ risk appetite can be neatly encapsulated in a given index by 
adding up all the potential risk factors. 
                                                 
35 All the figures show a discontinuity during September 11-17, 2001, as several financial markets were 





Second, once global financial market factors are explicitly considered, contagion 
from emerging markets is very small or essentially not existent. 
Third, although emerging markets have largely been more volatile than mature economies, 
global financial market risk factors are important for all countries.  
Fourth, some of the episodes of stress which were seemingly benign in that they were 
resolved relatively quickly may have actually altered investors’ risk appetite importantly.  For 
example, by examining the spread decomposition figures for the 2004-2007 period (Figures 15-31), 
it appears that the Turkey crisis in the spring of 2006 (which was preceded by a crisis in Iceland) 
increased default, as well market and interest rate volatility risks fundamentally by marking an 
upswing inflection point for all countries, including mature markets. 
Similarly, the Shanghai stock market meltdown in February 2007 was short-lived and 
apparently innocuous when compared to the subsequent take off of that market in the subsequent 
months. However, in terms of global market factors, this event was associated with a significant 
increase in funding liquidity risks for all the countries considered. The connection is not straight 
forward, as funding liquidity is proxied here by monetary conditions in the United States and 
measured by the 3-month ahead Federal Funds futures rate. However, funding liquidity has been 
particularly difficult to gauge since 2004 when the Federal Reserve began its tightening cycle that 
ended in September 18
th, 2007 in response to the subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis in the 
United States. During much of this period of tightening, long-term interest rates were largely 
unchanged even as short-term interest rates increased considerably in response to a number of hikes 
in the Federal Funds rate.  This peculiar extended period of flat or inverted yield curves in the 
United States has been associated in part with the “excess savings” of  emerging-market economies 
which found their way into U.S. financial markets (Warsh (2007)). China happens to be the chief 
investor in U.S. assets among emerging markets.  It is possible, then, that the China meltdown in 
February 2007–which was too small to derail the subsequent bullish tendency of the Chinese 
markets–was sufficient to cause international investors to revalue their expectations about the 
potential for tighter funding liquidity conditions, perhaps as a result of China being likely to invest 
less heavily in U.S. dollar assets in response to less bullish Chinese market conditions or because of 
expectations of depreciation of the U.S. dollar as a means to narrow global trade imbalances. The 
Chinese episode was also associated with an important increase in market liquidity risks for most 
countries examined, with the exception of the United States, Canada, the Eurozone, Ukraine and 
Peru.  
Fifth, the recent U.S. mortgage subprime crisis appeared to cause market liquidity strains in 
financial markets, particularly in mature economies. This effect is depicted most clearly in the  
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2004-2007 sub-period which is relies on new financial instruments as proxies (Figures 15-31). In 
particular, market liquidity risks increased in all the countries examined.
36  However, globally, 
default risk increased more sharply and accounted for a larger share of the difference between the 
actual spreads and their benchmark than market illiquidity. Thus, whereas a higher market liquidity 
risk accounted for up to about 8 percent of the innovations, increased default risk accounted for 20-
30 percent of the innovations in emerging markets. A similar relationship is evident in most mature 
markets, except that default risk, although increasing sharply, accounted for much smaller amount 
than in the case of emerging markets.
37 In the United States, the contributions were roughly the 
same, as default risk and liquidity risk accounted for around 4 percent of the innovations each. 
Increased funding liquidity risk as a result of the U.S. subprime mortgage problems is also 
evident in all countries.
38  Funding liquidity risks also increased for mature economies, contributing 
by about 4 percent of the innovations in the United States, less than 1 percent in Canada, and about 
8 percent in the Eurozone. 
Interestingly, Japan is the exception as global market risk factors did not appear to affect 
this country during the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, at least not directly through the first round of 
effects.
39 This observation is consistent with the argument proposed earlier that Japan moved in an 
opposite direction during this recent period of stress in other markets because of the Yen being a 
carry-trade currency. Crises abroad would lead investors to sell their overseas investments and 
repay their low interest rate yen loans, resulting in capital inflows and increased funding liquidity 
conditions in Japan. 
In sum, although the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis was experienced globally as a market 
liquidity shock , the contribution of default and funding liquidity risks were generally more 
important. While not exactly the same for all countries, default risk may have been slightly more 
important than funding liquidity risk (at least during the period prior to the injection of liquidity by 
several central banks). Japan is an exception in the sample examined. It may have been that what 
started as a market liquidity shock (as banks hoarded liquidity in response to the meltdown in the 
                                                 
36 This time series snapshot appears to give a clearer picture during this period of the trends in market 
liquidity risks, than the mean spread decomposition analysis (Tables 13 and 18) discussed in Section VI.A 
above. 
37 For example, default risk in Canada accounted for  around 6 percent of the innovations (compared to 
market liquidity amounting to less than 1 percent). In the case of the Eurozone, default risk accounted for 
close to 15 percent (versus market liquidity accounting for less than 1 percent). 
38 Contributing by about 15-30 percent of the innovations for most emerging markets, with the exception 
of Ecuador for which the contribution is smaller (around 6 percent). 
39 Of course, any potential weakness in the U.S. economy resulting from the subprime mortgage crisis 





ABCP market as subprime mortgages defaulted), quickly became a default and a funding 
liquidity crisis. This chapter is unspecific as to the exact mechanisms through which this may have 
occurred. However, these themes have been recently extended in Frank, González-Hermosillo and 
Hesse (2008) where these mechanisms are examined in more detail. In particular, interbank market 
rates are modeled as proxies for funding liquidity pressures during the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis, in addition to market volatility, market liquidity and default risks. They find that market and 
funding liquidity pressures increased sharply during the recent crisis, while bank solvency issues 
also became important. 
One other interesting question is the issue of timing with regards to this latest period of 
financial stress. Why mid-2007, given that the U.S. housing prices and activity had been declining 
since mid-2005 when the housing market reached a peak, and it was common knowledge that this 
market was likely to suffer a correction? What triggered the U.S. mortgage crisis that began as a 
default shock, before it became a market liquidity shock when the ABCP market froze? Some of 
the available explanations for this are based on structural characteristics related to when different 
vintages of subprime mortgages were reset (see International Monetary Fund (2007)). However, 
based on the results of this paper, it is interesting that the correction in the Chinese stock market on 
February 27
th, 2007 translated into a funding liquidity shock for all the countries considered (with 
the exception of Japan) of roughly the same magnitude, or bigger, than the U.S. shock. It appears 
that the Chinese correction, which was short-lived otherwise, contributed importantly to the shift in 
international investors’ risk appetite. Future research may be able to determine whether this event 
was a contributing trigger. 
For emerging markets, in particular, the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis largely represented 
a default risk and a funding liquidity shock, rather than a market liquidity shock, based on the 
relative contributions of the different risk factors. This is consistent with the fact that financial 
market development in emerging countries lags that in mature economies and therefore market 
liquidity shocks may be transmitted across borders, through this channel, less easily than across 
mature financial markets. Also, contrary to the common view that emerging markets were largely 
unaffected by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, the results in this chapter suggest that this was a 
global shock affecting all the countries examined. It is true, however, that the increase in spreads 
observed in emerging markets since mid-2007 still place them at historically low levels. But it is 
also evident from the results in this chapter that spreads have largely widened as a result of the U.S. 
subprime mortgage shock as investors have reduced their appetite for risky assets, with the main 
channels being an increase in the perceived risk of default and of tighter funding liquidity 
conditions.  
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Finally, the fact that idiosyncratic factors account for a relatively small proportion of the 
difference between the actual spreads and their benchmark for all the countries examined (at less 
than 20 percent of the innovations) further suggests that the global financial markets factors 
examined account for most of the innovations during the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis period. The 
only exception is Ukraine which was embroiled in uncertainty about its own presidential elections 
during mid-2007, showing a contribution from idiosyncratic factors amounting to close to 40 
percent of the innovations.
40 
7   Conclusions 
This chapter developed an empirical model for bond spreads which takes into account 
several variables associated with investors’ risk appetite. The bond markets considered consist of a 
variety of sovereign bond spreads for emerging markets and corporate bond spreads for mature 
markets. The chapter examined the various key periods of financial stress during the past decade. A 
shorter subperiod 2004-2007 was also examined based on new financial instruments as the relevant 
proxies.  
  In contrast with much of the current approach to measure investors’ risk appetite, which 
largely relies on ready-made composite indexes of different global risk proxies, this paper examines 
the relevant global components in a systematic fashion during the past decade. In particular, 
international investors’ risk appetite is framed as being determined by funding liquidity risk, which 
is proxied monetary liquidity conditions and is measured by the 3-month ahead Federal Funds 
futures rate. Investors’ risk appetite is also a function of default risk, proxied by the 10-year USD 
swap spread and the Itraxx 10-year Europe crossover credit default swap index for the shorter 
subperiod 2004-2007. As well, investors’ risk appetite is assumed to be determined by market 
liquidity risk proxied by the spread between the 20-year and the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond (where 
the latter is a more liquid asset and both are equivalent in terms of default risk), market volatility 
risk (proxied by the VIX index) and interest volatility risk (proxied by the swaption-implied interest 
rate volatility). The model also allows for direct channels of contagion from emerging markets and 
idiosyncratic factors not captured by the model’s specification.  
The model is used to identify and analyze the contribution of several risk factors to the 
widening of spreads during periods of financial stress. The unexpected changes in the spreads 
                                                 
40 In Ukraine, a presidential election took place on September 30
th, 2008. In the run-up to the elections, 
there was significant uncertainty from the apparent dead heat contest between pro-Soviet and pro-Western 





during periods of financial stress are decomposed into changes caused by funding liquidity 
conditions, aggregate risk factors, contagion effects, and idiosyncratic factors. The aggregate risk 
factors are default risk, market liquidity, market volatility, and interest-rate volatility risk. 
By using daily data, the model is able to capture short-lived episodes of crisis which would 
have appeared innocuous if based on their longevity alone. Some of them, like the financial crisis in 
Turkey during the Spring of 2006, appears to have fundamentally changed market volatility risk. 
Similarly, the meltdown of the Shanghai stock exchange in late February 2007, also seemingly 
innocuous if based on its duration alone, led to a significant increase in the perceived global 
funding liquidity risk—similar in size to the effect derived from the U.S. subprime mortgage 
debacle. 
The role of the different global risk components is examined through the various periods of 
financial stress during the past decade by country and over time. The main results are summarized 
below.  
First, global financial market conditions appear to be significant in all the crisis episodes 
examined. They themselves are far from constant. The testing of exactly how these global risks 
interact with each other was not examined directly in this chapter, but it is clearly a fundamental 
question in need of further research.  However, this paper went beyond the status quo which 
assumes that investors’ risk appetite can be neatly encapsulated in a given index by adding up all 
the potential risk factors. 
Second, once global financial market factors are explicitly considered, contagion from 
emerging markets is very small or essentially not existent. This result is at odds with some of the 
results in the empirical literature of contagion. The literature on contagion examines the links that 
exist over and above the market fundamental mechanisms that link countries and asset markets 
during noncrisis periods, which only appear during a crisis. However, the empirical literature on 
contagion does not identify exactly how these additional channels are formed during periods of 
stress. One potential channel of contagion is that shocks in any given market may impact 
international investors’ risk appetite through their rebalancing of portfolios or simply by a revised 
set of expectations. Often investors would first run from the most liquid markets where exiting is 
less costly. Almost a decade ago, Allan Greenspan noted that a rise in the default risk of a given 
country can impact upon the liquidity of other markets as a result of international investors 
offloading liquid assets, despite their relatively low default risk (Greenspan, 1999). The results in  
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this chapter suggest that contagion essentially dissappears when identifying the actual channels of 
spillovers.
41 
Third, although emerging markets have been historically more volatile than mature 
economies, global financial market risk factors are important for all countries. An area of future 
research is to examine how global financial market risk are interconnected. 
Fourth, although the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis was experienced globally as a market 
liquidity shock , the contribution of default and funding liquidity risks were generally more 
important. While not exactly the same for all countries, default risk may have been slightly more 
important than funding liquidity risk (at least during the period prior to the injection of liquidity by 
several central banks). It may have been that what started as a market liquidity shock (as banks 
hoarded liquidity in response to the meltdown in the ABCP market as subprime mortgages 
defaulted), quickly became a default and a funding liquidity crisis. This chapter is unspecific as to 
the exact mechanisms through which this may have occurred, and it should be a subject of future 
research. Interestingly, Japan behaved quite differently, likely as a result of the carry-trade as crises 
elsewhere are associated with larger capital inflows into Japan as low interest rate yen loans are 
repaid.   
Finally, in general, the various crises are characterized differently by changes in the global 
market risk factors, and sometimes some risk factors work in different directions and partially 
offset each other. This type of analysis should be helpful in elaborating a framework to assess 
global financial stability, another area for future research, as investors’ risk appetite may play an 
important role in increasingly integrated global financial markets. 
 
 
                                                 





A  Dates of Financial Distress 
 
The Russian Default/LTCM crisis episode (1998) starts with Russia’s announcement on 
August 17th of its intention to default on its international debt obligations and to devalue the Ruble. 
However, several events prior to this announcement had already created some distress in financial 
markets. Therefore, the benchmark spread is computed based on information prior to June 1
st, 1998. 
On September 23
rd,  the U.S. Federal Reserve announced a rescue plan for the hedge fund Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM). The crisis period is assumed to end just before the second cut 
in the U.S. federal funds rate which occurred in a surprised fashion between FOMC meetings on 
October 15
th, 1998. Given the proximity of the Russian crisis and the LTCM bail-out, these events 
are examined jointly during the period June 1
st through October 14
th,1998. 
The Brazilian crisis (1999) starts on January 13
th,  with the effective devaluation of the 
Real. The benchmark spreads are computed with information up to one week before the devaluation 
and the episode is assumed to end on January 29
th, 1999 when the Brazilian stock market rallied 
after the central bank further increased interest rates to support the currency. On that date it was 
also announced that an IMF team was in Brasilia to discuss an adjustment program with the 
authorities.  
The NASDAQ Bubble Burst (2000) episode is assumed to begin on April 3rd, when 
Microsoft is ruled to have violated antitrust laws causing the NASDAQ Composite index to fall by 
8 percent. The benchmark spreads are constructed with information up to March 10
th, when 
NASDAQ reached an all-time high. The end of this episode of stress is assumed to be May 10
th, 
2000. 
The Turkish crisis (2001)  is assumed to start on February 19th, when the Turkish President 
and the Prime Minister had a confrontation that prompted a sell-off of Turkish assets, forcing the 
devaluation of the Lira three days later. The benchmark spreads are constructed with information 
available two weeks before the crisis began. The crisis is assumed to end on March 5th, 2001, 
coinciding with the appointment of a new Minister in charge of Treasury, State Planning 
Organization and Privatization. 
The 9/11 (2001) episode is assumed to begin on September 17th, when the U.S. stock 
markets reopened a few days after the terrorist attacks in New York and the Pentagon. The end of  
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this episode of stress is assumed to be November 6
th, 2001, coinciding with one of the FOMC’s 
interest rate cuts which appeared to calm global financial markets.
42 
The WorldCom Accounting Scandal/ Brazilian Elections (2002) episode of financial stress 
is assumed to start on June 19th, at the time when there was a generalized sell-off of risky assets. 
On June 25
th, 2002 the accounting malpractices of WorldCom become public, leading to its 
bankruptcy on July 21st and to a period of in uncertainty about corporate integrity practices. The 
benchmark spreads are computed based on information up to April 23rd, coinciding with increasing 
concerns by investors regarding the anticipated Brazilian elections. This episode of financial stress 
is assumed to end on October 29th, 2002, the day after Lula’s election when the head of the ruling 
party gave public assurances of fiscal responsibility and Brazil announced the successful rollover of 
its remaining foreign exchange swap contracts. 
The run-up to the tightening of monetary policy in the United States (2004) was also  a 
period of uncertainty and apparent stress in global financial markets. The episode marking 
expectations of an imminent monetary policy tightening in the United States is assumed to begin 
following the release of a strong payroll data (for March) on April 2
nd, 2004. Against increasing 
speculation and uncertainty as to when monetary conditions might be tightened, and in light of a 
FOMC meeting, emerging markets experienced a generalized sell-off on May 3
rd, 2004. The 
benchmark spreads are, therefore, computed based on information up to April 2
nd, 2004. The end of 
this episode of uncertainty about the exact timing of the monetary policy tightening is assumed to 
be June 30
th, 2004 at the time when the U.S. Federal Reserve actually increased its federal funds 
rate (by 25 basis points) for the first time in more than four years. 
The Ford/General Motors downgrade episode (2005) is assumed to start on March 16th, at 
the time when Moody’s announced its intention to review the credit ratings of General Motors 
(GM) for a possible downgrade. In the event, GM was assigned ‘junk’ status on May 5
th, 2005. 
During this period, Ford’s rating was also downgraded. The benchmark spreads are computed 
based on information up to February 14th, when it is disclosed that GM’s outlook had become 
“negative”. The end of this period of financial market stress is assumed to be May 19
th, 2005 when 
bullish conditions appeared to have been reestablished in equity markets. 
The Turkish crisis (2006) spans from May 11
th  to July 24
th as a result of political instability 
in that country. This crisis came on the heels of financial difficulties in Iceland a couple of months 
                                                 
42 Although foreign markets and U.S. bond markets were open before September 17
th, there is incomplete 






43 During that period, there were several reports pointing to increased nervousness 
about the outlook for emerging markets and spreads generally increased. 
The Chinese stock market correction (2007) episode started on February 27
th (“black 
Tuesday”) as a hefty sell-off in the Shanghai stock exchange spread around the world. This period 
of stress period lasted until March 19
th when stock markets in emerging market rebounded. 
The final episode of stress in global financial markets examined in this paper is the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent liquidity squeeze in mid-2007. The start of the U.S. 
subprime mortgages and liquidity crisis is assumed to start be  June 15
th, 2007, coinciding with the 
announcement that two Bear Stearns’ hedge funds were having financial difficulties with their 
assets backed by mortgages in the United States. Although the troubles in the subprime mortgage 
market started earlier as defaults began to mount in late 2006, it took some time for the difficulties 
in this market to be clearly related to other financial markets. It was not until July 9
th, 2007, when 
credit rating agencies began downgrading higher-rated assets, that the severity of the crisis was 
fully appreciated and global financial markets collapsed. Although at the time of writing this paper, 
the crisis is not clearly over, for purposes of this research the end of the crisis is assumed to be 
August 9
th, 2007 which is also the end of the sample and it is just before the European Central Bank 
(ECB) began a round of liquidity injections, which was followed by several central banks across the 
world. Thus, on August 10
th, 2007 the ECB injected €95 billion in an effort to avert the meltdown 
in global financial markets. Other central banks followed suit in countries such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Russia and Argentina. The U.S. Federal Reserve cut its federal funds policy rate 
by 50 basis points on August 17
th, 2007 and by a further 25 basis points on October 30
th, 2007.  
                                                 
43 By the end-March 2006, Iceland’s stock market had fallen 19.1 percent since reaching a peak on 
February 15, 2006; the Icelandic Krona had fallen 12 percent against the USD since end-2005; and the central 
bank raised interest rates by 75 basis points to 11.5 percent (more than doubled in the previous two years) in 
an attempt to head off a crisis of confidence (Financial Times 3/31/06).   
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Table 1: Data Sources 
 
Data Description Source Mnemonic
10yr Canada Benchmark DS Govt. Index (Redemption Yield) Datastream BMCN10Y(RY)
10yr Germany Benchmark DS Govt. Index (Redemption Yield) Datastream BMBD10Y(RY)
10yr Japan Benchmark DS Govt. Index (Redemption Yield) Datastream BMJP10Y(RY)
10yr USD Swap Rate (Semiannual fixed rate vs 3m LIBOR) Bloomberg USSW10 Index
30-day Fed Funds Futures - 3m ahead Bloomberg FF4 Comdty
BFV 10yr CAD Canada Corporate BBB Bond Yield Bloomberg C28810Y Index
BFV 10yr EUR Eurozone Industrial BBB Bond Yield Bloomberg C46810Y Index
BFV 10yr JPY Japan Industrial BBB Bond Yield Bloomberg C45410Y Index
BFV 10yr USD US Industrial BBB Bond Yield Bloomberg C00910Y Index
CBOE’s SPX Volatility Index Bloomberg VIX Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 1 Bloomberg ITRXEX01 Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 2 Bloomberg ITRXEX02 Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 3 Bloomberg ITRXEX03 Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 4 Bloomberg ITRXEX04 Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 5 Bloomberg ITRXEX05 Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 6 Bloomberg ITRXEX06 Index
iTRAXX Europe Crossover 10yr, series 7 Bloomberg ITRXEX07 Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Brazil Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMBR Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Bulgaria Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMBU Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Colombia Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMCO Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Composite Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPEMSOSD Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Ecuador Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMEC Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Mexico Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMME Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Panama Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMPA Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Peru Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMPE Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Phillipinnes Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMPH Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Russia Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMRU Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus South Africa Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMSA Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Turkey Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMTU Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Ukraine Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMUK Index
JP Morgan’s EMBI Plus Venezuela Sovereign Spread Bloomberg JPSSEMVE Index
Lehman Brothers Short Swaption Volatility Index (1m-6m) Bloomberg LBSPX Index
Yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 10-year, constant maturity Bloomberg H15T10Y Index



















Brazil 6.7 3.9 1.8 8.3 4.6 0.2 74.6
Bulgaria 2.0 1.7 0.5 2.9 1.7 12.3 79.0
Ecuador 3.6 2.4 0.5 3.6 2.4 0.8 86.8
Mexico 6.5 3.1 5.0 8.3 2.9 0.8 73.5
Panama 4.1 1.7 3.0 5.2 2.4 3.1 80.5
Peru 3.5 1.3 2.1 4.1 0.7 1.5 86.7
Russia 5.5 1.1 1.8 5.0 2.2 1.0 83.5
Venezuela 5.0 4.2 0.6 6.2 2.1 0.3 81.7
USA 0.9 11.1 1.2 2.2 0.2 4.1 80.2
Canada 0.5 1.0 2.1 0.8 0.6 2.8 92.1  
 
Table 3: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Russian Default / LTCM Bailout (1998) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 1295 558 737 10.8 7.9 2.6 17.0 3.3 -0.1 58.5
Bulgaria 1291 539 752 9.1 9.7 -1.1 11.4 2.0 -0.4 69.3
Ecuador 1871 774 1097 9.9 9.0 0.1 11.0 2.9 0.0 67.1
Mexico 912 416 496 11.4 7.6 2.9 17.3 2.9 0.0 58.0
Panama 601 339 262 11.6 6.3 5.1 15.7 3.0 -0.3 58.5
Peru 869 434 435 10.5 8.2 2.8 18.1 2.2 -0.2 58.4
Russia 4664 758 3906 5.4 3.8 1.8 6.6 1.8 0.1 80.5
Venezuela 1881 526 1355 4.7 5.7 -0.6 9.9 0.8 0.1 79.3
USA 143 92 50 7.9 -0.2 4.4 3.1 -0.3 -0.2 85.3
Canada 126 84 42 7.8 10.1 4.9 4.9 1.7 -0.1 70.6
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 4: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Brazil Devaluation (1999) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 1540 1140 401 9.8 5.2 -1.1 15.3 -1.7 0.0 72.5
Bulgaria 915 757 158 14.5 11.0 0.9 16.7 -1.9 -1.8 60.5
Ecuador 2066 1462 604 8.5 5.7 0.0 9.1 -0.7 0.0 77.5
Mexico 832 657 175 12.9 6.1 -1.6 18.5 -1.8 0.2 65.6
Panama 501 440 61 17.4 6.4 -4.0 21.8 -2.2 -0.9 61.5
Peru 739 573 165 9.8 5.4 -1.1 15.2 -0.6 -0.6 71.9
Russia 5516 5159 356 43.3 24.8 -8.7 54.2 -5.0 -5.8 -2.9
Venezuela 1504 1174 330 8.1 7.3 0.5 16.6 -1.8 0.4 68.8
USA 158 172 -14 -12.9 1.2 3.3 -4.3 -0.5 2.6 110.6
Canada 153 146 7 24.7 23.8 -6.2 15.1 -0.9 -6.5 50.0
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
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Table 5: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - NASDAQ Bubble Burst (2000) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 758 639 120 51.0 32.3 -2.0 4.0 -15.8 1.8 28.8
Bulgaria 767 568 199 25.7 24.0 -0.2 1.3 -5.3 1.3 53.2
Ecuador 3479 2778 701 37.8 30.2 -0.6 1.9 -12.1 0.4 42.5
Mexico 400 293 107 27.9 15.6 -1.4 2.3 -6.5 0.1 62.1
Panama 433 344 89 27.9 13.1 -1.8 1.4 -7.2 0.5 66.1
Peru 529 408 121 27.3 18.7 -1.7 2.2 -6.6 0.4 59.7
Russia 1323 1819 -496 -28.8 -18.7 1.6 -1.2 11.4 0.6 135.1
Venezuela 965 749 215 23.2 24.4 0.1 2.0 -1.6 -0.5 52.5
USA 188 158 30 19.0 -0.5 -1.9 0.4 0.7 0.4 82.0
Canada 187 174 13 42.7 50.5 -5.6 0.9 -11.1 1.9 20.7
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 6: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Turkish Crisis (2001) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 734 680 54 46.3 39.3 25.1 30.7 10.8 -0.8 -51.3
Bulgaria 774 677 96 22.3 31.7 -8.0 12.3 4.7 1.1 35.9
Ecuador 1261 1219 41 96.8 119.0 -1.1 51.2 18.1 0.1 -184.1
Mexico 418 380 38 33.6 28.9 20.3 26.6 7.5 -0.4 -16.5
Panama 470 448 22 50.4 35.2 54.1 32.1 10.7 0.2 -82.7
Peru 639 676 -37 -50.1 -50.8 -26.9 -31.1 -6.1 1.7 263.3
Russia 1064 1007 57 63.5 64.5 51.6 35.0 12.8 -1.1 -126.3
Venezuela 850 842 8 228.3 365.0 -79.7 211.3 59.4 2.5 -686.8
USA 201 190 11 24.0 -1.2 28.7 1.6 -1.6 0.1 48.4
Canada 235 230 5 56.6 106.1 77.5 20.3 8.0 -1.2 -167.4
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 7: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - September 11th (2001) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 1155 974 181 -59.5 -11.4 17.6 73.8 25.7 -0.6 54.3
Bulgaria 666 595 71 -79.7 -21.7 -15.5 79.8 24.1 -2.4 115.4
Ecuador 1534 1427 107 -134.0 -31.8 -0.8 121.3 59.5 -1.2 87.1
Mexico 408 352 56 -67.9 -11.8 20.6 84.0 23.4 -0.2 51.9
Panama 479 400 80 -40.4 -5.9 23.2 44.5 14.9 -0.2 63.9
Peru 663 608 56 -94.6 -18.9 28.3 125.6 30.1 -1.7 31.2
Russia 923 832 91 -102.6 -19.5 44.4 103.2 54.3 -1.1 21.4
Venezuela 1017 924 94 -70.6 -22.4 -13.0 117.7 10.3 0.5 77.5
USA 208 188 20 -37.8 0.3 26.4 10.6 -2.0 -1.0 103.4
Canada 219 199 21 -35.8 -12.0 28.6 18.9 12.5 -1.6 89.4






Table 8: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) – 
 Brazilian Elections / WorldCom Accounting Scandal (2002) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 1904 709 1195 19.0 -6.5 2.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 77.6
Bulgaria 366 349 17 345.9 -175.2 -39.8 105.0 1.7 -3.6 -134.0
Ecuador 1703 953 750 30.8 -13.1 -0.3 8.0 0.1 0.0 74.4
Mexico 375 227 148 35.5 -11.1 5.7 13.3 0.1 0.0 56.5
Panama 513 346 167 34.6 -8.5 10.0 10.5 0.1 -0.1 53.5
Peru 780 424 356 24.8 -8.9 3.7 9.8 0.1 0.0 70.6
Russia 565 432 134 72.9 -24.8 16.4 21.0 0.0 -0.2 14.8
Venezuela 1109 904 205 57.9 -34.4 -6.0 28.7 0.5 0.2 53.1
USA 174 194 -20 -66.3 -1.0 -23.7 -6.1 0.1 0.4 196.6
Canada 193 191 2 590.5 -358.1 223.5 84.3 -0.5 -6.5 -433.2
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 9: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Federal Funds Tightening (2003) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 697 531 166 22.5 9.9 -9.3 -18.1 0.6 -0.2 94.6
Bulgaria 179 156 23 39.9 24.9 11.6 -25.9 -0.2 -2.2 51.9
Ecuador 901 696 205 23.1 12.5 0.5 -13.3 1.2 -0.2 76.2
Mexico 215 176 39 30.3 11.9 -12.5 -24.3 0.2 0.0 94.5
Panama 367 332 34 45.3 14.9 -35.7 -31.9 1.4 -0.2 106.2
Peru 456 335 121 16.4 7.7 -6.5 -13.8 0.8 -0.1 95.6
Russia 302 243 60 29.7 13.1 -17.8 -19.2 2.5 -0.2 91.9
Venezuela 658 638 20 133.8 97.4 36.9 -147.6 -8.8 3.1 -14.7
USA 122 116 6 45.2 -1.0 -42.3 -7.7 0.3 -1.0 106.5
Canada 96 89 7 29.7 24.0 -28.8 -9.1 1.4 -0.9 83.8
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 10: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Ford/GM Downgrades (2004) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 450 394 56 49.6 7.9 -9.4 -11.0 1.5 -0.5 61.9
Bulgaria 88 65 23 19.5 4.9 2.9 -3.4 0.4 0.2 75.4
Ecuador 736 634 103 41.9 8.7 0.6 -7.1 2.0 0.0 53.8
Mexico 184 153 31 34.4 5.1 -6.4 -8.1 0.7 0.0 74.2
Panama 299 289 10 138.0 17.8 -49.6 -29.3 4.7 -0.7 19.2
Peru 241 233 8 167.2 30.9 -29.8 -39.9 6.9 -2.2 -33.1
Russia 194 183 11 115.4 19.6 -32.2 -21.5 6.8 -1.4 13.3
Venezuela 476 464 12 175.3 50.0 23.5 -54.9 -3.1 1.3 -92.1
USA 104 102 2 151.3 -0.8 -65.1 -5.9 0.4 -3.0 23.2
Canada 117 115 2 110.5 34.9 -52.8 -10.5 3.6 -5.7 20.0
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
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Table 11: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Turkish Crisis (2006) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 257 215 42 31.1 5.2 -4.0 8.2 -7.2 -0.5 67.3
Bulgaria 90 79 11 36.8 8.6 3.0 6.8 -5.9 -0.4 51.0
Ecuador 509 455 54 46.5 10.2 0.1 7.9 -10.4 -0.4 46.2
Mexico 138 117 21 31.8 5.1 -4.3 8.0 -5.8 -0.1 65.4
Panama 206 169 37 20.3 2.7 -4.9 4.2 -3.8 0.0 81.6
Peru 169 150 20 34.2 6.5 -4.7 10.2 -6.6 -0.7 61.1
Russia 121 99 22 29.0 4.8 -5.5 5.5 -8.1 -0.2 74.4
Venezuela 215 165 51 13.5 3.9 1.1 4.3 -0.8 0.1 78.0
USA 123 123 1 291.4 -2.2 -88.1 17.6 7.4 -7.8 -118.3
Canada 105 101 4 45.9 13.4 -15.3 4.5 -8.2 -2.2 62.0
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 12: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Chinese Correction (2007) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 196 182 14 49.0 -3.7 -1.0 47.0 16.1 -0.4 -7.1
Bulgaria 68 64 4 61.7 -5.2 0.8 45.7 13.7 0.8 -17.5
Ecuador 715 692 24 108.1 -7.6 0.0 74.0 35.9 -0.5 -109.9
Mexico 114 107 7 56.7 -3.8 -0.8 52.6 14.0 -0.7 -18.1
Panama 167 156 11 40.3 -2.4 -2.1 33.7 11.3 0.2 18.9
Peru 138 125 14 29.3 -1.8 -0.6 29.8 7.0 0.2 36.0
Russia 112 103 10 44.3 -2.6 -1.4 33.0 17.3 0.0 9.5
Venezuela 225 209 15 36.1 -3.5 0.4 44.8 4.2 0.1 17.8
USA 112 109 3 53.0 -0.6 -3.1 11.4 -1.8 0.8 40.3
Canada 118 118 0 -578.0 63.9 47.4 -264.9 -170.1 0.9 1000.8
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 13: Mean Spread Decomposition (1998-2007) - Subprime Mortgages Crisis (2007) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 167 136 31 15.8 11.5 -1.5 18.8 14.6 -0.5 41.3
Bulgaria 70 54 16 11.1 11.9 1.3 10.5 7.1 0.5 57.7
Ecuador 682 612 70 27.3 26.2 0.8 24.1 28.1 -0.7 -5.8
Mexico 99 70 29 9.2 6.2 -0.7 10.3 6.8 0.0 68.2
Panama 139 114 25 11.5 6.5 -2.1 12.0 9.6 0.0 62.6
Peru 126 95 31 8.8 7.4 -0.6 11.8 6.7 0.0 66.0
Russia 106 82 24 12.7 9.7 -1.9 12.3 15.5 -0.3 52.0
Venezuela 318 253 65 9.0 11.2 0.9 14.2 2.5 0.3 62.0
USA 135 126 8 18.6 -0.7 -4.2 4.8 -1.9 -1.1 84.6
Canada 124 125 -2 -76.9 -105.6 17.9 -38.8 -60.0 10.5 352.9



















Brazil 16.2 14.7 0.6 12.9 5.1 1.7 48.8
Bulgaria 0.7 3.6 1.9 6.8 2.3 2.4 82.3
Colombia 14.5 10.8 0.6 10.1 6.7 1.4 56.0
Ecuador 1.8 6.9 3.7 2.0 7.9 0.7 76.9
Egypt 0.5 2.7 1.2 6.2 1.5 0.9 87.0
Mexico 20.1 14.4 1.0 8.0 6.3 3.6 46.6
Panama 8.0 9.0 0.7 12.9 4.8 1.6 63.0
Peru 7.8 13.0 2.4 6.2 6.1 3.4 61.2
Philippines 15.1 12.2 1.6 8.2 4.0 1.7 57.0
Russia 7.1 10.1 1.6 8.2 3.4 1.3 68.3
South Africa 4.3 4.1 1.4 2.1 3.6 0.6 84.0
Turkey 9.7 12.2 1.6 6.8 1.8 2.3 65.5
Ukraine 7.7 5.8 3.7 6.2 4.0 0.5 72.0
Venezuela 3.8 9.8 1.5 10.9 6.4 1.3 66.3
USA 1.1 1.9 1.7 4.4 3.9 0.3 86.5
Canada 0.5 1.9 2.9 1.8 1.6 0.9 90.4
Japan 0.9 0.6 0.6 1.5 1.9 0.9 93.5
Eurozone 2.4 4.6 0.6 2.5 0.9 4.0 84.9  
 
Table 15: Mean Spread Decomposition (2004-2007) - Ford/GM Downgrades (2005) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 450 380 70 48.3 64.9 6.6 -12.7 0.0 -0.1 -7.1
Bulgaria 88 67 21 19.3 40.1 2.1 -5.9 -0.2 0.8 43.8
Colombia 402 341 61 75.1 76.6 6.7 -17.9 0.5 -0.1 -40.8
Ecuador 736 630 106 18.9 54.6 3.7 -8.3 0.8 0.8 29.5
Mexico 184 152 32 61.6 65.8 7.3 -9.2 0.1 -0.2 -25.4
Panama 299 280 19 135.1 165.2 9.1 -32.3 2.8 0.6 -180.5
Peru 241 230 11 168.0 340.3 -39.3 -68.8 9.1 -1.9 -307.5
Philippines 431 388 43 89.1 93.9 8.7 -23.6 2.0 0.7 -70.9
Russia 194 180 14 104.8 136.1 12.0 -36.9 3.7 0.3 -119.9
South Africa 109 91 17 47.9 72.2 13.3 -3.2 2.7 0.2 -33.0
Turkey 315 257 58 37.0 59.3 2.3 -7.2 0.1 0.6 7.9
Ukraine 203 175 28 74.1 75.6 -3.2 -16.9 3.6 0.9 -34.0
Venezuela 476 460 16 131.6 322.0 23.6 -85.5 1.3 6.9 -299.9
USA 104 103 1 258.4 148.3 -202.1 15.4 19.6 -4.0 -135.5
Canada 117 115 2 18.6 160.9 -10.5 -18.7 1.2 2.8 -54.3
Japan 27 26 1 -75.8 -13.8 18.7 6.5 0.4 1.3 162.7
Eurozone 78 66 12 25.4 46.1 -3.7 -3.8 0.5 1.0 34.4
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
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Table 16: Mean Spread Decomposition (2004-2007) - Turkish Crisis (2006) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 257 210 46 30.9 6.9 3.1 8.0 -6.0 0.6 56.6
Bulgaria 90 79 11 31.2 10.3 1.1 9.8 -7.0 -0.9 55.5
Colombia 223 161 62 29.4 4.3 1.9 7.3 -5.1 0.1 62.1
Ecuador 509 454 55 18.5 12.2 4.8 10.0 -20.1 -0.9 75.4
Mexico 138 117 21 53.7 8.6 3.7 8.4 -6.8 1.7 30.8
Panama 206 166 40 30.9 6.5 1.3 8.0 -8.5 -0.3 62.2
Peru 169 143 26 33.3 20.8 -4.7 20.0 -14.7 1.0 44.2
Philippines 250 193 57 29.6 5.2 1.6 7.6 -5.5 -0.1 61.7
Russia 121 98 23 29.3 6.2 2.2 10.9 -10.9 -0.1 62.4
South Africa 98 79 19 29.8 8.5 5.2 2.0 -16.4 -0.1 71.0
Turkey 255 171 84 14.6 4.8 0.4 3.1 -3.1 0.3 79.9
Ukraine 219 168 51 32.1 6.3 -1.6 8.1 -13.6 -0.3 69.1
Venezuela 215 163 52 11.8 5.3 1.7 8.9 -6.1 -0.2 78.7
USA 123 122 1 126.6 14.6 -74.9 -9.6 76.5 2.3 -35.6
Canada 105 101 4 7.7 11.8 -4.5 7.2 -13.0 -1.3 92.2
Japan 28 26 1 -23.9 -1.1 3.5 -3.5 -13.3 -0.2 138.5
Eurozone 106 99 7 47.2 15.9 -5.0 7.3 -10.7 -2.0 47.4
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
 
 
Table 17: Mean Spread Decomposition (2004-2007) - Chinese Correction (2007) 
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 196 180 17 80.3 9.6 -1.5 30.2 5.2 -1.0 -22.8
Bulgaria 68 64 4 77.4 14.9 1.2 36.6 6.9 4.5 -41.4
Colombia 180 166 14 132.7 9.2 -1.5 44.7 8.8 0.2 -94.2
Ecuador 715 687 29 60.7 18.2 -5.6 39.5 24.4 2.0 -39.3
Mexico 114 106 8 145.8 8.7 -1.2 30.5 7.7 1.1 -92.6
Panama 167 154 12 94.6 11.0 0.1 34.8 10.0 0.4 -51.0
Peru 138 122 16 54.1 11.8 3.3 33.4 7.0 -1.6 -8.0
Philippines 185 169 16 87.5 5.6 -0.1 29.8 6.5 0.5 -29.7
Russia 112 101 11 70.7 7.3 -0.4 33.7 8.7 0.5 -20.6
South Africa 76 75 1 463.9 61.3 -12.4 50.7 84.2 -1.0 -546.7
Turkey 238 218 20 77.1 10.5 0.6 21.6 5.5 1.4 -16.7
Ukraine 150 130 20 68.6 6.3 1.4 22.4 9.4 0.8 -9.0
Venezuela 225 210 15 52.3 11.3 -2.5 53.4 9.6 2.2 -26.4
USA 112 109 3 62.1 3.1 7.8 -5.4 -11.5 -1.7 45.7
Canada 118 118 0 196.5 155.2 74.9 397.2 215.2 50.4 -989.4
Japan 25 27 -2 23.6 0.3 -0.3 2.2 -4.4 -0.7 79.4
Eurozone 82 80 2 132.3 21.5 1.8 31.1 12.3 6.7 -105.6







Table 18: Mean Spread Decomposition (2004-2007) - Subprime Mortgages Crisis (2007)  
Actual Bench. F. Err. FF Def Liq Vol Int EM Idios
Brazil 167 134 32 31.8 42.3 1.3 7.8 10.3 0.1 6.3
Bulgaria 70 55 15 18.2 37.5 1.5 6.1 6.9 0.3 29.4
Colombia 131 104 27 43.8 47.9 1.0 11.9 13.3 -0.1 -17.9
Ecuador 682 610 72 22.7 65.1 -1.2 9.8 38.2 -0.6 -34.1
Mexico 99 70 29 29.8 31.8 1.4 4.7 6.0 0.1 26.2
Panama 139 112 27 34.1 44.3 1.1 8.4 15.6 -0.1 -3.4
Peru 126 95 31 24.3 51.6 -1.1 9.9 15.3 0.1 -0.2
Philippines 165 129 36 32.2 34.3 1.3 8.0 10.6 0.0 13.5
Russia 106 81 25 25.5 33.5 1.3 9.2 15.3 -0.1 15.2
South Africa 96 66 30 17.0 27.7 1.6 1.5 16.0 0.0 36.2
Turkey 195 172 24 50.5 81.2 2.1 9.6 17.4 -1.4 -59.3
Ukraine 154 94 60 19.3 19.3 0.3 4.5 13.0 0.1 43.5
Venezuela 318 248 70 15.8 37.8 0.4 10.4 11.9 -0.4 23.9
USA 135 127 8 25.6 16.0 -4.1 -2.0 -25.9 0.1 90.4
Canada 124 126 -2 -16.7 -162.8 -3.8 -18.9 -54.6 0.8 356.0
Japan 29 30 -1 84.4 19.0 -11.4 6.2 -74.6 -0.2 76.6
Eurozone 90 77 13 22.4 43.7 -1.1 3.6 8.7 -0.1 22.8
Spread Decomp. (bps) Forecast Error Decomposition (%)
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Chapter 7:  Summary and Conclusions 
 
1 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research examined the transmission of shocks across financial markets resulting from 
contagion and changes in investors risk appetite. As financial markets across the globe are 
increasingly becoming more integrated and intermingled in complex ways, contagion and 
global financial conditions more generally play a crucial role in the transmissions of shocks 
originated in a given market or country. Indeed, potentially systemic financial crises can be 
so costly that policy makers often intervene by bailing-out key financial institutions or 
relaxing monetary policy when there is a fear that contagion may spread financial crises. 
  There is a common presumption that financial crises are not alike as the triggers of 
crises differ, and the economic and institutional environments in which crises take place 
vary amongst countries. Recent triggers for crises include sovereign debt default (the 
Russian crisis in August 1998), risk management strategies (the near collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management, LTCM, in September 1998), sudden stops in capital flows 
(Brazil in early 1999), collapses of speculative bubbles (the dot-com crisis in 2000), 
inconsistencies between fundamentals and policy settings (as in Argentina in 2001) and a 
liquidity squeeze (associated with the pressure in the U.S. subprime mortgage market from 
mid-2007). These examples include countries with highly developed financial markets as 
well as a number of emerging markets. 
  The identification of shocks triggering a crisis is just one dimension to 
understanding financial crises. A second, and arguably more important dimension, is to 
identify the transmission mechanisms that propagate shocks from the source country across 
national borders and across financial markets. These links are emphasized in third 
generation crisis models, where channels over and above the market fundamental 
mechanisms that link countries and asset markets during noncrisis periods appear during a 
crisis. These additional linkages are broadly known as contagion. 
  During much of the 1990s, several famous crises episodes shaped the policy in a 
number of emerging markets: from Latin America to Asia to Eastern Europe. The crises 
during  1998 were particularly important as Russia defaulted on its foreign debt  






obligations, while the shock was felt and propagated in mature economies. The near-
collapse and bail-out of a highly leveraged hedged fund, Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), was a key factor in spreading shocks globally during the fall of 1998.  Although 
other episodes of financial distress occurred in subsequent years (notably the financial 
problems in Brazil during the first part of 1999 which appears to have been largely a result 
of contagion from the Russian and LTCM crises), financial crises have been fairly 
infrequent and largely contained within national borders since the Argentinean crisis in 
2001. Some bouts of instability were evident during the spring and summer of 2006, when 
Iceland and Turkey faced a financial stress, and in late-February 2007 when China’s 
Shanghai stock exchange experienced a significant correction. However, these recent 
episodes are generally viewed as seemingly idiosyncratic and relatively innocuous from the 
perspective of contagion in global financial markets. The vast academic literature that was 
sparked by the key episodes of financial crises in Latin America in 1994-1995, the Asian 
crisis in 1996, and the Russian crisis in 1998, has been fairly subdued in recent years as no 
major regional or global crisis has been evident in recent years. That is, until mid-2007 
when a financial crises of apparent global proportions re-appeared, for the first time since 
late-1998.  
  The current setting following the U.S. subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis that 
began in mid-2007 has brought a renewed interest in financial crises. In the past, financial 
crises used to be thought as a characterization reserved for developing countries. Recent 
developments show that mature economies are not exempt. Furthermore, there is a new 
urgency in understanding the financial crises of the past so that the financial crises of the 
future can be anticipated and, hopefully, mitigated pre-emptively. Events during the second 
half of 2007 serve as a useful reminder that global financial crises are far from having 
become events from the past. Indeed, financial crises are far from being fully understood as 
crises often have different triggers and propagation mechanisms. Against this background, 
the research in this thesis attempts to address some of the key issues emerging from the key 
episodes of financial crises in the past decade. 
  This latest financial crisis was sparked by the softening in the U.S. housing market 
in recent years, and which led to a certain segment of the U.S. mortgage market deemed to  





be particularly risky because of the characteristics of the borrowers (e.g., self-employed, 
with limited income verification, etcetera), the “subprime” mortgages, defaulting in large 
numbers. What started as a seemingly idiosyncratic and market-specific crisis driven by 
problems in the subprime mortgage market in the United States during the spring and early 
summer of 2007, quickly led to defaults of financial institutions in other countries such as 
Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The stress in financial markets was also felt in 
various measures of volatility and illiquidity in a number of global financial markets. 
  The policy interest in understanding financial crises is clear as contagion can play a 
key role in spreading globally what would have been otherwise, in  the absence of 
contagion, contained idiosyncratic episodes of financial stress. Thus, contagion effects can 
lead to systemic financial crises. Indeed, the results in this thesis suggest that in the past 
decade there have been two episodes of  significant contagion across markets and national 
boundaries: the Russian/Long-Term Capital Management  (LTCM) crisis in 1998 and the 
2007 U.S. subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis. 
  These two episodes during 1998 and 2007 were, in many respects, different. But in 
some respects they also shared some similarities. Thus, in 1998, the trigger was a default 
event as the Russian government became unable to service its sovereign bonds. The 
Russian economy had been affected by growing economic imbalances in the aftermath of 
the end of the communist rule in the early 1990s. Investors who had positioned themselves 
heavily in the Russian market by earning high returns, such as the hedge fund LTCM, 
faced resulting losses. This episode may not have been that different from previous periods 
of financial crises, such as Mexico in 1994 or Thailand in 1996, except for the fact that 
financial innovation had brought into the scene highly leveraged hedge funds with 
positions in different markets across the globe. Indeed, LTCM was one of the largest highly 
leveraged hedge funds that existed in 1998. The Russian shock led LTCM to rebalance its 
global portfolio in the aftermath of the initial default shock and, in a rush to rebuild capital-
asset ratios, to deleverage its position elsewhere. The threat coming from the LTCM for the 
U.S. economy and the fear of “fire” asset sales were perceived to be so large that the U.S. 
New York Federal Reserve orchestrated the bail out of LTCM among a number of creditor 
banks. Furthermore, the U.S. Federal Reserve lowered interest rates quite aggressively in 
three steps during a period of a few weeks in an effort to stem what was perceived as the  






risk of a liquidity crunch in the aftermath of the unwinding of the leveraged financial 
positions by LTCM and possibly other financial institutions with similar exposures. There 
was intense contagion across global markets during those few weeks, but the policy 
reaction to inject liquidity made the episode be rapidly contained. 
  The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis during the first part of 2007 also began by a 
shock, this time by the realization that the housing market in the United States had become 
overvalued and a correction was impending. At first, during the spring of 2007, this shock 
was largely contained and largely reflected only financial instruments that had benefited 
from the hereto increase in property prices. But by mid-July 2007, there was a rush by 
credit rating agencies to re-evaluate the credit risk of various institutions and financial 
instruments, even those that up until then were assumed to be rated investment grade. As a 
result, it became clear that the shock was no longer contained within the riskiest sector of 
the mortgage market dubbed to be “subprime”. Indeed, at that point various financial 
institutions and banks began to reveal their losses resulting from bets on property values. 
Conduits established by banks as off-balance entities began to face funding liquidity 
pressures as their asset-backed-commercial paper (ABCP) programs began not to be rolled 
over by investors. This led to uncertainty about the risks in the overall financial system, 
leading to hoarding of liquid in the financial system. The monetary authorities in Europe, 
the United States and the United Kingdom intervened aggressively by providing liquidity 
to the financial markets beginning in August 9
th 2007. The policy actions seemed to have 
modest success in reducing liquidity strains in the interbank market until a program of 
coordinated action among the three central banks was launched in mid-December 2007. 
Even so, global liquidity strains led to concerns about the solvency of many of the globally 
systematically important large complex financial institutions. These events were still 
unfolding at the time of the writing of this thesis. Many lessons are still to be gathered, but 
some can be already deduced after examining the various episodes of financial stress in 
modern times. This thesis is one attempt to do so. 
  The thesis begins by unifying the commonalities among what up until now seem to 
be “different” approaches in the empirical literature of contagion. This analysis and 
empirical survey is presented in Chapter 2. Typically, most references to contagion are   





made rather loosely, often failing to distinguish between normal asset-market linkages and 
the extreme co-movements that may exist only during periods of stress. In the empirical 
literature, existing research  focuses primarily on the presence of contagion, while  
measuring the extent of contagion has received little attention. Furthermore, most studies 
focus on a single asset class across countries—often via some form of correlation 
analysis—despite  our expectation that different asset markets, domestic or otherwise, are 
linked by a pool of global investors. This chapter clarifies the concepts and shows that 
some of the main strains in the literature are actually special cases of a more generally 
unifying framework.  
  The thesis then proceeds in Chapter 3 to examine contagion effects during the past 
decade in a number of episodes of financial stress first for the case of global bond markets. 
Novel in this approach is that emerging markets and mature economies are considered to be 
part of the global financial setting from which international investors transfer their assets. 
Most of the literature on contagion, and indeed on financial crises, has been devoted 
exclusively to emerging economies. In contrast, the approach in this thesis is to model 
global financial flows which have in common the fact that international investors are 
increasingly able to shift positions across the globe. In this chapter, it was found that 
contagion did exist during 1998 and that Brazil’s financial crisis in early 1999 was likely 
the fallout of that contagion.  
  Chapter 4 then extends the analysis to global equity markets across a number of key 
emerging markets and mature economies. Again, the results seem to confirm similar 
findings.
1 
  The subsequent chapters expand the data set to encompass the most recent episodes 
of financial stress, some of which were still ongoing at the time of writing. Thus, the 
Turkish crisis in the spring of 2006, the Chinese stock market meltdown in February 2007 
and the U.S. supbrime mortgage and liquidity squeeze crisis that began in the summer of 
2007 are also examined. In addition, Chapter 5 expands the analysis and it analyzes jointly 
bond and equity markets for a number of emerging markets and mature economies. The 
                                                 
1 Versions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have been recently published in refereed economics journals. See Dungey, 
M., R. Renée Fry, B.González-Hermosillo, and V. Martin, (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007a).  






analysis is based on daily data, comprising nearly a decade of observations (1998-2007) 
during which a number of modern financial crises occurred. The results confirm that the 
Russian/LTCM episode of financial stress in 1998 was associated with important 
contagious channels to other markets in the rest of the world. Moreover, it is found that the 
crises episodes after 1998 largely lacked this characteristic of spreading contagion across 
the world. However, contagious effects returned with vehemence during mid-2007 during 
the U.S. subprime mortgage and liquidity crisis. Both episodes of contagious effects (the 
fall of 1998 and mid-2007) occurred largely through bond markets and both of them 
involved stress in the financial markets of mature economies. This  latter observation raises 
the possibility that the risk appetite of international investors, who are key players in major 
global financial centers, may play a role in the transmission of shocks across markets and 
countries. 
  In order to investigate this possibility formally, Chapter 6 empirically examines the 
role that international investors’ risk appetite, through changes in global financial market 
conditions, may have played in transmitting shocks across markets during the various 
crises periods of the past decade. The data examined is daily, based on the bond spreads of 
sovereign bonds in developing countries and investment-grade bonds issued by BBB 
corporations in mature economies. Indeed, the results suggest that contagious effects are 
essentially no longer existent after controlling for the role of shifts in investors’ risk 
appetite in response to changes in global financial market conditions. The results in 
Chapter 6 suggest that contagion essentially dissappears when identifying the actual 
channels of spillovers.  
  Some of the key conclusions that emerge from this research are the following: First, 
after examining the various episodes of financial stress across the past decade, it is found 
that the crises which generated the most contagion are the 1998 Russian/LTCM and the 
2007 U.S. subprime crises, both of which began in credit markets and spread to stock 
markets.  Second, once global financial market factors are explicitly considered as factors 
influencing investors’ risk appetite, contagion from emerging markets is very small or 
essentially not existent. This finding appears to be at odds with some of the results in the 
empirical literature of contagion. The literature on contagion examines the links that exist  





over and above the market fundamental mechanisms that link countries and asset markets 
during noncrisis periods, which only appear during a crisis. However, the empirical 
literature on contagion does not in fact identify exactly how these additional channels are 
formed during periods of stress. One potential channel of contagion is that shocks in any 
given market may impact international investors’ risk appetite through their rebalancing of 
portfolios or simply by a revised set of expectations. In effect, international investors’ risk 
appetite appears to be a key channel producing contagion across global financial markets. 
Finally, this research shows that contagion can be important in transmitting shocks across 
markets and countries. In an increasingly integrated global financial market, contagion can 
affect both developing countries and mature economies. International investors’ risk 
appetite can be an important conduit of that contagion.  
  In sum, this thesis develops an empirical methodology to examine financial market 
spillovers and quantifying the contribution of  contagion during various critical episodes. 
As well, the role of international investors’ risk appetite as a propagating mechanism for 
contagion is examined explicitly.  
  Recent events bring a renewed urgency for the need to understand the financial 
crises of the past, so that we can anticipate the crises of the future and perhaps be able to 
act pre-emptively to avoid the recurrence of systemic shocks sparked by contagion. Future 
research needs to examine further how liquidity shocks may transmit across markets and 
countries, particularly in the current context of complex financial instruments. Finally, the  
analysis in this thesis should be also helpful in elaborating a framework to assess global 
financial stability, another area for future research, as investors’ risk appetite may play an 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Dit onderzoek analyseert de rol van besmetting in het zenden van schokken doorheen 
markten. Een van de mogelijke geleidingsbanen voor besmetting is een zich wijzigende zin voor 
risico van internationale investeerders. Het doel van dit onderzoek is de empirische literatuur over 
besmetting onder de loep te nemen en een methodologie voor benadering van de huidige hiaten in de 
literatuur voor te stellen. Het onderzoeksprogramma bestudeert een aantal financiële crisissen over de 
voorbije tien jaar op basis van dagelijkse financiële gegevens voor een representatieve groep van 
ontwikkelingslanden en rijpe economieën
1. 
Het belang van een beleid op dit gebied is duidelijk, gezien besmetting een belangrijke rol 
kan spelen in een wereldwijd spreiden van wat anders, bij afwezigheid van besmetting, beheerste 
idiosyncratische episodes van financiële spanning zouden geweest zijn. Besmetting kan dus 
systematische financiële crisissen veroorzaken. Inderdaad, beleidsmakers hebben bijna steeds op 
typische wijze tussengekomen, door financiële instellingen uit de nood te helpen of het monetaire 
beleid te versoepelen wanneer episodes van financiële spanning tengevolge van besmetting dreigden 
systematisch te worden. Het onderzoek werd georganiseerd rond vijf afzonderlijke hoofdstukken die 
de verschillende aspecten van dit probleem analyseren
2. 
Hoofdstuk 1 leidt het onderwerp in met een overzicht van de daaropvolgende hoofdstukken. 
Hoofdstuk 2 bekijkt kritisch de hoofdthema’s in de actuele empirische literatuur over besmetting, met 
het doel blijkbaar ongerelateerde benaderingen die tot nu toe als een wijze tot onderzoek van 
financiële besmetting werden voorgesteld met elkaar te verzoenen. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de rol van 
besmetting in de obligatiemarkten in een aantal ontwikkelingslanden en rijpe economieën gedurende 
diverse periodes van financiële crisis onderzocht. Men heeft vastgesteld dat besmetting duidelijk 
merkbaar was gedurende het najaar van 1998 in de Russische crisis wanneer het Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) hedge fund bijna ineenstortte. Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de rol van besmetting in 
een aantal opkomende markten en rijpe economieën, doch gesteund op hun aandelenmarkten. 
Gelijkaardige uitwerkingen als deze die de Russische/LTCM crisis op andere economieën 
                                                 
1  Onderzocht in González-Hermosillo, Brenda, (2007a), “Spillovers and Contagion in International Capital 
Markets”, IMF Institute Courier, Washington D.C., Vol. 13. 
2 Hoofstukken 2, 3, 4 en 5 zijn deels een gezamenlijk werk met Mardi Dungey (Cambridge University), 





veroorzaakte worden vastgesteld. Versies van hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 werden onlangs in de 
aangehaalde economische tijdschriften of boeken
3 gepubliceerd. 
De daaropvolgende hoofdstukken breiden de gegevensset uit om de recentste periodes van 
financiële spanning behandelen, waarvan sommige op het ogenblik van opstellen van deze publicatie 
nog aan de gang waren. Aldus worden eveneens de Turkse crisis in het voorjaar van 2006, de 
instorting van de Chinese beurs in februari 2007 en de crisis van de subprime-hypotheken en 
contantenschaarste van de Verenigde Staten die in de zomer van 2007 begon onderzocht.  
Bovendien wordt in hoofdstuk 5 de analyse uitgebreid en worden in de literatuur voor de 
eerste maal de obligatiemarkten èn aandelenmarkten voor een aantal opkomende markten en rijpe 
economieën gezamenlijk onderzocht. Het opzet is dagelijkse gegevens uit observaties over een 
periode van bijna tien jaar (1998-2007) gedurende dewelke een aantal moderne financiële crisissen 
zich voordeden te behandelen. De resultaten bevestigen dat de Russische/LTCM episode van 
financiële spanning in 1998 samenhing met belangrijke besmettingskanalen voor andere markten in 
de rest van de wereld. Men stelde eveneens vast dat de crisisperiodes na 1998 dit kenmerk van 
spreiden van besmetting doorheen de wereld praktisch niet vertoonden. Nochtans kwam besmetting 
midden 2007 gedurende de crisis van de subprime-hypotheken en contantenschaarste in de Verenigde 
staten met alle heftigheid terug opduiken. Beide besmettingsepisodes (najaar 1998 en midden 2007) 
deden zich voornamelijk voor via obligatiemarkten en beiden hadden betrekking op spanning in de 
financiële markten van rijpe economieën. Deze laatste observatie schijnt erop te wijzen dat zin voor 
risico van internationale investeerders die tevens hoofdfiguren in de voornaamste wereldwijde 
financiële zijn misschien een rol in het zenden van schokken doorheen markten en landen kan spelen. 
Om deze mogelijkheid formeel te onderzoeken bestudeert hoofdstuk 6 empirisch de rol die 
zin voor risico van internationale investeerders, wegens toestandswijzigingen in de wereldwijde 
financiële markten, over de laatste tien jaren in het zenden van schokken doorheen de markten 
gedurende de diverse crisisperiodes zou kunnen hebben gespeeld. De onderzochte gegevens zijn 
                                                 
3 Dungey, Mardi, Renée Fry, Brenda González-Hermosillo, en Vance Martin, (2005a), “A Comparison of 
Alternative Tests of Contagion with Applications,” hoofdstuk 3 in Identifying International Financial 
Contagion: Progress and Challenges, uitgegeven door M. Dungey and D. Tambakis, Oxford University Press, 
New York; 
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dagelijkse gegevens, gesteund op de spreiding van staatsobligaties in ontwikkelingslanden en 
obligaties van investeerkwaliteit uitgegeven door gerenommeerde vennootschappen in rijpe 
economieën. Inderdaad, de resultaten schijnen aan te duiden dat er praktisch geen besmetting meer 
bestaat nadat de rol van wijzigingen in de lust voor risico van investeerders als reactie op de 
wijzigende toestanden in de wereldwijde financiële markten werd beheerst. 
Hoofdstuk 7 besluit met een aantal gevolgtrekkingen uit dit onderzoek en stelt een aantal 
domeinen voor toekomstige studie voor. Hierna volgen enkele van de hoofdbesluiten uit dit 
onderzoek: 
  Vooreerst werd na onderzoek van de diverse episodes van financiële spanning over de 
voorbije tien jaar vastgesteld dat de Russische/LTCM-crisis van 1998 en de subprimecrisis 
van de Verenigde Staten in 2007 de meeste besmetting veroorzaakten. Beide crisissen 
begonnen in de kredietmarkten en spreidden zich uit naar de beurzen.  
  Ten tweede, eens dat de factoren van de wereldwijde financiële markten uitdrukkelijk 
beschouwd worden als factoren die de zin voor risico van de investeerders beïnvloeden, is 
besmetting van opkomende markten zeer gering of nagenoeg onbestaand. Deze bevinding 
lijkt tegenstrijdig te zijn met sommige resultaten in de empirische literatuur over besmetting. 
De literatuur over besmetting onderzoekt de buiten de fundamentele marktmechanismen 
bestaande verbanden die landen en vermogensmarkten gedurende de periodes zonder crisis 
verbinden en die zich enkel gedurende een crisis manifesteren. Maar in feite bepaalt de 
empirische literatuur over besmetting niet precies hoe deze bijkomende kanalen gedurende 
periodes van spanning worden gevormd. Een mogelijk kanaal van besmetting is dat schokken 
in een bepaalde markt eventueel een invloed kunnen hebben op de zin voor risico van 
internationale investeerders, die zich uit via herschikking van hun portefeuilles of 
eenvoudigweg herziening van hun verwachtingen. Inderdaad, zin voor risico van 
internationale investeerders blijkt een belangrijk kanaal in het veroorzaken van besmetting 
doorheen de wereldwijde financiële markten te zijn. 
  Tenslotte toont dit onderzoek aan dat besmetting belangrijk kan zijn in het zenden van 
schokken doorheen markten en landen. In een steeds meer geïntegreerde wereldwijde 
financiële markt kan besmetting zowel ontwikkelingslanden als rijpe economieën treffen. Zin 
voor risico van internationale investeerders kan een belangrijke geleidingsbaan van deze 
besmetting zijn. 
 